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USE YOUR ILLUSION:  
THE FLASH-LAG EFFECT AS A TOOL FOR PSYCHOPHYSICS 
Summary 
 
The flash-lag effect is an illusion in which a moving object is perceived advanced 
beyond an aligned flash. The majority of research into the effect has been directed at 
specifying its source, though a small body of literature simply makes use of flash-lag to 
answer diverse questions about perception – without necessarily arbitrating between 
competing accounts of its nature. The current thesis expands on this little-explored 
potential of the flash-lag effect with the presentation of three papers reporting 
programmes of research that exploit the phenomenon to address issues unrelated to its 
cause. In the first paper it is shown that, like in visual flash-lag, a similar motion 
direction based anisotropy is evident in the motor version of the effect, in which one’s 
unseen limb is perceived ahead of a flash. Specifically, the effect is greater for motion 
towards, rather than away from fixation. Furthermore, Paper I also demonstrates for the 
first time a motor flash-drag effect, in which one’s unseen moving hand ‘drags’ the 
perceived position of a nearby flash. It is argued that both of these findings are evidence 
of parallels between vision and action systems. Paper II takes advantage of the 
explicitly perceptual nature of the flash-lag effect to investigate whether the visuospatial 
perception of threatening objects is different to that of non-threatening objects. It is 
ultimately shown that when a moving stimulus is threatening, the flash-lag effect is 
greater, regardless of its direction of motion. Paper III shows that gamma movement 
(the apparent contraction of disappearing stimuli) adds to and subtracts from the 
forward displacement of contracting and expanding stimuli, respectively. Prior to these 
papers, however, an overview chapter reviews the flash-lag literature, and argues that 
the effect can be a useful tool for psychophysics, even without a consensus on its origin. 
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Thesis overview 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This overview chapter aims to place the research reported in the remainder of the thesis 
within a coherent framework. While the great majority of work on the flash-lag effect is 
aimed at arbitrating between explanations of its cause, the experiments described herein 
are held together by their mutual circumvention of the topic. As such, lengthy 
arguments in favour of one or the other account will not be presented, though the debate 
may come up from time to time as a side issue. Instead, it will be claimed that flash-lag 
can be a powerful tool in the arsenal of psychophysicists, with or without reference to 
its underlying nature. More specifically, it will be highlighted that one can use it to 
distinguish between retinal and perceptual positioning, or else to make predictions and 
draw conclusions about differences in its magnitude between conditions. These two 
perspectives are derived from digesting a small subsection of research that uses the 
effect in one of these ways, and focuses only indirectly on the flash-lag debate. To date, 
this literature has received scant attention, and certainly no overarching review. After 
such a treatment, a summary will be given of the research communicated in the three 
papers of this thesis, and it will be highlighted that they embody this same approach of 
using flash-lag to scrutinise unrelated issues. Prior to this, however, the flash-lag effect 
will be introduced, with special attention given to its diversity across modalities, and 
then coverage of some of the more prominent theories put forward to explain it shall 
follow. 
 
 
1.1.1 The flash-lag effect and its diversity 
 
It has long been known that a flash, aligned for an instant with a moving stimulus, is 
perceived to lag behind it (for an historical overview, see Maus, Khurana, & Nijhawan, 
2010). A prominent early example of this phenomenon came from MacKay (1958), who 
produced a motion percept by applying intermittent pressure to observers’ eyeballs 
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while they viewed a room containing several continuously lit objects. Each press of the 
eye made the continuously visible stimuli seem to move, while the rest of the room was 
lit stroboscopically, and appeared to remain relatively static and lagging behind. This 
illusion occurred in spite of subjects’ knowledge that the sources of the external stimuli 
were not changing in position relative to one another. Interest in this basic phenomenon 
was reignited by Nijhawan (1994), who showed subjects a rotating luminous bar, with 
end segments that were occasionally flashed for 5ms. The percept at the time of each 
flash was of the continuously visible section being rotated beyond the briefly presented 
sections, despite their physical alignment. Nijhawan (1994) named this illusion the 
flash-lag effect and it has since been of considerable interest to vision scientists. Figure 
1.1 shows an example of another type of flash lag display, in which two translating bars 
appear ahead of a flash aligned between them. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1. The flash-lag effect: Flashes physically aligned with moving stimuli appear 
to lag behind them. 
 
 
Flash-lag has now been replicated extensively and demonstrated to occur with diverse 
kinds of stimuli (for reviews, see Hubbard, 2014; Krekelberg & Lappe, 2001; Maus et 
al., 2010; Nijhawan, 2002; Schlag & Schlag-Rey, 2002; Whitney, 2002). Notably, it has 
been shown that the display need not necessarily comprise of moving and flashed visual 
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components, per se. For instance, Sheth, Nijhawan, and Shimojo (2000) showed that the 
flash-lag effect occurs when the ‘moving’ stimulus is actually static in space, but varies 
continuously in a feature dimension over time. In the first of their experiments, a 
coloured disk changed gradually from green to red, or from red to green while its 
position in space was held constant. As the disk transitioned through colour space, 
another coloured disk was flashed adjacent to it. Here it was found that the flashed disk 
needed to be approximately 400ms’ worth of colour-change ahead in order to be 
perceived as the same. Further experiments revealed similar (though smaller) effects 
with spatially static stimuli that changed continuously in luminance, spatial frequency, 
and pattern entropy (Sheth et al., 2000). In light of previous work on flash-lag, the 
broadest implication of these findings is that the illusion is not limited to stimuli that 
change in spatial dimensions, but also occurs when something is varying in a feature 
dimension.  
 
Other researchers have shown that the flash-lag effect even occurs in non-visual stimuli. 
Alais and Burr (2003), for example, had a source of constant auditory white noise move 
(invisibly) through space near to their subjects, and presented a brief white noise burst 
at some offset in the middle of the trajectory. Comparable to the standard visual flash-
lag effect, the burst was perceived to lag behind the position of the moving auditory 
stimulus. Also, reminiscent of Sheth et al. (2000), it was shown in a separate experiment 
by Alais and Burr (2003) that when the time-varying stimulus changed in feature space 
(pitch, in this case), it was perceived to lead the instantaneous value of the ‘flashed’ 
stimulus.  
 
A final example of the diversity of flash-lag, which is given more treatment in the first 
of the three papers that make up this thesis, comes from Nijhawan and Kirschfeld 
(2003). These authors found that if one holds a rod, and moves it side-to-side through 
space in complete darkness, a small flash of light presented in alignment with the end of 
the rod is perceived to lag behind it. That is, the felt position of the subject’s rod (and, 
by extension, their hand) is perceived ahead of an aligned flash. This was described as a 
‘motor’ flash-lag effect, since the only input regarding the changing position of the rod 
in space could come from a combination of efferent motor commands and afferent 
proprioception. 
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We have seen so far that the flash-lag effect is not limited to visual motion through 
space, and also occurs in motor (Nijhawan & Kirschfeld, 2003) and auditory (Alais & 
Burr, 2003) space, as well as in visual (Sheth et al., 2000) and auditory (Alais & Burr, 
2003) feature dimensions. Whatever mechanism it is that underpins the flash-lag effect, 
it appears to be guided by a general perceptual principle. We turn now to the debate 
regarding the mechanisms that produce the flash-lag effect. 
 
 
1.1.2 What causes the flash-lag effect? 
 
1.1.2.1 Visual prediction 
 
Accompanying the flash-lag effect’s rediscovery, Nijhawan (1994) put forth an 
explanation, claiming that the misalignment reflected the workings of a perceptual 
mechanism that compensated for sensory transmission delays (Nijhawan, 1994). This 
account starts with the uncontroversial proposal that, without compensation, the time 
taken for retinal input to reach perception should mean that the percept of a moving 
object will lag behind its true position in space. However, more radical is the 
subsequent claim that one or more mechanisms – perhaps at multiple levels of the 
nervous system – reduce this physical-perceptual discrepancy by using the prior 
trajectory of a moving stimulus in order to predict its future state (e.g., Nijhawan & Wu, 
2009; Nijhawan, 1994, 2002, 2008). By estimating the position the moving object 
should occupy, it is suggested that neural delays can be at least partially cancelled out in 
the process of perception. This would allow organisms to interact effectively with 
moving objects by seeing them close to their real-world locations (Nijhawan, 1994). On 
this view, then, the flash-lag effect occurs because the percept of a predictably time-
varying stimulus is more up-to-date than that of an unpredictable flash, which is subject 
to a necessary delay. The difference between the position of the flash and the 
extrapolated position of the moving stimulus is the flash-lag effect. 
 
Two broad findings with so-called ‘half-cycle’ displays represent the principal 
difficulties for the visual prediction account (Nijhawan, 2002). Firstly, in the flash-
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initiated cycle, when the initial appearance of the moving stimulus coincides with the 
flash, the flash-lag effect is undiminished (Khurana & Nijhawan, 1995; Nijhawan, 
Watanabe, Khurana, & Shimojo, 2004; Nijhawan, 1992; Watanabe, 2004). If a moving 
object’s position is predicted on the basis of its prior trajectory, it seems on face value 
that this display, in which the moving object has no pre-flash history, should result in no 
flash-lag. Secondly, in the flash-terminated cycle, when the flash occurs at the moment 
the moving stimulus disappears, no flash-lag is observed (Eagleman & Sejnowski, 
2000a; Nijhawan, 1992; Whitney, Murakami, & Cavanagh, 2000). This is awkward for 
the visual prediction account because it would be expected that an unpredictable 
cessation of motion should result in a perceptual overshoot of the extrapolated moving 
stimulus. Further, in accordance with both of these findings, when the moving object 
changes direction at the time of the flash, it does not overshoot the change-point, but is 
forwardly shifted in the post-flash direction (Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000a; Whitney, 
Murakami, et al., 2000; Whitney & Murakami, 1998). In response to finding a flash-lag 
in the flash-initiated cycle, Nijhawan and colleagues have defended the visual 
prediction model, arguing that the processes underlying it could set up an extrapolation 
very rapidly (Khurana & Nijhawan, 1995; Nijhawan, 2008; Shi & Nijhawan, 2012). 
Indeed, if this process were complete significantly before either stimulus was registered 
in perception, it would explain why the moving stimulus is perceived ahead of the flash 
even when both appear simultaneously. To address the lack of a flash-lag effect in the 
flash-terminated cycle, it has been claimed that highly salient motion offset signals 
might correct for the extrapolations of recently halted stimuli (Nijhawan, 2008). This 
perspective suggests that there is no flash-terminated flash-lag because the ongoing 
position prediction applied to the representation of a moving stimulus is interrupted and 
backwardly masked by a strong offset transient signal. A series of studies have 
supported this proposition by showing that reducing the salience of motion offset 
transient signals leads to previously unobserved forward shifts of motion endpoints 
(Maus & Nijhawan, 2006, 2008, 2009; Shi & Nijhawan, 2012). For example, forward 
displacements are seen when the moving stimulus is made to fade out before 
disappearing (Maus & Nijhawan, 2006), when it moves into the blind spot (Maus & 
Nijhawan, 2008), or when it is either dim or blue and moves into the central fovea, 
which is insensitive to such stimulation (Shi & Nijhawan, 2012). The visual prediction 
account thus remains on the table in spite of the results from the flash-initiated and 
flash-terminated cycles. 
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1.1.2.2 Motion averaging and postdiction 
 
Two other explanations have their own, somewhat similar account of the flash-initiated 
and flash-terminated results. According to the temporal averaging model, the perceived 
position of a moving object equates to its mean position sampled over a period of time 
(Krekelberg & Lappe, 1999, 2000a, 2000b; Lappe & Krekelberg, 1998). The position of 
the visibly persisting flash is similarly averaged, though since it does not move, its 
mean location is somewhere behind that of the moving stimulus. Slightly different is the 
postdiction account, which agrees that position signals are averaged over time, but 
contends that the salience of the flash resets the averaging process (Eagleman & 
Sejnowski, 2000a, 2007). Once the averaging process is complete, the percept is said to 
be “postdicted to the time of the flash” (Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000, p. 2038). This 
explanation could therefore be seen as the opposite of the visual prediction account 
outlined above, since the suggestion is that future events bias the perception of earlier 
events, rather than the other way around. The suggestion is, then, that the pre-flash 
trajectory has no impact on the perception of flash-lag. Both the temporal averaging and 
postdiction accounts sit well with the flash-initiated and flash-terminated results 
because they allow for post-flash events to affect the percept of the flash relative to the 
moving stimulus. 
 
These positions, however, are not without their difficulties. Take for instance, that both 
accounts suggest that the forward displacement of a moving stimulus depends on its 
position comparison with a flash. It has been shown subsequently, however, that 
forward displacements can occur without comparison flashes, both in perception (Fu, 
Shen, & Dan, 2001; Maus & Nijhawan, 2006, 2008, 2009; Shi & Nijhawan, 2012), and 
in retinal physiology (Berry, Brivanlou, Jordan, & Meister, 1999). These displays 
produced forward shift effects despite the lack of a flashed stimulus to either persist in 
vision (as claimed by temporal averaging) or reset motion integration (as claimed by 
postdiction). Furthermore, Nijhawan (2002, 2008) has noted that both of these 
spatiotemporal integration theories argue that the neural delay for the moving and 
flashed stimuli are the same. The issue here is that for both stimuli to arrive in 
perception at the same time, and for the flash-lag effect to occur, the moving stimulus 
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should be perceived to speed up around the time of the flash – a phenomenon that has 
not been observed (Nijhawan, 2002).  
 
 
1.1.2.3 Differential latencies 
 
A third perspective argues, like visual prediction, that the flash-lag effect occurs 
because the moving object’s representation is more up-to-date than that of the flash, but 
due to a ‘passive’ difference in perceptual latency, instead of an ‘active’ prediction 
process (Kafaligönül, Patel, Öğmen, Bedell, & Purushothaman, 2010; Öğmen, Patel, 
Bedell, & Camuz, 2004; Patel, Öğmen, Bedell, & Sampath, 2000; Purushothaman, 
Patel, Bedell, & Öğmen, 1998; Whitney, Cavanagh, & Murakami, 2000; Whitney & 
Cavanagh, 2000b; Whitney & Murakami, 1998). Two findings provided the initial 
justification for this position over the visual prediction account. Firstly, there was the 
aforementioned lack of an overshoot of the moving object at abrupt motion reversal 
points (Whitney & Murakami, 1998), which was initially troublesome for visual 
prediction. Secondly, there was the finding that increasing the luminance of the moving 
stimulus relative to the flash increased the effect (Purushothaman et al., 1998). The 
authors of this latter study argued that, since higher luminance stimuli are subject to 
shorter delays, and that increasing the luminance of the moving stimulus enhances 
flash-lag, the misalignment must be the result of differential latencies.  
 
It has been contended, however, that the latencies for moving stimuli might actually be 
greater than those for flashed stimuli, when measured physiologically (Raiguel, Lagae, 
Gulyàs, & Orban, 1989; though also see Jancke, Erlhagen, Schöner, & Dinse, 2004) and 
psychophysically (Nijhawan et al., 2004). Nijhawan et al. (2004), for example, showed 
that response times to moving and flashed stimuli were no different, and further, that 
temporal order judgments actually suggested a latency advantage for flashes over 
moving objects. Along similar lines, Eagleman and Sejnowski (2000b) found that 
temporal order judgments for moving and flashed stimuli did not differ. Other authors 
have presented findings suggesting that moving stimuli may have a shorter latency than 
flashes, but not to an extent sufficient to explain the magnitude of the flash-lag effect 
(Arnold, Durant, & Johnston, 2003; Arnold, Ong, & Roseboom, 2009; Arrighi, Alais, & 
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Burr, 2005). Finally, even if the latency of the moving stimulus is less than that of the 
flash, this account does not neatly explain the flash-initiated flash-lag effect; that is, 
how can a latency advantage be bestowed upon one stimulus when it appears in 
synchrony with another (Maus et al., 2010; Nijhawan, 2002)? 
 
 
1.1.2.4 Attention 
 
A final approach to explaining the flash-lag effect, espoused initially by Baldo and 
Klein (1995), was actually the first to be offered in the wake of Nijhawan's (1994) 
motion extrapolation model, and invoked the possible role of attention. In an 
experiment not unlike Nijhawan's (1994), subjects judged the relative positions of a 
linear rotating stimulus and flashed extensions (Baldo & Klein, 1995). The experiment 
differed, however, in that the stimuli were rows of dots, rather than lines, and their 
eccentricity could be varied. It was found that as the flashed dots were moved away 
from fixation, they appeared to lag further behind the moving stimulus. Further, when 
the stimuli were switched, so that the outer dots rotated, while the inner dots flashed, the 
magnitude of the flash-lag effect did not depend on the eccentricity of the outer 
(moving) dots. On the basis of these results the authors claimed that the flash 
perceptually lags the moving stimulus because it takes time to shift attention from one 
to the other in order to compare their relative positions. When the initial locus of 
attention is far from the flashed stimulus, it takes more time to shift attention, and so a 
larger lag is perceived. 
 
Results contradicting the attentional allocation model were given by Khurana and 
Nijhawan (1995) in response to Baldo & Klein's (1995) findings. In this experiment the 
rows of moving and flashed stimuli were interleaved, rather than presented in separate 
locations, so that the shift in attention should presumably have been negligible 
(Khurana & Nijhawan, 1995). It was found in this case that the flash-lag effect was 
unaffected by the lack of a required attention shift. The attentional allocation theory has 
drawn further criticism for its inability to explain the presence of a full flash-lag effect 
in the flash-initiated cycle (Khurana & Nijhawan, 1995; Nijhawan, 2002). Specifically, 
it is unclear why there should be an attentional advantage for one stimulus over the 
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other when both appear simultaneously. Another set of experiments also explicitly 
manipulated (rather than inferred) attention by cueing the location of the flash, and 
found that doing so did not affect the flash-lag effect (Khurana, Watanabe, & Nijhawan, 
2000). However, in response, it has been shown that attention can at least modulate the 
flash-lag effect, if not cause it outright (Baldo, Kihara, Namba, & Klein, 2002; 
Chappell, Hine, Acworth, & Hardwick, 2006; Namba & Baldo, 2004; Sarich, Chappell, 
& Burgess, 2007). 
 
 
1.1.2.5 Summary of the flash-lag debate 
 
There is no widespread agreement on the nature of the flash-lag effect. The preceding 
review has attempted to non-exhaustively sketch out the most influential theories put 
forward thus far, and to give the reader an impression of the state of the discussion. It 
should be clear that attempts to integrate all flash-lag phenomena within a single 
overarching conceptual scheme have been fraught with problems. However, though it is 
fair to say that the majority of publications on the flash-lag effect at least attempt to 
weigh in on the debate regarding its cause, it is not always the principal focus. While 
the nature of such a pervasive perceptual illusion is obviously of considerable interest, it 
is worth noting that a subsection of the literature reports experiments that make use of 
the flash-lag effect in order to examine other perceptual effects. The section to follow 
will review this approach. 
 
 
1.2 Using flash-lag to address other questions 
 
1.2.1 Dissociating retinal and perceived positions 
 
Perhaps the most prominent example of using the flash-lag effect to probe an issue 
unrelated to mislocalisation came from Nijhawan (1997), who used it to demonstrate 
that colour channels are integrated centrally in the cortex. Specifically, this study 
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showed that a combination of superimposed coloured light is perceptually decomposed 
into its constituent colours if one component is in motion and the other is flashed. 
Nijhawan (1997) had observers view a green bar of light tracing a circular path around 
fixation, while a smaller red line was flashed on top of it as it reached a certain location. 
The green bar’s path was either uncovered so briefly that it appeared static (at the same 
moment and position that the flashed red line was presented), or else the bar was visible 
for its full trajectory. Under normal circumstances, superimposing red and green light 
produces a sensation of yellow, however, as has already been established, a moving 
stimulus is perceived to be spatially separated from a flash presented in the same 
location (e.g., Nijhawan, 1994). The question was, then, whether retinal collocation, but 
perceptual separation would lead to the flash appearing yellow, as with static stimuli, or 
red, suggesting that it had been cortically decomposed via input from motion 
processing. To test this, a red-green comparison line was presented on the opposite side 
of fixation from the flash, comprising of the same red component, as well as an 
adjustable green component. Subjects had to alter the green component until the red-
green mixture appeared to match the colour of the flashed line. It was found that when 
the moving green bar was presented only briefly (so that it appeared static), the green 
component of the comparison line was set much higher than when the full trajectory of 
the green bar was exposed. That is, the flashed line appeared reddish in the extended 
exposure (i.e., full motion) condition, and yellowish in the brief exposure (i.e., static) 
condition, despite the retinal stimulation at the time of the flash being identical. Further 
experiments shored up this finding by showing that the effect was specifically 
attributable to the perceived displacement of the stimuli, and that the visible persistence 
of the green bar in the brief exposure condition did not bias the flashed line’s colour 
towards green. Fundamentally it was concluded that motion signals have an input to 
colour processing, and therefore, that the percept of yellow must come about from the 
central cortical combination of separate red and green channels.  
 
While Nijhawan (1997) offered an interpretation of his colour decomposition finding in 
terms of a visual prediction mechanism that underpins the flash-lag effect, this was not 
the main focus of the study. Indeed, while the observed decomposition of yellow may 
be explained by way of a cortical process of motion extrapolation, it is not a prediction 
explicitly drawn from the visual prediction theory. Rather, the flash-lag effect was 
simply used here to reliably dissociate retinal location from perceived location in order 
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to get at the separate issue of how combinations of coloured light are processed. This 
leads us onto an analogous example of the use of flash-lag to distinguish between retinal 
and perceptual positioning, but in a rather far removed field of vision science. 
 
Khurana and colleagues made use of the flash-lag effect to investigate the processes 
underlying facial identification (Khurana, Carter, Watanabe, & Nijhawan, 2006). It had 
been shown previously that when the bottom half of one face and the top half of another 
are fused into a facial ‘chimera’, recognition of the constituent faces is impaired, 
compared to when the two halves are misaligned (Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987). The 
conclusion drawn from this composite face effect was that facial identification is based 
on automatic processes that examine the configuration of facial features. Essentially, the 
suggestion is that one cannot help but initially see a chimera as a new identity, which 
interferes with the ability to identify the component faces. Khurana et al. (2006) 
questioned whether retinal or perceptual alignment of the face halves was key to the 
composite face effect, and made use of the flash-lag effect to dissociate the two. They 
performed three experiments in which the top half of a face flashed in synchrony with 
the appearance of the aligned bottom half, which then moved to the right for 280ms 
before disappearing (i.e., a flash-initiated cycle). The faces could either be chimeras, in 
which the two halves were from different famous people, or non-chimeras, in which the 
two halves were from the same famous person. The first experiment revealed that when 
the bottom half moved following the disappearance of the flashed top half, 
identification reaction times were shorter than when the bottom half remained static (for 
the same 280ms used in the motion condition). This was only the case for chimeras, 
which in general took longer to identify than non-chimeras. The second experiment 
used the same chimeras and non-chimeras to verify that subjects genuinely perceived a 
misalignment between the face-halves when they were physically aligned. This was 
done by measuring the point of subjective equality with a method of constant stimuli, in 
which the flashed face-half was presented at various offsets from the starting point of 
the moving face half, and subjects had to judge whether one was left or right of the 
other. The third experiment used the exact same stimuli as the second, except that 
subjects were tasked with identifying as quickly as possible the flashed face half. 
Crucially, a peak in reaction times was observed that corresponded with each subject’s 
point of subjective alignment, as indicated by the results of the preceding experiment. 
Thus, the first experiment showed that retinal alignment and perceptual misalignment 
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disrupts the composite face effect, while the second and third experiments showed that 
perceptual alignment but retinal misalignment reinstated it. It was made clear, therefore, 
that the composite face effect is based more upon perceptual than retinal alignment of 
two halves of a facial chimera. 
 
Khurana et al. (2006) acknowledge that, like Nijhawan (1997), their study was not 
aimed at uncovering the causes of the flash-lag effect, but instead capitalises on it to 
address an issue in face perception. Nijhawan (1997) and Khurana et al. (2006) may 
represent the only adoptions of flash-lag for disentangling retinal and perceived 
positions, but a related mislocalisation, the flash-drag effect, has been put to analogous 
use elsewhere.  
 
The flash-drag effect describes the phenomenon of a brief flash being perceptually 
mislocalised in the direction of motion of a nearby moving stimulus (Whitney & 
Cavanagh, 2000a). For a diagram see Figure 1.2 further on. Kosovicheva et al. (2012) 
used this illusion to repeatedly shift the perceived (but not retinal) position of a briefly 
presented adapting grating. Earlier work had found that presenting a tilted grating to one 
part of the visual field biased the perception of subsequently viewed gratings in the 
opposite direction (tilt aftereffect; Gibson & Radner, 1937). Neurophysiological 
evidence also suggested that this effect resulted from the adaptation of orientation-
selective cells in V1 (e.g., Maffei, Fiorentini, & Bisti, 1973; Movshon & Lennie, 1979). 
By using the flash-drag effect to shift the perceived position of the adapting stimulus, 
Kosovicheva et al. (2012) were able to show that the tilt-aftereffect was strongest when 
the test grating was presented in the retinal location of the adaptor. However, the effect 
was also greater in the perceptually shifted position of the adapting grating, than it was 
in the ‘anti-perceived’ position, in the opposite direction. By dissociating the retinal and 
perceived positions of the adapting stimulus with flash-drag, Kosovicheva et al. (2012) 
provided evidence that motion signals are able to bias retinotopic mapping in V1.   
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Figure 1.2. The flash-drag effect: Flashes in the vicinity of moving stimuli are dragged 
in the direction of motion. 
 
 
This series of experiments, then, is analogous to those outlined in the preceding 
paragraphs: the aim was not to uncover the nature of flash-drag, but to make use of it to 
gain insights about other processes by distinguishing between retinal and perceptual 
positioning. The section following departs from this, reviewing some of the research in 
which variations in the size of the flash-lag effect have been used, and could be used, to 
examine a wide range of issues. 
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1.2.2 Variations in flash-lag magnitude 
 
Vroomen and de Gelder (2004) used the flash-lag paradigm to study temporal 
ventriloquism, a crossmodal phenomenon in which sounds bias the perceived timing of 
visual stimuli. Previous work had shown, for example, that the perceived rate of a 
flickering light is biased towards the rate of a concurrently fluttering sound (Gebhard & 
Mowbray, 1959), and that a series of auditory clicks before or after a flash make the 
flash appear to occur earlier or later, respectively (Fendrich & Corballis, 2001). It was 
noted, however, that all prior work on temporal ventriloquism had made use of rhythmic 
sequences of auditory stimuli, and never isolated auditory and visual stimuli (Vroomen 
& de Gelder, 2004). Vroomen and de Gelder (2004) thus performed an initial 
experiment in which a sound burst sometimes accompanied the flash in a standard 
visual flash-lag display. It was found that when the sound was presented, the flash-lag 
effect was smaller and the psychometric curve was steeper. This was interpreted as an 
enhancement of visual processing due to a perceptual sharpening of the temporal 
boundaries of the flash due to the concurrent sound burst. This explains why the 
perceived displacement of the moving and flashed stimuli was smaller, and the 
categorisation function of the flash was less variable. Comparable to the aforementioned 
finding of Fendrich and Corballis (2001), a second experiment by Vroomen and de 
Gelder (2004) also showed that if a sound burst was presented before or after the flash, 
the flash-lag effect was diminished or enhanced, respectively. A follow-up study with 
event-related potentials again used this adaptation of flash-lag to probe the time course 
of temporal ventriloquism in the brain (Stekelenburg & Vroomen, 2005). It is important 
to note here that these studies were different from those in the preceding section 
insomuch that flash-lag was not used to separate physical and perceptual positions. 
Instead, differences in the size of the flash-lag effect under different conditions (e.g., 
with and without sounds) were studied in order to make inferences about a distinct 
phenomenon (i.e., temporal ventriloquism). The two studies that follow share this 
characteristic, though they diverge in that they base their use of the effect upon 
particular interpretations of its cause. 
 
Recall earlier the attentional allocation explanation of the flash-lag effect. It was 
proposed that the time taken to shift attention from the moving to the flashed object in 
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order to compare their positions resulted in a misalignment due to the continued motion 
of the moving stimulus (Baldo & Klein, 1995). While later studies disputed that 
attention is at the heart of the effect (Khurana & Nijhawan, 1995; Khurana et al., 2000), 
other evidence implied that it can at least modulate it (Baldo et al., 2002; Chappell et 
al., 2006; Namba & Baldo, 2004; Sarich et al., 2007). Shioiri and colleagues exploited 
this to investigate whether the flash-lag effect could actually be used as a measure of 
spatial attention (Shioiri, Yamamoto, Oshida, Matsubara, & Yaguchi, 2010). In their 
first experiment the authors showed that when there are multiple moving objects, one of 
which is cued as the flash-lag target, the flash-lag effect is diminished, consistent with 
the aforementioned role of attention. Additionally, their second experiment revealed 
that the larger flash-lag effect seen in faster moving stimuli (which they argue require 
more attentional resources to track) was relatively diminished when the target was cued. 
These results were taken as confirmation that focusing attention on the target reduces 
the flash-lag effect, and the authors subscribed to the idea that attention affects, but does 
not cause, the misalignment. In their third experiment, the authors demonstrated that 
when a location near to the real target stimulus is cued, a reduction of the flash-lag 
effect is also observed. It was highlighted that this is consistent with previous findings 
showing that attention is spread over a region around an attentionally-tracked moving 
object (Matsubara, Shioiri, & Yaguchi, 2007). Finally, Shioiri et al. (2010) argue that 
the consistency of the results across their experiments suggest that the flash-lag effect 
could be an effective measure of spatial attention. Alternative measures, for instance, 
might require eye-tracking procedures, or more difficult psychophysical tasks such as 
detecting the perceptual threshold of a probe. These authors therefore suggest that, with 
a suitably grounded understanding of how it is modulated by certain effects (in this 
case, attention), flash-lag can be used as a measure of those effects in other contexts. 
 
This broad approach was also taken by Khan and Timney (2007) in a study of the 
effects of alcohol on neural latencies. In one of their experiments it is shown that 
drinking fruit juice mixed with alcohol leads to greater flash-lags than drinking an 
equivalent volume of fruit juice alone. They claim that since flash-lag is caused by 
differential latencies for the moving and flashed objects, the enhanced flash-lag effect 
after drinking alcohol must reflect a general slowing of neural processing speed. Not 
unlike Shioiri et al. (2010), Khan and Timney (2007) make use of an interpretation of 
the flash-lag effect’s underlying mechanism in order to address another question. While 
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Shioiri et al. (2010) asked whether the flash-lag effect could be used to measure visual 
attention, Khan and Timney (2007) are interested in whether alcohol affects perceptual 
latency. However, this is perhaps a good time to begin discussing the limits of using 
flash-lag as a tool for other research questions, since the justification of Khan and 
Timney's (2007) claim is flawed and requires unpacking.  
 
To begin, if one assumes that differential latencies are the sole cause of the flash-lag 
effect (which is unlikely – see further on), Khan and Timney (2007) give no 
justification for their prediction that a general elevation of neural latency should result 
in a greater misalignment. The differential latencies account has at its heart the claim 
that moving stimuli are processed faster than flashed stimuli, so that the flash is only 
seen after the moving stimulus has shifted forwards (e.g., Purushothaman et al., 1998; 
Whitney & Murakami, 1998). So, if as they say, “alcohol acts to increase neuronal 
latency for both the flash and the moving stimulus” (Khan & Timney, 2007, p. 1825), it 
follows that there should be no impact on the size of the flash-lag effect unless the 
latencies for the moving and flashed stimuli are affected to different extents. For their 
results to support their argument Khan and Timney (2007) would have had to justify 
why alcohol might be expected to slow the neural processing of the flash more than the 
moving stimulus. 
 
Second, the idea that differential latencies are the root cause of the perceptual 
misalignment between moving and flashed stimuli is not as widely accepted as the 
authors imply. In the treatment given earlier to the differential latencies account it was 
highlighted that, like attention, differences in processing latency might contribute to, but 
do not cause the flash-lag effect (Arnold et al., 2003, 2009; Arrighi et al., 2005). Other 
research suggests that the latencies for moving and flashed stimuli are either the same 
(Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000b), or different, but in the opposite direction to that 
predicted by the differential latency account (Nijhawan et al., 2004; Raiguel et al., 
1989). It should be clear, then, that processing latency differences might not be able to 
explain the discrepancy between effects observed after having, and having not, 
consumed alcohol. Indeed, other contending explanations of the flash-lag effect could 
also account for the difference. For example, in light of the preceding discussion of 
Shioiri et al. (2010), it could be that alcohol enhances the flash-lag effect because it 
increases the time taken to shift attention from the moving to the flashed stimulus. 
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While Shioiri et al. (2010) provided evidence that flash-lag was affected by attention in 
their stimuli, this was not the case for Khan and Timney (2007).  
 
Despite the flaws of this particular study, it nevertheless serves to demonstrate how 
variations in the size of the flash-lag effect can be used to address other issues in 
perception. As mentioned, Khan and Timney (2007) imply that the differential latency 
account of flash-lag is broadly accepted, though it should be clear now that this is not 
the case. Khan and Timney's (2007) approach, however, should be commended in that it 
highlights that if a consensus is reached about the cause of the flash-lag effect, the 
deeper level of insight would enhance its potential for applications elsewhere. So, for 
example, if it were true that differential latencies are at the root of the illusory 
displacement, inferences could be made about the latencies of different of stimuli by 
examining how flash-lag is modulated when they are presented as moving and flashed 
objects. 
 
A specific pair of findings in the literature hints at a further, more speculative use of 
flash-lag. These results bear upon the nature of the flash-lag effect, but it will be argued 
here that they point to a further, unrelated application of the illusion. Specifically, the 
idea posited is that differences in the size of the flash-lag effect could be used to 
compare cognitively based spatial associations between things. In justification of this, 
let us consider first the work of Noguchi and Kakigi (2008), who performed 
experiments including a crucial condition in which half of a Japanese Kanji character 
moved sideways, while the other half was flashed close to alignment with it. It was 
found that this condition produced smaller flash-lag effects than simply presenting 
moving and flashed bars or a pseudo Kanji character. Furthermore, an additional 
experiment showed that non-Japanese English speakers, with no knowledge of Kanji 
characters revealed no such reduction for the same Kanji stimuli. However, when 
viewing real and pseudo versions of an alphabetical character, English speakers 
produced results comparable to the Japanese speakers with Kanji characters; that is, a 
recognisable character resulted in a smaller flash-lag effect. The consistency of the 
findings across experiments, and an earlier response in the brain to Kanji characters in 
Japanese speakers (indicated by magnetoencephalography), is suggestive of a higher 
cognitive influence on the flash-lag effect (Noguchi & Kakigi, 2008). The conclusion 
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was that prior experience in other contexts of spatial associations between the moving 
and flashed stimuli can reduce the flash-lag effect. 
 
A second finding that implies flash-lag is reduced by cognitive associations between the 
moving and flashed stimuli was reported in the Khurana et al. (2006) paper mentioned 
earlier. Recall that these researchers presented combinations of face halves from the 
same famous person (i.e., a non-chimera) and different famous people (i.e., a chimera), 
with the top half flashing briefly as the bottom half began moving. The primary issue 
under investigation was not the nature of flash-lag, but instead whether the composite 
face effect depended on retinal or perceptual alignment of face halves. In their second 
experiment they verified that the flash-lag effect was perceived when using their facial 
chimera and non-chimera stimuli. While both stimulus types produced flash-lags, it was 
also shown that non-chimeras produced significantly smaller flash-lags than chimeras. 
That is, when the two halves were from the same, recognisable person, the flash-lag 
effect was diminished. This result is in accord with Noguchi and Kakigi (2008), in that 
the misalignment between the moving and flashed stimuli is reduced when they 
recognisably belong to the same overall object, or Gestalt. Performing the same 
experiment with unfamiliar faces might of course strengthen this finding. If the 
difference between chimeras and non-chimeras was relatively diminished or eliminated, 
it would suggest that mere surface level consistencies between facial features cannot 
explain the reduction of the flash-lag effect in facial chimeras. Especially in light of 
Noguchi and Kakigi (2008), however, the possibility must be considered that cognitive 
processes interact with spatial perception to reduce the flash-lag effect in things that are 
associated at a higher level. For instance, this could be in terms of either an effect of 
priming, whereby the moving stimulus primes the registration of the flashed stimulus 
(Khurana et al., 2006; Khurana, 2008), or because prior knowledge of things makes 
them appear more like they do in more familiar contexts (Noguchi & Kakigi, 2008). 
Further experiments could reveal whether experimentally induced associations (e.g., 
learned in the lab) between unfamiliar shapes, symbols, or images have a similar 
potency to reduce the flash-lag effect. If this literature were built upon, the size of the 
flash-lag effect could even be used as a tool to measure the strength of spatial 
associations, not unlike the suggestion of Shioiri et al. (2010) that it be used to measure 
attention. So, in this way flash-lag shows potential as a tool for assessing learning 
outcomes as they pertain to spatial associations. For instance, to draw closely from the 
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Noguchi and Kakigi (2008) study, the extent of children’s learning of characters could 
be measured by assessing changes in flash-lag magnitude when half is in motion and 
half is flashed. 
 
In the previous section, two examples were highlighted of flash-lag’s use for 
distinguishing between the contributions of retinal and perceptual positioning to 
unrelated phenomena, and a single example was given of a comparable use of the flash-
drag effect. The current section, on the other hand, has reviewed literature reporting 
either uses of flash-lag magnitude to measure parameters unrelated to the nature of the 
effect, or else point towards its application in other capacities. Variations in the size of 
the illusion have been made use of to study temporal ventriloquism, attention, and the 
effects of alcohol on perceptual latencies. It has also been conjectured that flash-lag 
might, with further empirical grounding, be exploitable in measuring the level of spatial 
association between pairs of stimuli. The section to follow will give an overview of the 
research reported in the body of the thesis, and give commentary on how it takes up the 
mantle of using the flash-lag effect, and particularly its magnitude, to probe 
miscellaneous issues.  
 
 
1.3 A synthetic overview of the research reported 
herein 
 
1.3.1 A common approach to answering different questions 
 
The three papers that make up the body of this thesis report programmes of research that 
are, on the surface, very different from each other, though they all leverage flash-lag to 
elucidate disparate issues in spatiotemporal perception. This section will provide a short 
summary of each paper in conjunction with a synthetic overview, bringing the topics 
together in light of research outlined in the preceding section. As will become clear, a 
tenet common to all of the papers herein is that they examine differences in flash-lag 
magnitude between opposing directions of motion. This approach is used to make 
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predictions and draw conclusions about the parallels between perception and action 
(Paper I), the effect of threat on visual perception (Paper II), and the way in which we 
perceive abruptly disappearing stimuli (Paper III). 
 
 
1.3.2 A common methodology 
 
Every experiment reported in the current papers makes use of a psychophysical method 
of constant stimuli to present the stimuli at various physical offsets from each other. 
Subjects are required to make binary choice judgments about where one stimulus 
appears in relation to another, and the physical offset that elicits 50% of each response 
is estimated by fitting a psychometric curve. This is taken to refer to the relative 
physical offset that yields perceptual alignment. This approach is widely used to 
measure the flash-lag effect (e.g., Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000a; Kanai, Sheth, & 
Shimojo, 2004; Khurana et al., 2006; Sheth et al., 2000; Shi & Nijhawan, 2008). In 
Paper I, two experiments are reported that measure the flash-drag effect, which is also 
often estimated with a similar method of constant stimuli (e.g., Durant & Johnston, 
2004; Fukiage, Whitney, & Murakami, 2011; Shi & Nijhawan, 2008; Whitney & 
Cavanagh, 2000a). Finally, in Paper III, two experiments are presented in which the 
forward displacement of a changing object’s endpoint is measured in relation to a 
continuously visible, rather than flashed, reference stimulus. This approach was most 
directly inspired by very similar work by Whitaker and colleagues, who also used a 
comparable method of constant stimuli (Whitaker, McGraw, & Pearson, 1999).  
 
It should be highlighted that the binary choice approach to measuring perceptual biases 
can be problematic certain circumstances. Importantly, Morgan and colleagues have 
recently argued that, unlike two-alternative forced choice discrimination tasks, binary 
choice leaves open the possibility that decisional criteria change between conditions, 
rather than perception itself (Morgan, Melmoth, & Solomon, 2013). For instance, 
cognitive effects might make a subject slightly more likely to give a certain response in 
a one condition more than the other. When it is suspected that this might be an issue at 
play, it is discussed in the corresponding section. 
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1.3.3 A summary of Paper I: ‘Motor’ versions of visuospatial 
illusions reveal shared perceptual space of vision and action 
 
Paper I uncovers similarities and differences between the visual and motor versions of 
the flash-lag effect. A great deal of literature argues that perception and action systems 
are not fundamentally distinct from one another. For instance, mechanisms of action 
production affect how motion is perceived visually (e.g., Viviani & Stucchi, 1989, 
1992; Viviani, 2002), and viewing a behaviour can affect action production (e.g., Brass, 
Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000). Similarly, 
several classes of neuron exhibit both motor and perceptual properties (Gallese, Fadiga, 
Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Murata et al., 1997). A paper from Nijhawan and 
Kirschfeld (2003) has also shown that the flash-lag effect occurs when the moving 
stimulus is not visual, but rather the motor/kinaesthetic representation of one’s body. 
This result was taken to further indicate that there is a deep intertwining of perception 
and action systems in the brain.  
 
Paper I starts with two experiments that build on Nijhawan and Kirschfeld's (2003) 
finding of a ‘motor’ flash-lag effect, with an examination of whether it displays a 
difference in magnitude when motion is either towards or away from the fovea. It has 
been shown elsewhere that this occurs in visual flash-lag, with foveopetal motion (i.e., 
towards fixation) leading to a larger forward displacement of the moving stimulus (Shi 
& Nijhawan, 2008). If the motor and visual flash-lag effects exhibited the same motion 
direction based anisotropy it would suggest that both are based on the same underlying 
systems. The subject gripped a handle in their right hand and moved it from one end of 
a rail to the other in complete darkness while fixating directly ahead. An LED was 
flashed at some offset from their handle, and they judged whether it had come from 
ahead of or behind the handle. The position at which the handle triggered it was varied 
between trials, and was always while the subject’s hand was to the right of their 
midsaggital plane. 
 
It was found that during motion towards fixation, there was a strong flash-lag effect, 
such that a flash aligned with the handle was perceived to lag considerably behind the 
position of the hand. However, during motion away from fixation there was a flash-lead 
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effect, with an aligned flash being perceived ahead of the hand. Velocity differences 
between motion directions were ruled out as a determining factor in the perceptual 
anisotropy. However, it was noted that in Experiment 1a, the distance travelled by the 
hand before hitting the first possible trigger location differed between foveopetal and 
foveofugal motion directions. In Experiment 1b this parameter was equalised between 
directions and the same results were obtained.  
 
Experiment 2a looks at whether this anisotropy is the result of a differential bias of the 
perceived position of the flash caused by the unseen motion of the arm. In vision, for 
instance, it has been shown that foveofugal motion in the right visual field can lead to a 
flash-lead effect, due to a small forward displacement of the moving stimulus and a 
large forward displacement of the flash (Shi & Nijhawan, 2008). Here a very similar set 
up to Experiments 1a and 1b was used, except that a reference bar was visible 
throughout each trial, somewhere above the flash. The task was to judge the location of 
the flash relative to the bar, rather than relative to the moving handle. It was found that 
during foveopetal motion (i.e., leftwards arm movement), a flash physically aligned 
with the reference bar was perceived approximately 4mm to its left. During foveofugal 
motion, on the other hand, an aligned flash was perceived accurately. The difference 
between conditions represents the first demonstration of a ‘motor’ flash-drag effect, in 
which one’s unseen arm movement biases the perceived position of a nearby visual 
stimulus. A follow-up experiment (Experiment 2b) removed the reference bar and used 
fixation as the reference stimulus. Movement directions were no longer explicitly 
foveopetal or foveofugal, and it was found that there was a rightwards bias (1.65mm) of 
the flash during rightwards (i.e., backhand) arm movement, but no bias during leftwards 
arm movement. This experiment therefore showed another motor flash-drag effect, 
though it appeared somewhat differently to that in Experiment 2a. It was argued that in 
Experiment 2a, a general foveopetal bias of briefly presented visual stimuli was added 
to by motor flash-drag during foveopetal motion, and cancelled out by it during 
foveofugal motion. The results of Experiment 2b are explained in terms of backhand 
arm movement being more associable with foveofugal than foveopetal visual motion. 
Since foveofugal visual motion produces a larger flash-drag effect (Shi & Nijhawan, 
2008), it is suggested that this might be evidence of parallels between the visual and 
motor flash-drag effects. 
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In light of the motor flash-drag effects seen in Experiments 2a and 2b, the results of 
Experiments 1a and 1b can be re-examined. While the flash position is clearly biased by 
the motion of the hand, it is not to an extent that would be able to explain the foveopetal 
flash-lag and foveofugal flash-lead seen in the initial experiments. It is suggested, 
therefore that Experiments 1a and 1b revealed a differential bias of hand position more 
than of flash position. Finally, it is proposed that more research is required to uncover 
the nature of the motor flash-lag/lead anisotropy, but that its overall character is still 
consistent with its reflection of common mechanisms in perception and action.  
 
Paper I expands on the perception-action literature by investigating ‘motor’ versions of 
two well-known perceptual illusions. Of particular interest in these experiments is the 
difference in flash-lag and flash-drag magnitude between opposing motion directions. 
On the whole, it is shown that the motor flash-lag and flash-drag effects display 
parallels with their visual counterparts, albeit with some caveats. This demonstrates how 
the size of the flash-lag and flash-drag effects can be measured across different 
modalities to infer similarities and differences between those modalities. In light of this 
one might, for example, devote further effort to examining the extent of the parallels 
between the visual and auditory flash-lag effects in a similar way. If analogous stimulus 
variations in the visual and auditory flash-lag effects produced analogous results, it 
would strengthen the suggestion that the effect is truly cross modal (Alais & Burr, 
2003). 
 
 
1.3.4 A summary of Paper II: Threat enhances the flash-lag 
effect 
 
Paper II looks at how threat can (and cannot) influence visual perception. This issue has 
become especially pertinent in the context of numerous studies claiming that the process 
of vision is ‘paternalistic’ (for a review, see Firestone, 2013). In general, the suggestion 
is that we perceive things not necessarily how they are in reality, but in ways that lead 
us to err on the side of caution when selecting a behavioural response. This position has 
stemmed from a multitude of findings. For example, hills look steeper when one is 
wearing a heavy backpack (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999), or when one is lacking in either 
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calories (Schnall, Zadra, & Proffitt, 2010) or psychosocial resources (Schnall, Harber, 
Stefanucci, & Proffitt, 2008). A counter position has emerged, however, suggesting that 
many of these apparently perceptual effects may actually reflect higher cognitive biases 
on processes of judgment and memory, for example (e.g., Durgin et al., 2009; Durgin, 
Klein, Spiegel, Strawser, & Williams, 2012; Firestone & Scholl, 2014; Firestone, 2013). 
It has been shown, for instance, that when a satisfactory explanation is given for the 
backpack worn by subjects judging how steep a hill is, the tendency to report the hill as 
steeper disappears (Durgin et al., 2009). The implication is, then, that subjects without a 
cover story guess at the experiment’s hypothesis, and provide responses in accordance 
with it. Other cognitive processes, such as memory, have also been shown to influence 
similar findings (e.g., Cooper, Sterling, Bacon, & Bridgeman, 2012). 
 
A part of the paternalistic vision literature that has received less of this type of critical 
attention has proposed that threat can bias visuospatial perception, such that we see 
threatening objects as either closer (Cole, Balcetis, & Dunning, 2013), larger (van 
Ulzen, Semin, Oudejans, & Beek, 2008), or faster (Riskind, Kelley, Harman, Moore, & 
Gaines, 1992; Riskind, Moore, & Bowley, 1995; Vagnoni, Lourenco, & Longo, 2012; 
Witt & Sugovic, 2013), than non-threatening objects. It is argued that, for the most part, 
this literature potentially suffers from the same cognitive confounds as the research on, 
for instance, hill gradients. An adapted version of the flash-lag effect – an 
unambiguously perceptual measure of relative positioning – is offered as an appropriate 
test of whether threat can indeed bias visuospatial perception. 
 
In Experiment 1, subjects high or low in spider phobia viewed an image of a spider or a 
butterfly looming or receding on one side of the display. During this animation, the 
same image was flashed on the other side of the screen at one of several size offsets 
from the animated image, and subjects had to judge which image appeared larger at the 
time of the flash. It was predicted that if threatening objects are perceived as closer or 
larger, then the high-phobia group should display both a greater looming flash-lag and a 
smaller receding flash-lag for spiders than they do for butterflies, and that this 
anisotropy should be greater than it is in the low-phobia subjects. Regarding the claim 
that threatening objects are perceived to move faster, previous studies (e.g., Witt & 
Sugovic, 2013) only tested motion towards the subject. The only prediction to be tested 
here, then, is that the high-phobia group should produce a larger looming effect in 
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spiders than in butterflies, and that this difference should be greater than it is in the low-
phobia group, since flash-lag scales up with speed (Nijhawan, 1994).  
 
The results of Experiment 1 showed that there was no difference in the flash-lag effect 
between phobia groups for either direction of motion, or with either animal image. 
While this is inconsistent with the paternalistic vision stance, since it suggests that 
perception is not affected by threat, several possible issues with the study are identified. 
Overall, it is found that the receding spider produced a smaller flash-lag than the 
receding butterfly. It could be, therefore, that everyone found the spider more 
threatening than the butterfly, and that an enhanced effect during looming motion was 
not observed due to a ceiling effect. Furthermore, the moving (target) and flashed 
(comparison) images were the same, something which has been suggested as a factor 
that may eliminate a perceptual bias (Firestone & Scholl, 2014). Experiment 2 
attempted to address these points. 
 
Each trial in Experiment 2 uses one of two spider images (more- and less scary) that 
linearly translate upwards or downwards across the display, while two lines (constant 
separation) are flashed simultaneously above and below it. The flash-lag effect is 
measured by varying the physical position of the spider between the lines and asking 
subjects to judge which line appeared closer to the spider at the time of the flash. 
Crucially, in one condition the display is oriented normally (i.e., vertically), and in the 
other it is oriented horizontally, so that motion up or down the screen corresponds to 
either towards or away from the subject. Again, subjects were either high or low in 
spider phobia. The principal finding from this experiment is that while the more- and 
less scary spider images produce similar flash-lag effects in the low-phobia subjects, the 
more scary spider results in a considerably enhanced flash-lag effect in the high-phobia 
group. It did not matter whether the motion was towards or away from the subject, but 
flash-lag was greater overall in those who found the moving stimulus more threatening.  
 
It is argued that these results provide support for the broad claim of paternalistic vision 
that threat can bias visual perception, but that they contradict the specific claim that 
threatening stimuli are perceived closer to us. For this to be the case one would have 
expected to see an effect of display orientation, which did not manifest. 
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This paper, like the previous one, makes predictions about how the size of the flash-lag 
effect should vary between motion directions if certain mechanisms are at play. In the 
previous paper the directions of motion were (mostly) of one’s hand relative to fixation, 
while in this paper the directions of motion are of stimuli towards or away from the 
body. Unlike with motor flash-lag in Paper I, however, Paper II shows that the direction 
of motion has little effect on the flash-lag effect, but that other manipulations (i.e., how 
threatening the stimulus is, per se) have a considerable impact. The findings from Paper 
II are ultimately discussed in terms of several of the perspectives put forward to explain 
the flash-lag effect, though the data do not explicitly arbitrate between the divergent 
viewpoints. 
 
 
1.3.5 A summary of Paper III: Additive and subtractive 
effects of gamma movement on the forward displacement of 
size-changing stimuli 
 
Paper III demonstrates that when a size-changing stimulus abruptly disappears, its size 
at offset is more shifted forwards after contraction than it is after expansion. Whitaker et 
al. (1999) previously showed that expanding or contracting stimuli that suddenly 
disappear are perceived to be larger or smaller, respectively, than a continuously visible 
static stimulus visible for the same period of time. These authors, however, did not 
report a difference in the size of the effect between expanding and contracting motion. 
Informal observations suggest that contracting motion results in a greater effect. 
 
In Experiment 1, a vertical line expanded or contracted for some time before 
disappearing in synchrony with a flashed line on the opposing side of fixation. Subjects 
judged which line appeared longer at the time of the flash. While flash-lag does not 
normally manifest under such flash-terminated circumstances (e.g., Nijhawan, 1992), 
the size of the flash was perceived to lag behind the size-at-offset of the dynamic 
stimulus. It is argued, though, that this could well be the result of stimulus eccentricity 
(see Kanai et al., 2004), rather than something particular to expanding or contracting 
motion. More interesting is that the flash-lag effect was larger for contracting than 
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expanding lines. It is suggested that this might be the result of gamma contraction – the 
rapid apparent contraction of abruptly disappearing stimuli (e.g., Bartley, 1941; Kenkel, 
1913). More specifically, the idea is that the forward displacement of contracting 
stimuli is added to by gamma movement at offset, while the forward displacement of an 
expanding stimulus is subtracted from. 
 
Rather than using a flashed reference, Whitaker et al. (1999) used a comparison 
stimulus that remained visible throughout the presentation of the dynamic stimulus, and 
did not report a forward displacement advantage of contracting motion. Experiment 2 
adopted this procedure in order to test whether the result in Experiment 1 came about 
from using flashed references. The experiment was thus identical to Experiment 1, 
except that instead of the reference line being flashed, it was visible throughout the 
same time period that the dynamic line was presented. Again, it was found that the size 
of the dynamic stimulus was displaced forwards at offset, and that the effect was greater 
for contracting than expanding lines. 
 
It was then reasoned that, if gamma movement were occurring in Experiment 2 when 
the dynamic stimulus suddenly disappeared, it should likewise have been occurring in 
the reference line. At the moment of comparison, then, this would have relatively 
diminished apparent size of both stimuli, and so augmented the forward displacement of 
expanding stimuli, and reduced it in contracting stimuli. Experiment 3 examined this 
possibility by having the reference line remain on screen for some time after the 
disappearance of the dynamic line. Consistent with the posited effect of gamma 
movement, Experiment 3 (compared to Experiment 2) produced a more pronounced 
forward displacement for contracting lines and a smaller shift for expanding lines. 
 
To examine further the possibility of gamma movement’s involvement in the forward 
displacement anisotropy observed thus far, Experiment 4a presented the same stimuli as 
Experiment 1, except that only the very top and bottom portions of each line were 
shown. The dynamic stimulus was thus a pair of small squares that moved vertically 
towards or away from each other. Subjects judged whether the moving or flashed pair of 
squares was more widely spaced. The idea was that since gamma contraction only 
occurs in stimuli that are perceived as coherent objects, squares moving towards or 
away from each other should produce less of an anisotropy than a coherent line that 
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contracts or expands. Experiment 4a also tested whether the motion of the ends of the 
lines relative to fixation might have produced the greater forward displacement for 
contracting stimuli. Consistent with predictions, the results showed that the expanding 
and contracting lines were not shifted forwards to different extents. 
 
Experiment 4b, however, took these stimuli a step further, and presented only one 
square from each stimulus, that either moved towards or away from the display’s 
horizontal meridian. Here it was shown that the anisotropy reappeared, and re-
established the possibility that the motion direction of the ends of the lines relative to 
fixation contributed to the effects observed in Experiments 1-3. It is argued, however, 
that while the anisotropy in Experiment 4b may occur due to a flash-terminated flash-
lag advantage for foveopetal motion (e.g., Kanai et al., 2004), it is unlikely to be able to 
explain the anisotropy seen in Experiments 1-3, since Experiment 4a showed no such 
difference. 
 
To better establish whether motion direction relative to the fovea produces the greater 
forward displacement of abruptly disappearing contracting stimuli, Experiment 5 uses a 
full-cycle flash-lag procedure, in which the dynamic stimulus continues after the flash. 
It has been shown previously with linearly translating stimuli, that full-cycle flash-lag 
results in a relatively enhanced foveopetal effect (Shi & Nijhawan, 2008). However, if 
gamma contraction is the principal factor in the anisotropy seen in Experiments 1-3, the 
difference between conditions should not manifest, since the dynamic stimulus does not 
disappear at the moment of comparison, and cannot, therefore, be subjected to gamma 
movement. This is indeed what is shown in Experiment 5, with no difference between 
the forward displacements of contracting and expanding lines. 
 
It is discussed that contracting stimuli are in the process of transitioning towards a 
natural endpoint, of ‘zero’ size, while expanding stimuli do not have an implicit 
endpoint. When either stimulus disappears, gamma contraction makes them appear to 
rapidly (but not instantaneously) attain ‘zero’ size. It is claimed, then, that the forward 
displacement of abruptly disappearing contracting stimuli is greater than that of 
expanding stimuli because it effectively fast-forwards its transit to its inferred endpoint. 
In formerly expanding stimuli, on the other hand, this process has to work against the 
underlying forward displacement, and thereby reduces it. 
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Finally, a novel interpretation of gamma movement is offered that invokes our lack of 
experience with the phenomenon of sudden, instantaneous disappearance, both with 
distal objects and their retinal images. Since objects and their images tend to become 
less visible over a period of time before going entirely out of view, it is argued that our 
visual systems prefer to interpret abrupt disappearance as rapid contraction (as when an 
object rapidly recedes), given that this is more likely to reflect the true state of things. 
 
This paper makes use of the flash-lag effect to gain insight into how we perceive stimuli 
that abruptly disappear. Experiments 2 and 3 are not strictly flash-lag studies (since they 
do not employ flashes), but the forward shift effects they produce are similarly useful 
for uncovering the mechanisms at play. As in the preceding papers, the focus is on the 
magnitude differences in effects that can be observed between different directions of 
motion. The paper begins with the observation that motion direction (contraction versus 
expansion) has an impact on the size of forward displacements, and proceeds to whittle 
down the possible underlying cause of the anisotropy.  
 
 
1.4 Discussion 
 
The body of this thesis is made up of three papers, each devoted to a distinct topic in 
perception, but tied together by their use of flash-lag (and some related mislocalisations) 
in order to draw inferences about separate issues. Before moving on to discuss this in 
more detail, however, it should be noted the three papers can be integrated under a 
further high-level conclusion. In short, the flash-lag effect represents an attempt by the 
visual system to discern the most likely, or most behaviourally useful set of 
environmental circumstances. In Paper I, this is evidenced by the greater effect for 
foveopetal, than foveofugal arm movement, which is argued to be a more behaviourally 
significant type of limb motion. In Paper II, flash-lag is shown to be larger for scary 
objects – permitting the threatened observer more time to select a response to their 
changing positions. Finally, in Paper III, flash-lag findings are used to back the claim 
that disappearing stimuli are seen to rapidly contract because prior experience with 
stimuli that go out of sight implies they are more likely to have done so gradually, 
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rather than instantaneously. Whatever the system that underlies flash-lag, the present 
findings suggest that it is an active, adaptive mechanism, allowing the observer of a 
moving object a more useful and actionable percept. On this basis, however, a single 
theory of flash-lag is still not favoured over the alternatives. 
 
Let us take a step back from this line of thought, though, and return to the main thrust of 
the thesis – that is, the utility of flash-lag. Recall that Paper I looks at the similarities 
and differences between the visual and motor versions of the flash-lag and flash-drag 
effects in order to establish whether they have a common cause. The second paper 
investigates the effect of threat on visuospatial perception, by examining differences in 
the magnitude of the flash-lag effect for scary and less scary stimuli that move towards 
or away from the observer. In Paper III, flash-lag magnitude differences between 
expanding and contracting stimuli that suddenly vanish are taken to reflect the processes 
underlying how we perceive abruptly disappearing stimuli. Alongside previous research 
that takes a similar approach to using the illusion, it is hoped that attention will be 
drawn to flash-lag’s wide-ranging potential as a tool in psychophysics.  
 
Highlighted earlier were two main ways in which the flash-lag effect can be put to use 
in perception research. Firstly, the misalignment itself permits a distinction between 
retinal and perceptual positioning. This has been used, for example, to demonstrate that 
colour can be perceptually decomposed via motion signals (Nijhawan, 1997), and that 
for the composite face effect to occur, face halves need only be aligned perceptually, 
and not necessarily on the retina (Khurana et al., 2006). Secondly, flash-lag can be used 
in the way adopted in the current papers, by examining how the size of the effect varies 
between experimental conditions. This approach has previously yielded insights about 
the processes underlying temporal ventriloquism (Stekelenburg & Vroomen, 2005; 
Vroomen & de Gelder, 2004), the speed of neural processing following alcohol 
consumption (Khan & Timney, 2007), and the potential for flash-lag to be used as a 
measure of attention (Shioiri et al., 2010). Setting the current studies apart from 
previous research in this vein, however, is that they relied on comparisons of the size of 
the misalignment between different directions of motion, that is, directional anisotropies 
in the flash-lag effect. The ideas that guided each avenue of research enabled 
predictions to be derived about how opposing directions of motion might produce 
different flash-lag magnitudes. Previously, flash-lag anisotropies have only been used to 
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inform about the cause of the misalignment itself (e.g., Kanai et al., 2004; Shi & 
Nijhawan, 2008).  
 
Focusing on directional anisotropies in the effect should be seen, however, as only one 
approach to the size of the flash-lag effect across conditions. For example, in Paper II it 
is notably demonstrated that the magnitude of the flash-lag effect can vary between 
populations. While predictions are made about how flash-lag should change between 
directions of motion relative to the observer, it is found that the effect’s size depends 
more on how threatening the observer finds the stimulus. When the observer considers 
the moving object more threatening, (i.e., when high-phobia subjects viewed the more 
scary spider), the flash-lag effect is relatively enhanced, regardless of motion direction. 
It should be noted that this is comparable to the research by Noguchi and Kakigi (2008), 
who found flash-lag differences in specific meaningful stimuli (moving and flashed 
components of Kanji characters) dependent on the observer’s experience, or 
interpretation of the stimulus (i.e., whether they were a Japanese or non-Japanese 
speaker). Not only does the potential for flash-lag in investigating the perceptual effects 
of cognition considerably widen the scope of its use, this approach also highlights how 
between-group differences can be observed. 
 
The real-time, perceptual nature of flash-lag endows it with much potential. At the 
moment that the flash is perceived, there are two stimuli, with an unambiguous 
separation between them that participants easily make a perceptual judgment about 
(e.g., Khurana et al., 2006). This attribute is central to the use of flash-lag in Paper II, in 
which potential biases in judgment and responding are teased apart from perception 
itself. As a counter example, it is helpful to consider how another forward displacement 
phenomenon does not share the same real-time characteristics of flash-lag, and is thus 
less useful in the contexts outlined above. Representational momentum is evident when 
several successive views of a stimulus are shown as it is moved in some consistent 
direction, and observers judge whether a final view is the same as or different to the 
penultimate view (for reviews, see Hubbard, 1995, 2005). Observers tend only to give a 
“same” response when the final view is progressed further along the implied trajectory 
than the penultimate view. While it has been argued that flash-lag and representational 
momentum reflect the same underlying systems (e.g., Hubbard, 2013), it should be 
noted that the methods of their measurement are rather different. In flash-lag, people 
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make a judgment about two stimuli perceived simultaneously, while in representational 
momentum, subjects must compare a currently perceived stimulus with a remembered 
stimulus. One cannot claim, therefore, that variations in the magnitude of 
representational momentum reflect perception, more than they do cognition. Flash-lag, 
on the other hand, provides a convenient perceptual snapshot of the misalignment of 
two simultaneously presented objects. Differences in the size of the effect are thus more 
likely to be perceptual in nature.  
 
For investigating issues unrelated to mislocalisation, researchers may also consider 
other real-time, perceptual forward displacements, such as the motion-induced position 
shift (e.g., De Valois & De Valois, 1991; Ramachandran & Anstis, 1990). In this 
illusion, adjacent windows containing stimulus fields translating in opposite directions 
appear shifted in the direction of the motion they respectively contain. While this 
forward shift effect is just as ‘perceptual’ as flash-lag, in that the target and comparison 
stimuli are simultaneously visible, the requirement for two windows containing moving 
surfaces limit the scope of applications. Flash-lag is more versatile in this respect, since 
observers need only be presented with a moving object and a flashed object, with few 
other constraints on the stimuli. 
 
Before concluding, however, it is worth noting that caution should be taken when 
adopting flash-lag for one’s particular application. The results of Paper III suggest that 
flash-lag can be linearly added to and subtracted from by some effects (e.g., gamma 
movement), but Paper II highlights that some factors (e.g., threat), can interact with the 
processes underlying flash-lag itself. If one plans to use flash-lag to address another 
issue, it is certainly worthy of consideration that the effect of interest may or may not be 
independent of the mechanisms behind the flash-lag effect. Furthermore, as outlined 
earlier with the example of Khan and Timney (2007), discretion is required when basing 
one’s use of flash-lag on a contentious interpretation of its cause. These authors relied 
entirely on the differential latencies account of flash-lag in the interpretation of their 
results, though this is not widely accepted as an explanation of the effect. Shioiri et al. 
(2010) also predicated their use of the illusion on a particular account (i.e., attentional 
allocation), but backed up their arguments with data suggesting that it was indeed an 
important factor. The lesson here is that the disputed source of the flash-lag effect 
means that using it on the basis of a theory as to its cause requires special justification. 
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1.5 Conclusions 
 
This overview chapter began by outlining the prominent theoretical positions in 
competition with each other to explain the nature of the flash-lag effect. Following on, a 
review was given of a separate literature, presenting numerous examples of flash-lag’s 
use by researchers in addressing separate issues not directly related to perceptual 
mislocalisation. This led into a summary and synthetic overview of the papers compiled 
to form the body of the thesis, including discussion of the factors that draw them 
together. 
 
The cause of the flash-lag effect is hotly debated, though a particular vein of research, 
contributed to by this thesis, has recognised that the effect’s contentious origins need 
not hinder its use in alternate fields. Flash-lag is robust, versatile, cross modal, and 
unequivocally perceptual, and thus lends itself to a breadth of possible applications. 
Two ways of using flash-lag for other purposes have been drawn attention to. First, 
there is the potential to distinguish between retinal and perceptual alignment of stimuli, 
and second, predictions and conclusions can be made about variations in the size of the 
effect between conditions. The current papers report research that falls under the second 
of these categories, with the more specific characteristic that they all probe for 
differences in the size of the effect between different directions of motion. 
 
The debate regarding the nature of flash-lag is undoubtedly important, though will 
likely not produce a commonly accepted explanation in the near future. It is argued here 
that, in spite of this, the potential for the effect to be used in other capacities should not 
be overlooked. However, as was highlighted earlier in a review of work by Khan and 
Timney (2007), further narrowing the scope of explanations for flash-lag will greatly 
enhance its possible benefits to researchers.  
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Paper I: ‘Motor’ versions of visuospatial 
illusions reveal shared perceptual space of 
vision and action 
 
 
2.1 Abstract 
 
It has been argued by many researchers that perception and action are intimately 
intertwined. A review of the literature is followed by a series of experiments that 
support this general position by demonstrating ‘motor’ analogues of two well-known 
visual illusions. It has been shown previously that the position of one’s unseen moving 
limb is perceived to lead the position of a collocated flash (motor flash-lag effect; 
Nijhawan & Kirschfeld, 2003), and separately, that visual flash-lag is larger for 
foveopetal than for foveofugal motion (Shi & Nijhawan, 2008). The first two 
experiments show that the motion direction based anisotropy in vision is similarly 
evident in the motor domain, but that the smaller effect in foveofugal motion actually 
becomes a flash-lead effect when the moving stimulus is one’s unseen hand. 
Additionally, it is demonstrated for the first time that limb movement in the dark biases 
the perceived position of nearby flashes in the direction of motion: a motor equivalent 
of the visual flash-drag effect (Whitney & Cavanagh, 2000a). The findings overall are 
claimed to represent common mechanisms in perception and action. It is ultimately 
suggested that the primacy of earlier-developing motor systems may engender 
analogous biases in the later-developing visual system through processes of associative 
learning. 
 
 
	   35 
2.2 Introduction: The common ground between 
perception and action  
 
In this section a broad outline will be given of some of the commonalities between 
perception and action systems. Psychological perspectives, principally informed by 
behavioural measures will be covered first, followed by neurophysiological evidence 
that also suggests a weakening of the theoretical distinction.  
 
Intuitively we feel that our sensations are distinct from our actions. It is not novel to 
suggest, however, that the historical separation between sensory and motor processes is 
too rigid to reflect the reality of the brain. Representative of this position is Sperry 
(1952), who highlights that 
 
[a]mong the salamanders and lower fishes, where thought processes are presumably 
negligible, the bulk of the nervous apparatus is clearly concerned with the 
management of motor activity... From the fishes to man there is apparent only a 
gradual refinement and elaboration of brain mechanisms with nowhere any radical 
alteration of the fundamental operating principles. (p. 297) 
 
Here, the notion is that, compared to more primitive vertebrates, human brains simply 
have a greater capacity for cognitive processing in the mediating stage between 
afference and efference, but that a stark divide remains absent. The following section 
will review how this general perspective has gained momentum in the intervening years, 
and how a venerable literature has grown around it. 
 
 
2.2.1 Psychological perspectives 
 
Numerous experiments have demonstrated either the motor system exerting an effect on 
perception, or of perception affecting motor processes, which taken together expose the 
underlying parallels of these two branches of the nervous system. Outlines of the 
literature from these two viewpoints will be considered before moving on to cover the 
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contributions of two influential psychological theories: the theory of event coding, and 
the motor theory of speech perception.  
 
A profitable area of research has concerned how the ways in which the brain controls 
movement also affect how motion is perceived. Take, for example, how limb velocity 
varies when tracing shapes on a two-dimensional plane. Under these circumstances it 
has been shown that instantaneous velocity depends in a lawful fashion upon curvature, 
such that it is higher at less curved, than at more curved parts of the trajectory - 
something that has come to be known as the two-thirds power law (Flach, Knoblich, & 
Prinz, 2004; Schütz-Bosbach & Prinz, 2007; Viviani & Schneider, 1991; Viviani, 
2002). This aspect of motor control is difficult to violate in one’s own movement 
(Viviani & Mounoud, 1990; cf. Beets, Rösler, & Fiehler, 2010), and is thought to 
directly reflect updating processes in populations of motor cortical neurons (Schwartz, 
1994; Viviani, 2002). Crucially, the two-thirds power law has also been demonstrated to 
bias visual perception in a number of ways. In an influential experiment, Viviani and 
Stucchi (1989) showed subjects a moving dot tracing an ellipse with a principal axis 
that could be varied in extremity. The task was to decide which axis was longer. When 
the dot’s velocity profile was in accordance with the two-thirds power law for either a 
vertical or horizontal ellipse, subjects’ discrimination thresholds were biased in that 
direction. So, for example, if the trajectory of the dot described a perfect circle, but its 
velocity profile described an ellipse with a vertical principal axis, subjects would be 
more likely to say that it was a vertically oriented ellipse. In a separate study, the same 
authors asked subjects to vary the velocity of a moving dot tracing an ellipse so that it 
appeared constant throughout its trajectory (Viviani & Stucchi, 1992). It was found that 
only if the velocity profile obeyed the two-thirds power law was it judged as uniform, 
despite this being an objectively inaccurate estimate. The generalisability of the two-
thirds power law, out of motor processes, and into perceptual processes, reveals how 
limits upon systems of movement production can also constrain how motion is 
perceived. Indeed, there is also evidence that people are equally, and highly, sensitive to 
deviations from the two-thirds power law in displays comprising just a dot trace, or also 
including a point-light display of a whole-body human, or of just an arm appearing to 
draw the trace (Bidet-Ildei, Orliaguet, Sokolov, & Pavlova, 2006). The insensitivity to 
biological form implies that the effect of motor constraints upon perception extend 
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beyond biological motion, and into movement in general. This point will be returned to 
in the discussion. 
 
Another line of research has looked at how the manipulation of motor systems through 
training or adaptation affects visual perception. Staying briefly with the two-thirds 
power law, it initially appeared that one could not retrain the motor system to violate the 
rule (Viviani & Mounoud, 1990; Viviani, 2002), though a more recent finding has 
shown that this is not the case. Subjects were given passive motor training in velocity 
profiles that disobeyed the two-thirds power law, and it was found that this made them 
more sensitive to that particular velocity profile in an ensuing visual discrimination task 
(Beets et al., 2010). A similar experiment showed that when subjects were trained on a 
cyclical arm movement task, subsequent duration estimations were enhanced for a 
similar movement presented visually (Hecht, Vogt, & Prinz, 2001). These experiments 
relied on motor training, but shorter-term motor adaptation effects have also been 
shown to exert an effect on vision. For instance, Volcic and colleagues started by noting 
that there are systematic inaccuracies in depth perception that are not present at a certain 
distance from the body corresponding approximately to the length of one’s arm (Volcic, 
Fantoni, Caudek, Assad, & Domini, 2013). After performing an adaptation task in 
which subjects’ arms were made to seem longer, however, the region of accurate visual 
depth perception became recalibrated to the ‘new’ arm length. Similarly (though 
returning to motion, rather than depth perception), another study showed that adapting 
to a constant lateral force during reaching movements made people more accurate at 
interception movements, but only when the target moved in a direction consistent with 
the adapting force field (Brown, Wilson, Goodale, & Gribble, 2007). The authors 
claimed that motor adaptation produces a predictive model for motor systems that is 
also made use of by visual perception. These findings all represent examples of vision 
following the lead of motor systems in a fluid, changeable manner, so that when the 
motor processes change, so too do the visual processes. Consistent with the claim that 
perception follows action in an ad hoc way, Knoblich and Flach (2001) further showed 
that people are more capable of predicting the outcomes of their own behaviour, viewed 
on video, than they are the outcomes of other people’s actions. This implies that 
inherent familiarity with one’s own motor system enhances visual perception of it in 
action. 
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Thus far the focus has been on behavioural and psychophysical evidence for action 
systems calibrating visual perception. However, particular effort has also been applied 
to the complementary perspective of how perception affects action, and more 
specifically, how viewing the behaviour of conspecifics influences behavioural 
execution. For example, it has been shown that viewing a given action automatically 
facilitates subsequent performance of that action (e.g., Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 2001; 
Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000; Castiello, Lusher, Mari, Edwards, & 
Humphreys, 2002; Edwards, Humphreys, & Castiello, 2003; Knoblich & Flach, 2001; 
Vogt, Taylor, & Hopkins, 2003; Wohlschläger & Bekkering, 2002). Brass et al. (2000), 
for example, found that when people are tasked with performing a particular finger 
movement in response to a short video clip, reaction times are shorter to videos of the 
same, rather than different finger movements, and to finger movements in general, 
rather than to symbolic cues. Similar findings have also been reported for whole-hand 
prehension actions, and further show that viewing human hands has more of an effect 
than viewing robot hands (Castiello et al., 2002; Edwards et al., 2003). The implication 
of this is that viewing an action automatically primes the motor systems involved in 
performing a similar action, suggesting a fundamental connection between action 
perception and production. Consistent with this, interference effects are also evident 
when the observed and produced behaviours are incompatible (for a review, see 
Blakemore & Frith, 2005). This was found in the aforementioned Brass et al., (2000) 
study when a task-irrelevant finger movement was incongruent with the to-be-
performed finger movement. Another characteristic example comes from Kilner and 
colleagues, who had their subjects make repeated vertical or horizontal sinusoidal 
movements of their extended arm while viewing someone else perform a similar 
movement along either the same or the perpendicular axis (Kilner, Pauligan, & 
Blakemore, 2003). Motion capture data revealed more variance in the subjects’ arm 
movements when observing movement along the incongruent, versus the congruent 
axis. Taken together, these findings show that perceiving the actions of a conspecific 
can facilitate or impede the observer’s behaviour, depending on whether they are trying 
to perform a similar or dissimilar action. Why should this be though? This question 
brings us on to two separate theories that account for the unity of perception and action 
in their own ways. 
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2.2.1.1 Theory of event coding 
 
Proposed by Prinz (1997), the theory of event coding has at its heart the common-
coding principle: the claim that perceptions and planned actions are represented in the 
same cognitive domain. It is said that at more peripheral levels of the nervous system, 
afferent sensory codes (from receptors) and efferent motor codes (to muscles) might 
well be distinct, but that they overlap at a central, higher level, “between (late) 
perception and (early) action” (Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001, p. 
849). This is in contrast with the more orthodox assumption that sensory and motor 
systems are coded independently and require an intermediary process of translation in 
order to interact (Hommel et al., 2001).  
 
A further theoretical tenet is that actions are planned on the basis of the perceptual 
effects they are aimed at producing (the action-effect principle; Prinz, 1997). The idea is 
that perceiving and acting are both ways of “internally representing external events (or, 
more precisely, interactions between these events and the perceiver/actor)” (Hommel et 
al., 2001, p. 860). Put differently, an action is simply a way of producing a perceptual 
effect in the world. In this manner it is proposed that external events are coded for, and 
that the only distinction between codes for action and codes for perception are that the 
former are used to supervise the motor system in producing the desired perceptual 
result. Importantly, it is thought that the sensory outcomes aimed for in a planned action 
are not the relatively proximal feedback one gets from, say, an arm movement, but are 
instead higher-level, more distal effects. An action plan to turn on a light, for example, 
will not be oriented towards achieving visual and proprioceptive feedback of operating 
the light switch itself, but will instead be focused on achieving the action’s end goal – 
the perceived illumination of the room. 
 
Often experiments are cited as consistent with the theory when they demonstrate an 
interaction between features (e.g., the spatial location) of a stimulus and a required 
response, as these are thought to represent the use of the same event code (Prinz, 1997). 
A prominent example comes from the spatial stimulus-response compatibility effect, 
noted by Fitts and Deininger (1954). In short, when asked to respond to a stimulus, 
subjects show shorter reaction times when stimulus and response are spatially 
	   40 
compatible. Simon, Hinrichs, and Craft (1970), for instance, had subjects rest each of 
their hands on one of two buttons out in front of them. Speeded left or right button-
presses were required on the basis of high or low auditory tones (relationship 
counterbalanced across subjects) presented monaurally. Even though subjects were told 
to ignore which side the tone came from, reaction times were shorter when the required 
response was on the same side as the tone presented. This compatibility effect suggested 
to Prinz (1997) that action was facilitated when it required use of the same, already-
active, event code that incorporated the side of space as one of its features. In the same 
study, it was shown that when subjects’ hands were crossed, the pattern of results 
remained constant, rather than reversing along with the arm positions (Simon et al., 
1970). That the effect followed the side of space, rather than the subject’s arm position, 
leant further supported the idea that actions were coded for in terms of their distal, 
external effects. The action-effect principle found further support from a variation of 
this experiment by Hommel (1993). Here the button presses also operated one of two 
lights positioned above each loudspeaker. In a crucial condition, the left-hand button 
switched on the right-hand light, and vice versa. Under these circumstances, it was 
found that when subjects were instructed to press the button indicated by the tone, the 
aforementioned compatibility effect was present, but when they were asked to produce 
the right- or left-hand light, the results reversed, and they were now quicker to respond 
with the contralateral hand. This was strong support for the action-effect principle, as it 
seemed that the compatibility effect varied with the distal effects of actions, rather than 
with their proximal, body-centred features.  
 
Implicitly, the theory of event coding emphasises the part played by perception in 
action, insomuch as it claims that the perceptual effects of actions are the principal 
concern of codes-for-action. However, to make this observation is perhaps to do the 
theory of event coding a disservice, since really its core tenet is that there is no 
fundamental distinction between perception and action planning. We move now to 
another theory, which is not necessarily at odds with the aforementioned, but that 
clearly accentuates the role of action systems in perception over the reverse relationship. 
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2.2.1.2 Motor theory of speech perception 
 
According to the motor theory of speech perception, we do not perceive speech by 
translating acoustic features into phonemes, but rather we rely on our mechanisms of 
speech production to decode the speaker’s own intended phonetic gestures (Galantucci, 
Fowler, & Turvey, 2006; Liberman, Cooper, Shankweiler, & Studdert-Kennedy, 1967; 
Liberman & Mattingly, 1985, 1989). 
 
Liberman and colleagues began with an interest in how speech is understood given the 
various difficulties of deriving phonetic information directly from an acoustic signal in 
natural speech (Liberman et al., 1967). For instance, it is highlighted that we can 
understand speech at rates far exceeding the temporal resolving capacity of our auditory 
apparatus. Indeed, attempts to construct reading machines that translate print into 
sequences of arbitrary sounds were unsuccessful due to subjects’ inability to decipher 
the sounds at useful speeds, even after considerable practice (Galantucci et al., 2006; 
Liberman et al., 1967). It was also noted that while invariant acoustic cues for perceived 
phonemes are elusive, the articulatory gestures of the vocal tract, measured by 
electromyogram, are noticeably consistent across utterances of a phoneme (Liberman et 
al., 1967). Put differently, when acoustics point to one phonetic outcome, and 
articulatory gestures to another, perception follows the latter (Galantucci et al., 2006). 
 
The motor theory of speech perception therefore proposes that mechanisms of speech 
production might also underlie its perception, by decoding the intended phonetic 
gestures of the speaker from the auditory signal (Liberman et al., 1967; Liberman & 
Mattingly, 1985). It is posited that in the brain, intended phonetic gestures are 
represented by the relatively unchanging motor commands that are used to produce the 
individual vocal tract movements associated with a particular gesture (Liberman & 
Mattingly, 1985). Phonemes are constructed from one or more of these units of 
articulation. Additionally, the tendency of multiple phonetic gestures to overlap in time 
is thought to allow the auditory system more time to resolve the sound produced by 
each articulatory event.  
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It follows, then, that phonetic perception is not strictly auditory, as it works on the basis 
of gestures rather than acoustics (Mattingly & Liberman, 1988). It is said that speech is 
perceived through a process of ‘generative detection’, in which the gestures required to 
produce a speech signal are reconstructed internally (Mattingly & Liberman, 1988). In 
this way it is thought that speech is recognised as such (by both speaker and listener), 
by virtue of the fact that it can be reproduced. So, in the case of the reading machines 
mentioned earlier, normal speech perception was not approximated because it was 
impossible to reconstruct the artificial articulatory events.  
 
In essence, the motor theory of speech perception puts forth the claim that in terms of 
speech, perception and action are interwoven, or in Liberman’s (1967) words, “there is 
only one process, with appropriate linkages between sensory and motor components [of 
the nervous system]” (p. 452). This was later elaborated on with the assertion that a 
special phonetic module had evolved to empower both speech production and 
perception in unison (Liberman & Mattingly, 1985). Liberman and colleagues thus 
claim that their account satisfies a theoretical requirement for parity between speaker 
and listener, because perceived and produced speech events are represented in the same, 
commensurate fashion (Liberman & Whalen, 2000; Mattingly & Liberman, 1988).  
 
In line with the evidence outlined earlier that perception of a behaviour can facilitate its 
subsequent production, the motor theory of speech perception has been supported by the 
finding that one can verbalise a syllable faster upon hearing that same syllable, rather 
than a tone (Fowler, Brown, Sabadini, & Weihing, 2003; Porter & Castellanos, 1980; 
Porter & Lubker, 1980). Neurophysiological findings have also been congruous. For 
instance, when speech is perceived, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of the 
tongue (Fadiga, Craighero, Buccino, & Rizzolatti, 2002) and lip (Watkins, Strafella, & 
Paus, 2003) regions of the motor cortex produces stronger motor evoked potentials 
(MEPs) in the corresponding musculature. More recently, functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) has also been used to show that areas involved in the 
production of specific phonemes are likewise in use during their perception 
(Pulvermüller et al., 2006; Wilson, Saygin, Sereno, & Iacoboni, 2004). Further 
discussion of the relevance of the discovery of mirror neurons to the motor theory of 
speech perception will be given further on. 
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It is interesting to note here the parallels between the motor theory of speech perception 
and the theory of event coding outlined earlier. Fundamentally, they are aligned in their 
advocacy of a common-coding approach to perception and action– both claiming that 
the traditionally distinct processes in fact rely on a common psychological resource. 
However, they come at the issue from different perspectives. The motor theory of 
speech perception emphasises the role of action-in-perception, while the theory of event 
coding is an account of the part played by perception-in-action, though this should be 
seen as simply a difference in empirical starting points. An important difference, 
however, is that the motor theory of speech perception claims that both perception and 
action are permitted by recourse to motor commands, while the theory of event coding 
suggests that it is only at a higher-cognitive level, divorced from the low-level specifics 
of motor commands, that the two can interact (Galantucci, Fowler, & Turvey, 2001).  
 
 
2.2.2 Neurophysiological perspectives 
 
This section will consider several classes of neuron that might be considered to bridge 
the perception-action divide. First addressed will be mirror neurons, which respond both 
to perception and performance of actions. This will be followed by briefer outlines of 
the properties of canonical neurons, which respond when an object is either fixated or 
manipulated, and visuotactile neurons, which fire during action execution and also 
during visual and somatosensory stimulation. The relevance of these neurophysiological 
findings will also be linked back to the aforementioned psychological theories. 
 
2.2.2.1 Mirror neurons 
 
Mirror neurons that discharge during both the performance and observation of an action, 
were initially observed in area F5 of the monkey ventral premotor cortex (di Pellegrino, 
Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 
1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996). It was found that the spike rate of a 
‘grasping mirror neuron’, for example, would dramatically increase when the monkey 
watched the experimenter taking a piece of food in his hand, and also when the monkey 
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grasped the food itself, and would cease activity when the action was completed 
(Gallese et al., 1996). It is worth noting that area F5 is traditionally considered to be a 
predominantly ‘motor’ oriented area, with a functional emphasis on orchestrating 
movement, so it was of great interest that cells there also responded to visual input, and 
particularly in such a specific way (Gentilucci et al., 1988; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Fogassi, 
& Gallese, 1997). 
 
Three major classes of mirror neuron were identified in those early studies (di 
Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996). Some cells (~30%) 
were termed ‘strictly congruent’, as they only responded to observed and executed 
actions that were very similar to each other, such as to a particular type of precision 
grip, and not to other types of grip. ‘Broadly congruent’ neurons showed less 
discriminatory selectivity, so that they would discharge in response to grasping in 
general, for example, rather than to a precision grip only. Neurons of this class might 
otherwise have been very particular about either their visual or motor tuning, but in 
these cases were more broadly selective for the other modality. ‘Broadly congruent’ 
cells made up the majority of the F5 population (~60%). Finally, if a cell reacted to 
observed and executed actions that were distinct, but perhaps associated or 
complementary, it was labelled as a ‘logically-related’ mirror neuron. There therefore 
appears to be a population of mirror neurons with diverse and specialised selectivities, 
which would allow them to support sophisticated computational functions (see further 
on). 
 
Some mirror neurons in area F5 are furthermore responsive to auditory stimuli that 
signify the performance of particular actions (Keysers et al., 2003; Kohler et al., 2002). 
Kohler et al. (2002) found that neurons that responded, for example, to the sight and 
sound of a peanut being broken by the experimenter, also responded when the monkey 
itself broke the peanut. This replicates the initial findings of visuomotor matching 
properties of mirror neurons (e.g., Gallese et al., 1996). Importantly, a further condition 
demonstrated a similar sensitivity to the sound of the breaking peanut alone. Taken with 
the original findings of mirror neuron properties, this illustrates that action execution 
and perceptual input in general (i.e., not simply vision) can stimulate mirror neuron 
populations.  
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Cells with ‘mirror’ properties are also prominent in the inferior parietal lobule (IPL; 
Bonini et al., 2010; Fogassi et al., 2005). The IPL is connected to F5 via the superior 
temporal sulcus – in which some neurons are selective for action observation, but not 
execution (Perrett et al., 1989; Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). This circuit has 
come to be recognised as the classic, and perhaps predominant, functional mirror 
neuron system (Cook, Bird, Catmur, Press, & Heyes, 2014; Rizzolatti et al., 2001), 
though the presence of neurons with mirror-like properties has also been demonstrated 
in other areas of the monkey brain, such as the dorsal premotor and primary motor 
cortices (for a review, see Casile, 2013). 
 
A weight of evidence has concurrently accumulated to suggest that humans too have 
mirror neurons (for reviews, see Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2012; 
Rizzolatti et al., 2001). An early example applied TMS to the motor cortex and found 
increased MEPs in hand muscles while the subjects viewed hand grasping actions 
(Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995). The implication here is that activity in the 
relevant motor neurons is facilitated by the passive observation of actions. Indeed, much 
of the evidence covered earlier showing behavioural facilitation and interference effects 
when viewing similar or different actions also cites a role for mirror neurons (e.g., Brass 
et al., 2000; Castiello et al., 2002; Kilner et al., 2003). Such findings surely compel 
some reflection on the use of the word ‘passive’, since it seems that simple action 
observation may be less passive than intuitively assumed. A more recent fMRI study by 
Kilner and colleagues required that human subjects perform and observe the same and 
different actions one after another (Kilner, Neal, Weiskopf, Friston, & Frith, 2009). 
When the same action was observed twice or performed twice, adaptation effects were 
found in the inferior frontal gyrus (considered the human homologue of the monkey’s 
area F5), so that repetition of the stimulus resulted in a weaker response. Importantly, 
this was also the case when subjects observed an action and then performed it, and vice 
versa, suggesting that the region is substantially composed of neurons with mirror-like 
properties. A similar methodology also revealed consistent findings in the human IPL 
(Chong, Cunnington, Williams, Kanwisher, & Mattingley, 2008). Evidence of mirror 
neurons in humans has almost exclusively been from indirect, non-invasive measures, 
though recently human single-cell recordings have also yielded supportive results 
(Mukamel, Ekstrom, Kaplan, Iacoboni, & Fried, 2010).  
 
	   46 
Before addressing interpretations of the function of mirror neurons, it is worth noting 
that, at the very least, these cells represent a bridging of perceptual and motor systems. 
This fronto-parietal network codes for actions, both perceived and performed. 
Consideration will now be given to the function they may serve. 
 
2.2.2.1.1 Mirror neuron functions 
 
Regarding the computational function that mirror neurons may play, the principle 
account suggests that they aid in the understanding of actions by conspecifics, and was 
posited by those who originally discovered the cells (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese 
et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996). In short, the suggestion is that when an action is 
visually perceived, mirror neurons allow an internal simulation of the observed action in 
the neural substrate of the perceiver’s own motor system. It is argued that such a 
mechanism would permit observers a much more thoroughgoing comprehension of 
others’ behaviour than could be gained from a purely visual analysis of action 
(Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Rizzolatti et al., 2001). From this perspective, it might 
be said that actions of conspecifics are not remotely perceived like other events. Instead, 
they are perceived intimately and familiarly, with one’s own motor systems privately 
resonating in conformity. As Rizzolatti and Craighero (2004) suggest,  
 
[e]ach time an individual sees an action done by another individual, neurons that 
represent that action are activated in the observer’s premotor cortex. This 
automatically induced, motor representation of the observed action corresponds 
to that which is spontaneously generated during active action and whose 
outcome is known to the acting individual. Thus, the mirror system transforms 
visual information into knowledge. (p. 172) 
 
The conspicuous parallels between the action understanding theory of mirror neuron 
function and the motor theory of speech perception have not gone unnoticed (e.g., 
Galantucci et al., 2006; Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998; Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004). Recall that, according to the latter, speech perception is not simply 
the apprehension and cognitive analysis of acoustic information, but a process of 
generative detection of the intended phonetic gestures of the speaker (Liberman & 
Mattingly, 1985; Mattingly & Liberman, 1988). In the motor theory of speech 
perception, then, speech is perceived by recruiting the listener’s own speech production 
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system, much as in the action understanding account of mirror neurons, one’s motor 
system internally simulates observed actions in order to better comprehend them. The 
discovery of mirror neurons has also been invoked to support the theory of event coding 
on the basis of the suggestion that the class of cells demonstrates shared representations 
(i.e., common coding) between perception and action (Hommel et al., 2001). However, 
the notion of resonant motor systems connecting sender and receiver proposed by the 
action understanding theory of mirror neurons certainly seems more readily applicable 
to the motor theory of speech perception (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998). 
 
2.2.2.3 Canonical neurons 
 
Some cells that share similar anatomical loci with mirror neurons also show some 
comparable visuomotor matching properties. ‘Canonical’ neurons, for example, respond 
when a particular object is fixated on, as well when that object is manipulated (Murata 
et al., 1997; Murata, Gallese, Luppino, Kaseda, & Sakata, 2000; Sakata, Taira, Murata, 
& Mine, 1995; Taira, Mine, Georgopoulos, Murata, & Sakata, 1990). These cells were 
originally noted in the monkey anterior intraparietal sulcus, and were found to respond 
to visual fixation of, say, a lever, as well as to the action of pulling the lever, with or 
without vision (Murata et al., 2000; Sakata et al., 1995; Taira et al., 1990).  
Subsequently, canonical neurons were also discovered in monkey area F5 (Murata et al., 
1997), the same region in which mirror neurons were first found. Neuroimaging in 
humans has further suggested that we also possess canonical neurons in a similar 
frontoparietal circuit (Grèzes, Armony, Rowe, & Passingham, 2003). 
 
Both mirror and canonical cells have very similar motor properties (e.g., some firing 
during precision grip, others during whole hand prehension) but the difference is in their 
visual selectivity (Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 2000). Canonical neurons 
respond to the visual presentation of objects, while mirror neurons respond to the 
observation of actions. The finding that some canonical neurons are additionally 
sensitive to the spatial orientation of their preferred object has led researchers to suggest 
that perhaps they are involved in the visual guidance of hand movements for object 
manipulation (Chao & Martin, 2000; Murata et al., 2000; Taira et al., 1990). 
Fundamentally though, it is sufficiently interesting to note that perception of objects 
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draws upon motor systems, as if in preparation for potential action, or perhaps even for 
some deeper level of ‘motor perception’ (Fadiga et al., 2000). This idea is not dissimilar 
to the aforementioned action understanding theory of mirror neuron function, in which 
the actions of others are internally reproduced in the observer’s motor system to enable 
a stronger understanding. Canonical neuron properties are also consistent with the 
theory of event coding (Hommel et al., 2001), in which it is suggested that perceptions 
and planned actions are co-represented by the same cognitive resource. Cells that are 
selective for both the manipulation and perception of an object could certainly be seen 
to embody this principle of common-coding. 
 
2.2.2.4 Visuotactile neurons 
 
We have seen that both mirror neurons and canonical neurons are present in area F5 of 
the monkey ventral premotor cortex. Just posterior of F5, in area F4, another class of 
neuron with sensorimotor properties is also of interest. The cells in this region are 
commonly thought to be focused on coding for the movement of proximal body parts, 
such as the head or arms (Gentilucci et al., 1988; Rizzolatti et al., 1997). In this latter 
respect they can be distinguished from F5 neurons, which tend to be active during the 
movement of distal body parts such as the hands and fingers (Gentilucci et al., 1988). It 
has also been demonstrated, however, that many of the F4 neurons also discharge in 
response to both visual and tactile sensory stimulation (Gentilucci et al., 1988; 
Graziano, Hu, & Gross, 1997b; Graziano, Yap, & Gross, 1994). Interestingly, the visual 
receptive fields appear to be anchored to the tactile receptive fields, extending out into 
the close vicinity, and moving with the body part, rather than eye position (Graziano et 
al., 1997b, 1994). So, when an object is brought close to a neuron’s tactile receptive 
field on the monkey’s face or arm, for instance, the cell will begin firing in response to 
the visual stimulus, and will cease firing as it is moved away. This was found to be the 
case irrespective of eye position (Graziano, Hu, & Gross, 1997a). Furthermore, it was 
shown that if the lights went out and the object was quietly removed from the monkey’s 
peripersonal space, the cell would continue to fire until the lights were switched back on 
and fresh visual input could verify that it was no longer in the receptive field (Graziano 
et al., 1997a). 
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One interpretation is that these neurons underpin the visual guidance of actions towards 
objects, for which they would no doubt be useful (Gentilucci et al., 1988; Graziano & 
Gross, 1998; Graziano et al., 1997a, 1997b, 1994). Alternatively, Rizzolatti and 
coworkers (Rizzolatti et al., 1997) suggested that perhaps the region is responsible for 
representing the positions of things in motor terms, that is, in terms of how one might 
go about interacting with them. This is comparable to the way in which canonical 
neurons represent objects with reference to how they can be manipulated. Again, like 
canonical neurons, this is consistent with positions outlined earlier that assert the role of 
action systems in perceptual processes. 
 
Similarly bimodal cells with body-part-anchored visual and tactile receptive fields have 
also been recorded in the ventral intraparietal area of the monkey brain (Avillac, 
Denève, Olivier, Pouget, & Duhamel, 2005; Colby, Duhamel, & Goldberg, 1993; 
Duhamel, Colby, & Goldberg, 1998). Interestingly, it has further been shown that, at 
least in this parietal area, the neurons exhibit mirror-like properties (Ishida, Nakajima, 
Inase, & Murata, 2009). Like those described above, the cells discharge both when an 
object touches a certain body part and when an object is moved close to that body part, 
but also when an object is moved close to the corresponding part of a conspecific’s 
body. Inspired by the action understanding theory of mirror neurons, the inference made 
is that we use the representations of ourselves to understand the bodies of others. 
Presumably, the interpretation of Rizzolatti et al. (1997) would be that our own motor 
systems are utilised in understanding the peripersonal space of conspecifics, as if we are 
anticipating their potential actions. 
 
 
2.2.3 Summary of perception-action unity 
 
An outline has been given of some of the major theoretical positions and fields of 
research that support a weakening of the distinction between perception and action. We 
saw that principles of action production, such as the two-thirds power law, also affect 
visual perception. It was then highlighted that motor training and adaptation are able to 
modulate these sorts of perceptual effects. Evidence from a different perspective was 
then discussed, showing that observing behaviour could facilitate or impede behaviour 
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performance. The rationale and principal forms of evidence behind the influential 
theory of event coding and the motor theory of speech perception were given treatment 
to highlight the ways in which perception and action could be coupled. Finally, the 
properties and functions of mirror, canonical, and visuotactile neurons were addressed, 
since they demonstrate a concrete neurophysiological underpinning that helps explain 
much of the behavioural data. We turn now to another angle of attack on the unity of 
perception and action that has received little attention and that will be the focus of the 
current experiments. 
 
 
2.2.4 Motor counterparts of perceptual illusions 
 
Leading on from the literature just reviewed, the motivation behind this approach is the 
possibility that perceptual illusions could also manifest in a ‘motor’ domain, if the two 
aspects of the nervous system really are as connected as claimed. Take, for example, the 
flash-lag effect – an illusion in which a flash appears to lag behind an instantaneously 
collocated moving object (MacKay, 1958; Nijhawan, 1994). It has been shown that the 
effect is modulated by the observer’s control of both the moving (Ichikawa & 
Masakura, 2006, 2010; Scocchia, Actis Grosso, De’Sperati, Stucchi, & Baud-Bovy, 
2009) and the flashed (López-Moliner & Linares, 2006) stimuli, and that motor or 
vestibular motion signals alone (in the absence of retinal motion) can also produce the 
displacement (Cai, Jacobson, Baloh, Schlag-Rey, & Schlag, 2000; Schlag, Cai, 
Dorfman, Mohempour, & Schlag-Rey, 2000). While these findings imply that motor 
involvement can modulate the visual illusion, an experiment by Nijhawan and 
Kirschfeld (2003) did away with a moving visual stimulus altogether. In complete 
darkness subjects held a 53cm long rod out in front of them and repeatedly rotated their 
wrist side-to-side to produce a sinusoidal motion of the rod’s end. During this 
movement a flash was sometimes presented at some lateral offset from the end of the 
rod and subjects had to judge whether it was ahead, behind, or centred on the rod itself. 
Only when the flash was 7-9cm ahead did subjects report that it was actually aligned. 
This shows that the flash-lag effect occurs when the moving stimulus is not visual, but 
is instead the unseen, felt position of an extension of the body in motion. The 
conclusion was that analogous internal forward models in the motor (e.g., Miall & 
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Wolpert, 1996) and visual (Nijhawan & Kirschfeld, 2003; Nijhawan, 2008) systems 
produce the motor and visual flash-lag effects, respectively. This idea is consistent with 
the wealth of literature outlined earlier suggesting that perception and action share close 
functional ties. For example, the finding of both a motor and a visual flash-lag effect 
could be accounted for by the theory of event coding’s assertion that perceptual and 
motor events are coded for in the same representational space. The claim would be that 
we see similar forward displacements of moving objects in vision and action because 
the same processes underpin them. The motor theory of speech perception, and the 
action understanding theory of mirror neuron function might claim in their own terms 
that we observe similar displacements in perception and action because action systems 
are recruited in perception. Such a suggestion would be consistent with the findings of 
motor principles guiding visual perception (e.g., two-thirds power law; Viviani, 2002). 
 
There has however yet to be a follow-up to Nijhawan and Kirschfeld's (2003) basic 
finding. The first two experiments in the current investigation will therefore attempt to 
replicate and extend Nijhawan and Kirschfeld's (2003) finding by examining whether 
the motor flash-lag effect displays a motion direction based anisotropy comparable to 
that in visual flash-lag. Specifically, it has been shown that the visual flash-lag effect is 
larger for motion towards the fovea (foveopetal; FP) than for motion away (foveofugal; 
FF) (Kanai et al., 2004; Mateeff & Hohnsbein, 1988; Shi & Nijhawan, 2008). Revealing 
such a parallel between the well-studied visual effect and the under-studied motor effect 
would shore up the suggestion that they reflect analogous mechanisms in the motor and 
sensory pathways.  
 
Related to flash-lag is another motion-related spatial mislocalisation, commonly termed 
the flash-drag effect (e.g., Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2007; Shi & Nijhawan, 2008). This 
illusory displacement was initially discovered by Whitney and Cavanagh (2000), who 
had subjects judge the direction of misalignment of horizontal lines flashed on opposing 
sides of a rotating radial grating. When physically aligned, the flashed lines were 
perceived as if dragged in the direction of motion of the nearest edge of the grating, 
such that one line appeared above the other. Later research has expanded on this finding 
to suggest more generally that the positions of stationary flashes are biased in the 
direction of nearby motion (for a review, see Whitney, 2002). There has not, however, 
been an investigation of whether one’s unseen body movement is similarly able to drag 
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the perceived positions of nearby flashes. The second two experiments probe this issue, 
by looking at whether arm motion in the dark biases the perceived positions of flashed 
lights relative to continuously visible reference stimuli. Demonstrating a motor flash-
drag effect would be further evidence that visual and motor domains share a 
representational space. 
 
 
2.3 Experiment 1a 
 
2.3.1 Methods 
 
2.3.1.1 Pilot observations 
 
Two informal pilot studies suggested that there exists an anisotropic motor flash-lag 
effect. In one, an LED was attached to the end of a rod (approximately 400mm long), 
which the experimenter held at one end and passed back and forth through a vertical 
infrared beam to trigger a 1ms flash. When movement was towards a fixation point 
(approximately 200mm left of the trigger beam), the flash was perceived to lag the felt 
position of the rod. When movement was away from the beam this was also the case, 
but to a smaller extent. In a similar method, the experimenter pinched the LED between 
the thumb and forefinger of his right hand and moved his arm back and forth through 
the beam. Here there was the compelling sense that the flash came from somewhere 
behind where it was actually known to be. This was the case for both foveopetal and 
foveofugal motion, though again the effect was larger in the former. This is consistent 
with the anisotropy found in the visual flash-lag effect (Kanai et al., 2004; Mateeff & 
Hohnsbein, 1988; Shi & Nijhawan, 2008).  
 
Pilot experiments were also performed with naïve subjects. In these, subjects gripped a 
handle attached to a horizontal rail and moved it side-to-side beneath a row of static 
light sources, one of which flashed as the handle passed the midpoint of the row. There 
seemed to be a general tendency towards foveopetal flash-lag effects and foveofugal 
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flash-lead effects, though there was also a great deal of inconsistency between subjects. 
It was hypothesised that the consistent perceptual effects observed across subjects by 
Nijhawan and Kirschfeld (2003) may have been due to every subject having a very clear 
notion that the source of the flash was in motion along with the handheld rod. In the 
pilot studies mentioned above, however, this may not have been the case. It was thus 
decided that in the main experiments all subjects would be deceived into believing that 
the source of the flash in each trial was in motion with their hand. 
 
2.3.1.2 Subjects 
 
Eight naïve subjects (4 male, 1 left-handed) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
participated in exchange for money or course credits. 
 
2.3.1.3 Apparatus 
 
Handle, slide rail, and false flash array. Subjects sat at a desk with their head 
immobilised by a chin rest and used their right thumb and forefinger to grip a handle 
(12.5mm in diameter × 23mm long) in front of them, angled up and pointing towards 
the level of their eyes. The base of the handle was attached to a vertical rod, which was 
in turn attached to a ball-bearing slide rail mounted on the desk. The handle itself was 
thus freely movable in the frontoparallel plane, from 450mm to the right to 150mm to 
the left of one’s midsaggital plane (600mm extent-of-travel). Attached to the top of the 
handle, approximately 400mm from subjects’ eyes, was a horizontal row of sixty-one 
2mm diameter spots positioned at 5mm intervals, the central of which was directly 
above the handle. Nine of the spots, randomly distributed over the full length of the 
array, could be flashed (white light; 1ms) in sequence with repeated presses of a button 
by the experimenter (see Procedure).  
 
Fixation, real flash, and half-silvered mirror. Directly in front of subjects was a 2mm 
red fixation spot, reflected in a half-silvered mirror mounted between them and the false 
flash array. Also reflected in the mirror was a 2mm spot that could be flashed (white 
light; 1ms) 150mm (20.43°) to the right of fixation. Both fixation and flash were 
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projected in the same optical plane as the row of spots on the false flash array. The 
brightness of the flash was adjusted to approximate the brightness of the flashes from 
the false array. Thus, when the light spot was flashed and seen in the mirror, its image 
was superimposed over the false flash array and thus appeared to have come from one 
of the 61 false flash spots. The real flash and central spot on the false flash array were 
aligned with each other when the slide rail reached the halfway point of its extent-of-
travel. The fixation and flash light sources were suspended above the mirror and 
concealed from view by a screen. 
 
Trigger positioning and velocity measurement. Three infrared trigger switches were 
attached to a motorised linear positioner mounted on the desk, oriented parallel to the 
slide rail. The positioning of these switches relative to each other was fixed. When a pin 
(yoked to the subjects’ handle) passed through the 1st then 3rd of the switches, a 
computerised timer was started then stopped, respectively. Halfway between the 1st and 
3rd switches, the 2nd switch was used to trigger the light spot flash reflected in the half-
silvered mirror. The timing switches allowed the subjects’ arm velocities at the time of 
the flash to be monitored on a trial-by-trial basis. Having these switches attached to the 
linear positioner meant that they could be repositioned between trials, so that the 
subjects’ handle could trigger the flash before reaching, when in alignment with, or after 
passing the flash. The experiment was controlled using custom Matlab scripts running 
with the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). See Figure 2.1 for a 
diagram of the experiment. 
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Figure 2.1. Experiment 1a: Diagram of experimental set-up. 
 
2.3.1.4 Procedure 
 
Instructions. With the room lights on, subjects were given a chance to pinch the handle 
and move it from one end of the rail to the other. If the subject appeared to be moving 
the rail particularly fast or slow the experimenter demonstrated an approximate ideal 
velocity, which they were asked to maintain as consistently as possible throughout the 
experiment. Their attention was then drawn to the row of spots on the false flash array 
and they were told that a random one of the spots would flash during each trial while 
they were moving the handle, and that they would have to say aloud whether they 
thought the flash had come from ahead of or behind the handle (binary choice). So, 
when moving leftwards, for example, a “flash-ahead” response would mean that they 
thought the flash had come from one of the spots to the left of their handle. The 
experimenter then showed the subject several of the spots on the false flash array 
flashing one at a time. After this point the false flash array was discreetly turned off, 
and all subsequent flash presentations came from the fixed flash source suspended 
above the half-silvered mirror. This meant that during the experiment the flash was 
always at the same retinal eccentricity, so that the changing distance between the 
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fixation point and the flash between trials could not be used as a cue for responding. 
Subjects were made to believe that the source of the flash was in motion with their arm 
so that their task was more clearly defined. That is, rather than having subjects judge 
where a static flash was (attached to the desk, represented in allocentric coordinates) in 
comparison to their limb (in egocentric coordinates), subjects had to judge whether the 
flash came from ahead of or behind the middle of an array. Finally, subjects were told 
that they would hear whirring mechanical noises during the experiment (i.e., from the 
motorised linear positioner) and that they should ignore them as best as possible. 
 
Experiment. The fixation point was visible throughout the experiment. Before the 
room was made completely dark it was ensured that subjects were in the correct 
position and holding the handle properly. The lights were switched off and a 
computerised voice told the subject to move the handle to either the left or right end of 
the rail. Once in position, the linear positioner moved the trigger switch to one of 7 
locations, so that the handle would trigger the flash when it reached one of 7 physical 
offsets from alignment. For the FP condition this meant that the flash was triggered 
while the handle was -160mm, -120mm, -80mm, -40mm, 0mm, 40mm, and 80mm from 
physical alignment. For the FF condition, the flash was triggered when the handle 
reached -80mm, -40mm, 0mm, 40mm, 80mm, 120mm, or 160mm from the flash. The 
difference in handle offsets between motion directions was in anticipation of a flash-lag 
effect in FP motion and a flash-lead effect in FF motion, as indicated by pilot 
experiments. Once the trigger was in position, the computerised voice asked subjects to 
“move right”, or to “move left”, depending on the condition. A single smooth arm 
motion brought the handle from one end of the rail to the other, and the flash was 
presented when the trigger was hit somewhere in the middle of the handle’s trajectory. 
Upon reaching the rail’s end-of-travel, the computerised voice said “respond”, 
prompting the subject to speak aloud whether they thought the flash had come from a 
source on the false flash array ahead of or behind the handle. The experimenter entered 
this response by pressing one of two keys on a computer keyboard, at which point the 
linear positioner moved the switch platform to a random position at a velocity that was 
varied between trials. This was a decoy movement to prevent subjects from being able 
to respond on the basis of the sound of the motor. Subjects were then told to “reset” the 
handle position by moving it back to the original starting point. Upon completing this 
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motion, another decoy movement of the trigger was made before it was moved into its 
intended position for the next trial. At this point the next trial began. 
 
In sessions lasting approximately 1 hour, subjects performed 14 training trials (2 motion 
directions × 7 handle offsets × 1 repetition of each handle offset), followed by 280 
experimental trials (2 motion directions × 7 handle offsets × 20 repetitions of each 
handle offset) in 4 blocks, between which the room was illuminated for at least 2 
minutes and the direction of arm motion was alternated. Block order was 
counterbalanced across subjects. Within each block the order of trials was randomised. 
After the final trial of each block, excluding the final block, the computerised voice 
asked subjects to “hold position,” so that when they let go of the handle it would be in 
the correct position when the time came to begin the next block of trials. At the end of 
the experiment the method of deception was explained and subjects were questioned 
about whether they suspected the true source of the flashes; none did. 
 
Data analysis. Subjects’ responses from each motion direction were fit with a 
cumulative normal function (as implemented by the Palamedes toolbox for Matlab; 
Prins & Kingdom, 2009). Points of subjective equality (PSEs) and confidence intervals 
were estimated by means of a bootstrap procedure with 2000 iterations. PSEs referred to 
the extent of offset of the handle from the flash that received approximately 50% ‘flash-
ahead’ and 50% ‘flash-behind’ responses. A flash-lag effect, for example, would be 
evidenced by a positive PSE value, meaning that the flash had to be physically ahead of 
the hand in order to be perceived as aligned. Conversely, a flash-lead would appear as a 
negative PSE value. All PSEs are in millimetres (mm), and all velocities are in metres 
per second (m/s). Figure 2.2 shows the psychometric curves from a representative 
subject. 
 
 
2.3.2 Results 
  
PSEs. A paired-samples t-test revealed that the mean FP PSE (M = 45.34mm, SD = 
27.09) was significantly different from the mean FF PSE, (M = -50.25mm, SD = 20.35), 
t(7) = 6.16, p < .001, d = 2.183. This indicates that physically aligned flashes during FP 
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motion were more likely to have received a “flash-behind” response than physically 
aligned flashes during FF motion. One-sample t-tests furthermore showed that the mean 
FP PSE was greater than zero, t(7) = 4.73, p = .002, d = 3.578, indicating a flash-lag 
effect, and the mean FF PSE was less than zero, t(7) = 6.98, p < .001, d = 5.279, 
indicating a flash-lead effect. The data from the left-handed subject were similar to 
those from the right-handed subjects. The mean PSEs across subjects are plotted in 
Figure 2.3. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Experiment 1a: Psychometric curves from a representative subject. Negative 
offsets represent flash positions behind the hand. 
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Figure 2.3. Experiment 1a: Mean points of subjective equality for foveopetal and 
foveofugal motion. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard error. 
 
 
Velocity at the time of the flash. Subjects tended to move at higher velocity during FP 
motion trials (M = 0.61m/s, SD = 0.11) than during FF motion trials (M = 0.55m/s, SD 
= 0.06), t(7) = 2.66, p = .033, d = 1.428. However, there was no correlation (r = -.348, p 
= .399) between the velocity anisotropy and the PSE anisotropy, indicating that 
difference in velocity between directions did not explain the PSE difference between 
directions. 
 
 
2.3.3 Discussion 
 
These findings show that, when moving one’s arm towards fixation in total darkness, an 
aligned flash appears to lag behind the felt position of the hand. The data also show that 
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during motion away from fixation, an aligned flash is not only less likely to receive a 
“flash-behind” response, but actually tends to be perceived ahead of the hand.  
 
Besides being more likely to give “flash-behind” responses during FP motion, subjects’ 
arm movements also tended to be faster in that direction. While the visual flash-lag 
effect increases with velocity (Krekelberg & Lappe, 1999; Lee, Khuu, Li, & Hayes, 
2008; Nijhawan, 1994; Wojtach, Sung, Truong, & Purves, 2008), differences in velocity 
are unlikely to explain the difference in perceptual effects observed herein, since the 
velocity anisotropy did not correlate with the perceptual anisotropy across subjects. 
Furthermore, to argue that velocity differences are responsible for the perceptual 
anisotropy, one would have to assume that arm movement velocity above or below a 
certain threshold leads to a flash-lag or flash-lead effect, respectively. This has not been 
observed in visual flash-lag, and it is unlikely that subjects would have consistently 
moved their arm above this threshold velocity in one direction, and below it in the other. 
 
It cannot be ruled out, though, that differences in the layout of the trigger positions 
between movement directions lead to the difference in perceptual anisotropy. Consider 
that the earliest encountered trigger position for FP motion was 140mm from the start-
of-travel, compared to 220mm in FF motion. So, while the physically aligned trigger 
position was at the halfway point of motion in both directions, the overall spread of 
trigger positions over the full trajectory was inconsistent between motion conditions. 
Another experiment was therefore performed to investigate whether centring the array 
of trigger positions (rather than the aligned trigger position) on the halfway point of arm 
motion produced the same results. 
 
 	    
	   61 
2.4 Experiment 1b 
 
2.4.1 Methods 
 
2.4.1.1 Subjects  
 
A further 8 naïve subjects (5 male, 3 left-handed) with normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision participated in exchange for money or course credits. 
 
2.4.1.2 Apparatus and Procedure 
 
This experiment was identical to Experiment 1a, except that the rail’s left-most end-of-
travel was brought in 80mm further to the right, so that the full extent of travel was 
520mm rather than 600mm in Experiment 1a. This meant that the distance to the first 
trigger position was identical (140mm) in both directions of motion but that the 
physically aligned trigger position was reached after 300mm in the FP condition, 
compared to 220mm in the FF direction. Post-experiment questioning revealed that no 
subjects suspected the true source of the flash. 
 
 
2.4.2 Results 
 
PSEs. A paired-samples t-test again showed that the mean FP PSE (M = 93.89mm, SD 
= 77) was significantly different from the mean FF PSE, (M = -68.39mm, SD = 68.74), 
t(7) = 4.39, p = .003, d = 1.556. Two one-sample t-tests were used to compare the PSE 
in each direction with zero. These showed that, as before, the FP PSE was greater than 
zero, t(7) = 3.45, p = .011, d = 2.607, and the FF PSE was less than zero, t(7) = 2.81, p 
= .026, d = 2.127. The data from the left- and right-handed subjects were similar. Mean 
PSEs are plotted for each direction of motion in Figure 2.4 below. 
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Figure 2.4. Experiment 1b: Mean points of subjective equality for foveopetal and 
foveofugal motion. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard error. 
 
 
Velocity at the time of the flash. Also as before, subjects tended to move the handle 
faster during FP motion (M = 0.57m/s, SD = 0.14) than they did during FF motion (M = 
0.54m/s, SD = 0.11), t(7) = 2.51, p = .041, d = 1.477, but there was no correlation (r = -
.349, p = .396) between the velocity anisotropy and the PSE anisotropy. 
 
 
2.4.3 Discussion 
 
Experiment 1b produced the same overall findings as Experiment 1a, despite centring 
the array of trigger positions on the halfway point of arm motion. This suggests that the 
FP flash-lag effect and the FF flash-lead effect found in Experiment 1a are not due to 
differences in the layout of the trigger positions between motion directions. 
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An examination of the individual data from Experiments 1a and 1b (see Figure 2.5) 
suggests that there was a trend for those who produced a large FP flash-lag effect to also 
produce a large FF flash-lead effect. However, this was not borne out as a significant 
negative correlation between the PSEs in each direction, r = -.156, p = .563.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.5. PSEs for foveopetal and foveofugal motion from each individual in 
Experiments 1a and 1b in ascending order of anisotropy magnitude. Error bars indicate 
± 1 standard error. 
 
 
These experiments reveal that when unseen hand movement is towards the fovea, a 
collocated flash is perceived to lag behind the felt position of one’s hand. This replicates 
Nijhawan and Kirschfeld's (2003) basic finding of a motor flash-lag effect, though it 
should be noted that in their experiment the flash occurred when the motor stimulus (a 
handheld rod) was aligned with fixation, so motion at the time of the flash was neither 
foveopetal nor foveofugal. It has been shown herein that when motion is away from 
fixation, the perception is rather of the flash leading the hand’s position. It was 
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mentioned earlier that the visual flash-lag effect occurs regardless of movement 
direction relative to the fovea, but that it is larger when motion is towards, rather than 
away from fixation (Kanai et al., 2004; Mateeff & Hohnsbein, 1988; Shi & Nijhawan, 
2008). The direction, or sign, of the anisotropy is therefore the same between visual and 
motor domains, though some more in depth examination is required (see further on). 
Finding a foveopetal flash-lag and a foveofugal flash-lead in almost every subject 
suggests that making subjects believe that the flashes were in motion with their hand 
resulted in more consistent between-subject data than was found in the aforementioned 
pilot studies. 
 
Visual flash-lead effects have been reported under certain circumstances (for a review, 
see Hubbard, 2014), such as when the luminance of the flash is increased 
(Purushothaman et al., 1998), when the contrast between moving and flashed stimuli is 
decreased (Arnold et al., 2009), or when the appearance of the flash is precued 
(Hommuk, Bachmann, & Oja, 2008). However, only a finding from Shi and Nijhawan 
(2008) helps elucidate why there might be a flash-lag effect in one motion direction and 
a flash-lead effect in the other. In an experiment analogous to the motor versions 
reported above, these authors presented bars that translated towards or away from 
fixation in either the right or left visual field. Large flash-lags were found in both visual 
fields during foveopetal motion, though a small flash-lag, and a flash-lead were found 
during foveofugal motion in the left and right visual fields, respectively. Considering 
that the experiments reported herein were using the right visual field exclusively, it 
stands out that this combination of motion direction and visual field might hold the key 
to understanding the present anisotropic effects. That is, a foveofugal flash-lead may not 
be peculiar to motor flash-lag. Shi and Nijhawan (2008) performed further experiments 
and demonstrated that their flash-lead was the result of a small forward displacement of 
the moving object coupled with a large forward displacement of the flash (i.e., a large 
flash-drag effect, in which the position of the flash is shifted in the direction of nearby 
motion), that actually shifted the perceived position of the flash past that of the moving 
stimulus. Compared to foveopetal movement, it was shown that motion in a foveofugal 
direction (regardless of visual field) is associated with both a reduced flash-lag, and an 
enhanced flash-drag. The same study also found that, when motion is towards fixation, 
the perceived position of the flash is actually repulsed, rather than dragged. On this 
view, a flash-drag in the FF condition and a flash-repulsion in the FP condition 
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contributed to – but did not fully account for – the visual flash-lag anisotropy. If similar 
but more pronounced effects are present when the position of an unseen arm in motion 
is probed with a visible flash, this could account for the difference between the FP and 
FF conditions observed herein. Most notably, a strong flash-drag might explain why the 
flash was perceived to lead the position of the hand during foveofugal motion. This 
leads to the further question of whether the hand or the flash is biased to a greater 
extent. Take, for example, that in both directions of motion the percept tends to be of 
the flash being to the right of (i.e., more foveofugal than) the hand. Is this because the 
flash is repulsed during foveopetal motion and dragged during foveofugal motion, while 
hand position is relatively stable? Or, might the flash position remain stable, while the 
hand position is biased further along its trajectory in foveopetal motion, and less far in 
foveofugal motion? These questions will be examined in more detail in the next 
experiments, which look at whether flash-drag effects occur when the moving stimulus 
is one’s unseen limb. 
 
 
2.5 Experiment 2a 
 
2.5.1 Methods 
 
This experiment was an attempt to produce a flash-drag version of Experiments 1a and 
1b, in much the same way that flash-drag adaptations of visual flash-lag experiments 
have been performed (e.g., Shi & Nijhawan, 2008). The aim was thus to measure 
whether there exists a motor flash-drag effect when the flash is presented at a 
comparable eccentricity to that at which it appeared in the former experiments. 
 
2.5.1.1 Subjects 
 
Twelve subjects (4 male, 2 left-handed) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
participated in exchange for payment or course credits. 
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2.5.1.2 Apparatus  
 
The handle, false flash array, half-silvered mirror, central fixation point, and 
computerised voice remained unchanged from the preceding experiments. The slide 
rail’s extent-of-travel was 600mm, as it had been in Experiment 1a. This time, however, 
the trigger switch and timing switches were fixed in position, such that the flash was 
always triggered when the subject reached the halfway point of arm motion. Instead of 
just one true flash, there was a row of true flash light sources spaced at 8mm intervals, 
again mounted above the half-silvered mirror and superimposed over the false flash 
array spots. During leftwards (FP) movement, the horizontal offsets of the flash from 
the reference line could be 24mm, 16mm, or 8mm to the right, physically aligned, or 
8mm or 16mm to the left. During rightwards (FF) movement the offsets were 24mm, 
16mm, or 8mm to the left, physically aligned, or 8mm or 16mm to the right. Also above 
the half-silvered mirror was a vertical reference line (1mm × 25mm; white light), visible 
in the same plane of depth as the flashes, with its lowest point 25mm (3.55°) above the 
central flash. This allowed a flash to be presented at a particular horizontal offset from 
the reference line. To prevent subjects using the changing position of the flash relative 
to fixation to inform their judgments, the row of true flashes and the reference line were 
yoked together and their position was randomly jittered between 3 locations to the right 
of fixation (150mm ± 15mm; equating to 20.43° ± 2.13°). See Figure 2.6 for a 
schematic diagram of the experimental set up. The experiment was controlled with 
custom Matlab scripts running with the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 
1997). 
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Figure 2.6. Experiment 2a: Schematic diagram of apparatus and stimuli. 
 
 
2.5.1.3 Procedure 
 
Instructions. As in the previous experiments, subjects gripped the handle between the 
forefinger and thumb of their right hand and were given a chance to familiarise 
themselves with the full extent of the slide rail’s travel (600mm). An approximate ideal 
movement velocity was demonstrated. The same method was used to imply to subjects 
that during the experiment the flashes would be coming from the false flash array 
attached to the top of the handle. Subjects were then told that they would fixate their 
eyes straight ahead while they moved the handle from one end of the rail to the other, 
during which a flash would appear from the false flash array. Their task was to judge 
(verbally) whether the flash had been to the left or right of the reference line (binary 
choice). The same computerised voice was used to give verbal instructions throughout 
the experiment. 
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Experiment. The fixation point was visible throughout. With the lights switched off, 
the computerised voice requested that subjects move their arm either to the right or left 
end of the rail, depending on whether the first block would consist of leftwards (FP) or 
rightwards (FF) trials, respectively. Before each trial began, the reference line and row 
of true flashes were moved into a decoy position, before being moved to the intended 
position, so that the sound of the linear positioner did not reliably indicate to where they 
had moved. Once in position, the reference line was illuminated and the computerised 
voice said either “move left” or “move right,” depending on the condition. When the 
handle reached the halfway point of motion, one of the true flashes was presented 
(1ms). As in the previous experiments, arm velocity at the time of the flash was 
measured using the time taken to pass between two switches (120mm apart) either side 
of the flash trigger. Upon reaching the end-of-travel the computer voice asked the 
subject to “respond,” to which the subject said either “left” or “right.” In response, the 
experimenter pressed one of two keys on a computer keyboard accordingly. At this 
point the reference line was switched off, and was moved along with the flashes to 
another decoy position. The computerised voice then said “reset,” which was the signal 
for the subject to move their handle back to the start. After resetting the handle position, 
the reference line and true flashes were moved to another decoy location, and then to 
the intended location for the following trial. At this time the reference line was 
illuminated again and the next trial was in progress. 
 
After 12 training trials (2 motion directions × 6 flash offsets × 1 repetition of each flash 
offset), subjects performed 288 experimental trials (2 motion directions × 6 flash offsets 
× 3 reference positions × 8 repetitions of each flash offset) in sessions lasting 
approximately 1 hour. The same block design (counterbalanced across subjects) was 
used as in previous experiments, with the same procedure of illuminating the room 
during each break. Trials were randomised within each block. When shown the true 
flashes at the end of the experiment all subjects indicated that they had believed the 
flashes they saw had come from the false flash array. 
 
Data analysis. The same procedure of fitting psychometric curves to each subject’s data 
was used to generate PSEs and confidence intervals. Each PSE corresponded to the 
horizontal offset of the flash from the reference line that would be expected to receive 
50% “flash-left” and 50% “flash-right” responses. A positive value would mean that the 
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flash had to be to the right of the reference bar in order to be perceived as aligned with 
it, while negative values mean that the flash had to be to the left. A flash-drag would 
therefore be indicated by a positive value in the leftwards condition, and by a negative 
value in the rightwards motion. All PSEs are in millimetres (mm), and all velocities are 
in metres per second (m/s). Psychometric curves from a representative subject are 
plotted in Figure 2.7. 
 
 
2.5.2 Results  
 
PSEs. A paired-samples t-test revealed that leftwards PSEs (M = 3.98mm, SD = 4.45) 
were significantly to the right of rightwards PSEs (M = -0.26mm, SD = 4.39), t(11) = 
5.16, p < .001, d = 1.493. Additionally, one-sample t-tests showed that the mean 
leftwards PSE was significantly to the right of physical alignment, t(11) = 3.1, p = .01, d 
= 1.87, but that the mean rightwards PSE was not significantly different from 
alignment, t(11) = .21, p = .84, d = 0.12. There was furthermore a significant paired-
samples correlation, r = .793, p = .002, indicating that those who produced large 
leftward biases during leftwards motion, also tended to produce relatively large leftward 
biases during rightwards motion. Mean PSEs for each direction of motion are plotted in 
Figure 2.8. 
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Figure 2.7. Experiment 2a: Psychometric curves from a representative subject. Negative 
offsets represent flash positions to the left of the reference. 
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Figure 2.8. Experiment 2a: Mean PSEs for leftwards and rightwards motion. A positive 
value means that the flash had to be to the right of the reference line in order to be 
perceived as aligned. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard error.  
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Figure 2.9. Experiment 2a: PSE anisotropy scores (i.e., the difference between 
leftwards and rightwards PSEs) for each individual, and the mean anisotropy. A positive 
anisotropy score means that the leftwards PSE was right of the rightwards PSE (i.e., a 
relative flash-drag). Error bar indicates ± 1 standard error. 
 
 
Velocities. A paired-samples t-test shows that mean velocity was not different between 
motion directions, t(11) = 2.07, p = .063, d = 0.603, nor was PSE anisotropy correlated 
with velocity anisotropy between directions, r = .031, p = .925. This indicates that 
velocity did not have a major impact on the perceptual task. 
 
 
2.5.3 Discussion 
 
These data show that the perceived position of a flash presented in the visual periphery 
is biased by the direction of nearby unseen hand movement. During leftwards (FP) 
	   73 
motion, the flash had to be an average of 4mm right of physical alignment with a 
continuously visible reference line in order to be perceived as aligned. During 
rightwards (FF) movement, however, the flash was not significantly biased away from 
physical alignment. An examination of Figure 2.9 demonstrates that, for every subject, 
the difference between the perceived positions of the flashes in each direction was 
consistent with a direction-dependent flash mislocalisation. Put differently, an aligned 
flash during leftwards motion was perceived to the left of an aligned flash during 
rightwards motion. This represents the first demonstration of a motor flash-drag effect. 
While modest, the effect during leftwards movement is highly robust, and equal to 
approximately twice the width of the flash itself, or 0.57° of visual angle.  
 
However, it is worth considering whether this bias reflects a change in perception 
between conditions, or simply a change in how subjects respond. It has been posited 
that measuring illusions with binary choice tasks such as that adopted here means that 
the possibility of shifts in decisional criterion masquerading as shifts in perception is 
not ruled out (Morgan et al., 2013). In terms of the present experiment, it might be, for 
example, that when moving one’s hand leftwards, or immediately after having heard the 
instruction to “move left”, subjects were more likely to give a “left” response, due to 
cognitive biases. Given that the stimuli were presented peripherally, where spatial 
uncertainty is greater (Kanai et al., 2004), one might also have expected the potential 
influence of cognitive factors to be high. This possibility is addressed in the following 
experiment, in which stimuli are presented closer to fixation. 
 
Why, though, should leftwards movement produce a drag effect and rightwards 
movement no effect at all? There is evidence that visual stimuli are often biased towards 
fixation (foveal attraction; Eggert, Ditterich, & Straube, 2001; Mateeff & Gourevich, 
1983; Nieman, Sheth, & Shimojo, 2010; O’Regan, 1984; Osaka, 1977), and it has been 
shown in particular that the perceived positions of brief flashes are biased towards 
fixation in comparison to continuously visible stimuli (e.g., Mateeff & Gourevich, 
1983). In light of this, it could be that in the current experiment there was a general 
tendency to perceive the flash closer to fixation than the continuously visible reference 
line, which was enhanced by leftwards (FP) arm movement and nulled by rightwards 
(FF) arm movement. In support of this, subjects who demonstrated a large leftwards 
bias during leftwards motion were also likely to show a relatively large leftwards bias 
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during rightwards motion. This is consistent with the possibility that there are individual 
differences in the extent of the foveal attraction of flashes. The possibility is thus raised 
that the motor flash-drag effect observed during leftwards movement was augmented by 
foveal attraction, making it greater than it might otherwise be. The next experiment tests 
this possibility by having subjects judge the position of the flash relative to a central 
fixation point, rather than to a reference line in the periphery. 
 
 
2.6 Experiment 2b 
 
2.6.1 Methods 
 
2.6.1.1 Subjects 
 
Ten subjects (5 male, 1 left-handed) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
participated in exchange for money or course credits. 
 
2.6.1.2 Apparatus 
 
The handle, false flash array, half-silvered mirror, and computerised voice remained 
unchanged from the last experiments. A row of 5 true flashes was mounted above the 
half-silvered mirror (as the true flashes had been in previous experiments) and its image 
was superimposed over the row of light spots on the false flash array – itself projected 
through the mirror. The true flashes did not change position during the experiment. The 
face of the false flash array was approximately 318mm from subjects’ eyes. The 
fixation point was also reflected in the half-silvered mirror, though it was now visible 
35mm (6.29°) above the central true flash. The fixation point was projected in the same 
plane of depth as the flashes. The horizontal offsets of the 5 true flashes from fixation 
were 6mm or 3mm to the left, physically aligned, or 3mm or 6mm to the right. The slide 
rail was restricted to 400mm extent-of-travel, so that the subjects’ handle could be 
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moved 200mm to either side of fixation. The flash trigger switch and timing switches 
were mounted on the motorised linear positioner (as in experiments 1a and 1b), and 
their position was jittered between 3 locations, allowing the flash to be presented at the 
moment the handle reached fixation, or 30mm before or after reaching it. This meant 
that the amount of handle motion required to trigger the flash was unpredictable. Figure 
2.10 shows a schematic diagram of the experimental set up. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10. Experiment 2b: Schematic diagram of apparatus and stimuli. 
 
 
2.6.1.3 Procedure 
 
Instructions. The instructions procedure from Experiment 2a was used again, except 
that now subjects were tasked with judging whether the flash had appeared to the left or 
right of fixation (binary choice). 
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Experiment. As in previous experiments, the fixation point was visible throughout. The 
same instructions from the computerised voice were used to ensure than the subject’s 
handle was in the correct starting position. Once the linear positioner had moved the 
triggers into a position (preceded by a decoy movement), the command was given to 
“move left” or to “move right.” Subjects moved their hand from one end of the rail to 
the other, during which one of the 5 true flashes was presented at a given offset from 
fixation. Upon reaching the end-of-travel, the “respond” command was given, at which 
time subjects verbalised whether they thought the flash had been to the left or right of 
fixation. The experimenter entered the response before a decoy movement of the 
triggers was made, and then the command to “reset” was given. After reaching the 
starting position, another decoy movement was made, followed by a movement of the 
triggers into the assigned position for the next trial. 
 
Subjects performed 10 training trials (2 motion directions × 5 flash offsets × 1 repetition 
of each flash offset), followed by 240 experimental trials (2 motion directions × 5 flash 
offsets × 3 trigger positions × 8 repetitions of each flash offset) in sessions lasting 
approximately 1 hour. The same counterbalanced alternated block design was used, 
with the same procedure of illuminating the room during breaks. All subjects indicated 
at the end of the experiment that the deception method had worked. The fitting of 
psychometric functions was identical to the procedure used in Experiment 2a, although 
now PSEs referred to biases relative to fixation, rather than to a peripheral reference.  
 
 
2.6.2 Results 
 
PSEs. A paired-samples t-test again showed that the mean leftwards PSE (M =  
-0.15mm, SD = 0.59) was significantly right of the mean rightwards PSE (M =  
-1.65mm, SD = 1.01), t(9) = 5.93, p < .001, d = 2.113. One-sample t-tests showed that 
while the mean leftwards PSE did not differ significantly from alignment, t(9) = .81, p = 
.437, d = 0.543, the mean rightwards PSE was significantly biased to the left, t(9) = 5.2, 
p = .001, d = 3.47. The paired-samples correlation did not reach significance, r = .606, p 
= .063. See Figure 2.11 for the mean PSEs plotted for each direction of motion. 
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Figure 2.11. Experiment 2b: Mean PSEs for leftwards and rightwards motion. A 
negative value means that the flash had to be to the left of fixation in order to be 
perceived as aligned. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard error. 
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Figure 2.12. Experiment 2b: PSE anisotropies (i.e., the difference between leftwards 
and rightwards PSEs) for each individual, and the mean anisotropy. A positive 
anisotropy score means that the leftwards PSE was right of the rightwards PSE (i.e., a 
relative flash-drag). Error bar indicates ± 1 standard error. 
 
 
Velocities. A paired-samples t-test shows that subjects moved the handle faster during 
leftwards motion (M = 0.69m/s, SD = 0.11) than during rightwards motion (M = 
0.62m/s, SD = 0.11), t(9) = 4.91, p = .001, d = 1.552. There was however no correlation 
between PSE anisotropy and velocity anisotropy, r = .311, p = .382, suggesting that 
directional differences in velocity did not explain the PSE differences. 
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2.6.3 Discussion 
 
These findings replicate those of Experiment 2a, insomuch as rightwards PSEs are left 
of leftwards PSEs (see Figure 2.12) – indicating a general motor flash-drag effect. 
Unlike the previous experiment, however, rightwards motion produced a significant 
flash-drag, while leftwards motion did not. This particular facet of the results is in fact 
the opposite of what was found previously, when the flash was judged with reference to 
a continuously visible line in the periphery, and will be revisited shortly. The shift 
during rightwards motion in this experiment was smaller than that found during 
leftwards motion in Experiment 2a (~0.57°), though still corresponds to approximately 
0.3° of visual angle. That an unseen arm movement can bias the position of a flash in 
relatively central vision to this extent is especially interesting given that people are 
normally extremely accurate at judging the relative alignment of two visual stimuli 
(Westheimer, 1987, 2009). In light of this it seems unlikely that a shift in decisional 
criterion (see Morgan et al., 2013) could explain the result. This also lends weight to the 
suggestion that the bias observed in Experiment 2a was genuinely perceptual in nature, 
and not due to a change in criterion. 
 
We turn now to considering why an effect was found in rightwards motion, but not in 
leftwards motion. In discussing Experiment 2a it was argued that foveal attraction of the 
flash might enhance a flash-drag effect during leftwards motion (which was towards 
fixation), though cancel it out during rightwards motion (which was away from 
fixation). In Experiment 2b, neither motion direction was explicitly fovepetal or 
foveofugal. The same distance was travelled leading up to, and after passing fixation, 
and the flash was triggered when the hand was either about to reach, aligned with, or 
having just passed fixation. The flashes appeared at small offsets from fixation, and all 
offsets were used an equal number of times during both directions of arm movement. It 
could be therefore that some horizontal foveal attraction of the flash reduced the flash-
drag effect, but it is unclear why it should be to different extents in each motion 
direction. An argument from the perspective of foveal attraction thus fails to clarify why 
rightwards motion should produce an effect that leftwards motion does not. The 
findings on visual flash-drag though might help to shed some light on the situation. 
Attention was brought earlier to the findings of Shi and Nijhawan (2008), who showed 
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that the visual flash-drag effect was larger during foveofugal motion than it was during 
foveopetal motion. Now, consider that in everyday life, unless one is adopting a slightly 
awkward posture (e.g., if their arm crossing to the opposite side of their midsaggital 
plane), the right hand tends to stimulate the right visual field more often than the left 
visual field, and vice versa for the left hand. A backhand movement of either hand away 
from the body will therefore produce foveofugal visual feedback more often than it will 
foveopetal visual feedback. So, it could be that in the present experiment, backhand 
(rightwards) movement produced a flash-drag effect because of the fundamental 
interaction, or similarity, between visual and motor systems. That is to say, even when 
backhand movement is not clearly foveopetal or foveofugal in nature, perhaps the close 
association of foveofugal visual motion with backhand arm movement means that the 
two types of motion are similarly potent at yielding flash-drag effects. The relatively 
small flash-drag that is evident in visual foveopetal motion (Shi & Nijhawan, 2008), 
might also therefore translate to a small motor flash-drag for forehand (leftwards) arm 
movement. While we saw that this class of motion resulted in a strong flash-drag in 
Experiment 2a, it was argued that it was probably supplemented by foveal attraction. In 
the current experiment, however, this reasoning would imply that a flash-drag in either 
direction would have to work against foveal attraction. A weak foveopetal, or forehand, 
motor flash-drag effect might therefore have been nulled by a stronger tendency to see 
the flash closer to fixation. 
 
On the basis of the findings of Experiments 2a and 2b it is argued that the flash-drag 
effect occurs in the motor domain, as well as in vision, though some other potential 
explanations must also be addressed. For a start, it cannot be ruled out that the flash 
mislocalisation observed here occurred because subjects attempted to pursue with their 
eyes the felt position of their hand, and that this eye movement itself was responsible 
for the perceived shift of the flash. This would simply reassert previous findings that 
flashes presented during smooth pursuit are mislocalised in the direction of eye 
movement (Ward, 1976). However, for smooth pursuit eye movements to produce the 
effects observed, subjects would have had to have been doing this only during leftward 
arm movements in Experiment 2a, and only during rightwards arm movements in 
Experiment 2b – an unlikely set of circumstances. It is thus proposed that smooth 
pursuit eye movements are probably not at the heart of the motor flash-drag effect 
observed herein. 
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An issue that compels caution in interpreting the size of the present motor flash-drag 
effects concerns the use of a continuously visible reference stimulus for judging the 
relative position of the flash. Visual flash-drag is most often probed by measuring the 
perceived offset of two simultaneously presented flashes – each nearby to one of two 
stimuli moving in opposite directions (e.g., Durant & Johnston, 2004; Eagleman & 
Sejnowski, 2007; Fukiage, Whitney, & Murakami, 2011; Watanabe, Nijhawan, & 
Shimojo, 2002; Whitney & Cavanagh, 2000). The perceived distance between the two 
flashes when they are physically aligned is taken as a measurement of the sum of two 
flash-drag effects – one in each direction (Whitney & Cavanagh, 2000a). Another 
method, upon which the current approach was based, has been to present a continuously 
visible stimulus, which the position of the flash must be judged with reference to in the 
presence of motion (e.g., Shi & Nijhawan, 2008). This method has its drawbacks 
though, since it has been shown that the positions of brief visual stimuli are often biased 
towards continuously visible nearby landmarks (Sheth & Shimojo, 2001). The 
implication, then, is that the flash-drag effects observed in the current experiments may 
actually represent underestimations, due to the use of continuously visible reference 
stimuli that could limit the dragging effect of arm motion. An alternative method, 
analogous to the majority of the visual flash-drag literature, would have been to have 
subjects move their arms in opposite directions and present simultaneous flashes near to 
each of them. The offset of the flashes (divided by 2) would have demonstrated a flash-
lag effect uncontaminated by the presence of visual landmarks. Unpublished 
observations with such a method, however, indicate effects of a similar size to those 
shown herein, of less than 5mm (approximately 0.6°) in each direction (Nijhawan, 
2004). This suggests, therefore, that the presence of a continuously visible reference 
probably did not greatly impact the size of the motor flash-drag effect as measured in 
Experiments 2a and 2b. 
 
A separate possibility is that the perceptual system attempts to reconcile the position of 
the flash with the felt position of the hand, by shifting the former closer to the latter, as 
if the flash is treated as a brief glimpse of the hand’s position. This would be a form of 
multisensory integration not unlike the well-known ventriloquist effect, in which the 
location of an auditory stimulus is biased towards a visual stimulus that appears to be 
associated with it (Howard & Templeton, 1966). Other multisensory illusions also show 
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that vision can ‘capture’ the location of touch (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998; Pavani, 
Spence, & Driver, 2000) and proprioception (Holmes, Crozier, & Spence, 2004; 
Holmes & Spence, 2005), so that tactile and proprioceptive judgments are spatially 
biased towards, for instance, a fake hand, or a mirror image of the subject’s opposing 
hand. It has been shown too that proprioceptive information is more reliable during 
active versus passive movements (Chokron, Colliot, Atzeni, Bartolomeo, & Ohlmann, 
2004; van Beers, Wolpert, & Haggard, 2002), and that visual input is less reliable when 
a solitary stimulus is viewed in total darkness, compared to when the whole visual field 
is illuminated (Mon-Williams, Wann, Jenkinson, & Rushton, 1997; Plooy, Tresilian, 
Mon-Williams, & Wann, 1998). Taken together with the assertion that sensory inputs 
are integrated in an optimal fashion given the reliability of current input (e.g., van Beers 
et al., 2002), the present experiments seem ideal candidates to display the 
proprioceptive capture of vision, given that they all involved active arm movements and 
minimal visual stimuli. To reiterate, then, the question here is whether the flash-drag 
effects found herein represent attempts by the brain to integrate an impoverished visual 
stimulus, with a relatively compelling kinaesthetic and proprioceptive sense of the arm 
in motion. In addressing this issue let us reconsider the findings of Experiments 1a and 
1b, in which it was shown that the flash was perceived to lag the position of the 
foveopetally moving hand by about 45mm, and lead the position of the foveofugally 
moving hand by around 50mm. The displacements of the hand are therefore 
approximately an order of magnitude greater than the largest displacements of the flash. 
It seems unlikely, therefore, that motor flash-drag effects contribute in any major way to 
the motor flash-lag and flash-lead effects (something that will be revisited in more 
detail later). So, if we take the foveofugal flash-lead effect to represent a shift in the 
position of the hand, rather than of the flash, it suggests that one’s hand is perceived less 
far along its trajectory than it really is when moving away from fixation. If this was also 
the case during Experiment 2a, (which used comparable stimuli to Experiments 1a and 
1b, but in a flash-drag configuration), and if the flash positions were biased towards the 
perceived location of the hand, we would have expected to see the flash shifted left, 
towards the hand during rightwards motion. This was however not the case. Flashes in 
this condition were not significantly shifted away from the reference line. This finding 
implies that capture of the flash position by the hand was not responsible for the motor 
flash-drag effects. 
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A final finding that should be addressed is that of Watanabe, Sato, and Shimojo (2003), 
who demonstrated that flash-drag can occur when the moving stimuli have been 
occluded at the time of the flash. In their experiment a flash-drag was observed when 
two white circles translated vertically in opposite directions and flashes were presented 
over each of their trajectories when they were close to horizontal alignment. This effect 
persisted even when the central portions of the circles’ trajectories (but not the flashes 
themselves) were seemingly occluded by a black rectangle. That is to say, when the 
flashes were presented after the circles had completely disappeared (apparently behind 
the occluder), a flash-drag effect, though diminished, was still present. The conclusion 
was that visual objects in motion are tracked even when out of view by relatively high-
level mechanisms able to influence the processes behind the flash-drag effect. In 
support of this general idea, it has been shown that visual flash-drag can occur with 
illusory motion (Watanabe et al., 2002) and apparent motion (Shim & Cavanagh, 2004; 
Whitney, 2006) stimuli. The possibility therefore, is that the present motor flash-drag 
effects were the result of inferred visual motion, or perhaps mental imagery of the hand. 
While the aforementioned experiments all differed from the current study in that they 
involved explicitly visual motion percepts, cognitive processes cannot be ruled out as an 
explanation for the motor flash-drag effect. However, as we shall see further on, a more 
promising, lower-level account presents itself in the intertwined nature of perceptual 
and motor systems. 
 
 
2.6.3.1 Motor flash-lag and lead in light of motor flash-drag  
 
Let us return briefly to consider the findings from Experiments 1a and 1b, in light of the 
flash-drag effects observed in Experiments 2a and 2b. In discussing the dual finding of 
a flash-lag in foveopetal arm motion, and a flash-lead in foveofugal arm motion, the 
possibility was raised that the flash may have been repulsed in the former, and dragged 
beyond the hand in the latter, analogous to vision (Shi & Nijhawan, 2008). Essentially, 
it was not clear whether the hand or flash position was biased differently depending on 
the direction of motion, or whether it was a combination of both. Indeed, it has now 
been argued that while the position of the flash is generally dragged in the direction of 
motion, the size of the effect is too small (by approximately an order of magnitude) to 
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account for the difference of the perceived position of the hand relative to the flash 
observed between foveopetal and foveofugal flash-lag. It seems, therefore, that the 
findings of Experiments 1a and 1b reflect a motion direction based anisotropy of 
perceived hand position. During unseen arm movement towards fixation, the motor 
flash-lag effect is observed to approximately the same extent as was originally reported 
by Nijhawan and Kirschfeld (2003). However, when the arm is moving away from 
fixation, and a flash is presented in alignment, the percept is in the opposite direction, 
such that the hand lags the position of the flash.  
 
Before attempting to explain the difference between the foveopetal and foveofugal 
effects, it is worth returning briefly to a possible interpretation of motor flash-lag in 
general. Since the latency of proprioceptive information is lower than that of vision 
(Stein, Wallace, & Meredith, 1995), one’s hand might be perceived ahead of a brief 
visual stimulus because its representation arrives earlier in perception. A reduced 
latency for moving objects compared to flashes has been put forward to explain the 
flash-lag effect in general (Purushothaman et al., 1998; Whitney, Murakami, et al., 
2000; Whitney & Murakami, 1998), though it is doubtful whether it can account for the 
variety of phenomena observed (Alais & Burr, 2003; Arnold et al., 2009; Krekelberg & 
Lappe, 2001; Nijhawan et al., 2004; Nijhawan, 2002; Sheth et al., 2000). In addition to 
these issues with the approach, the current finding of a flash-lead effect in FF motion is 
entirely at odds with a differential latency account. In spite of the faster processing of 
proprioceptive information, a limb moving away from fixation was perceived to lag 
behind a visible flash.  
 
What, then, might cause hand position to be biased further along its trajectory in 
foveopetal motion, and less far along its trajectory in foveofugal motion? One 
explanation might be that, irrespective of motion direction, the hand is biased towards 
fixation more so than the flash. Indeed, in both directions of motion, subjects perceived 
their hand to be closer to fixation than an aligned flash. While it was discussed earlier 
that visual stimuli are often foveally attracted, the particular issue here is whether an 
invisible limb is biased in the same way, but to a larger extent than a visible flash. It has 
been highlighted elsewhere that if a foveofugally moving stimulus is foveally attracted 
more so than a flash, it might produce what appears to be a flash-lead effect (differential 
foveal attraction; Kanai et al., 2004). This leads to a question: are we really seeing the 
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flash lead the position of the hand in the FF conditions, or is it just that subjects 
perceive their hand closer to fixation than the flash, irrespective of motion direction? 
The apparent tendency for people with a large foveopetal flash-lag to also produce a 
relatively large foveofugal flash-lead, though not significant, would support this 
interpretation. However, if a static force (Nieman et al., 2010) such as differential foveal 
attraction were strong enough to produce a bias of the magnitude observed, one would 
have expected it to cancel out the motor flash-lag effect reported by Nijhawan and 
Kirschfeld (2003), though their experiment used similar velocities and produced a flash-
lag effect comparable to that observed in the present foveopetal motion condition. This 
last point warrants further attention. Consider that if the limb were especially biased 
towards fixation by foveal attraction, foveopetal motion (as in the present experiment) 
should produce a larger effect than motion that is neither towards nor away from 
fixation (as in Nijhawan & Kirschfeld, 2003), because the bias would drag the former 
far beyond the flash and the latter back towards the flash. The differential foveal 
attraction hypothesis is therefore difficult to reconcile with the present findings in 
conjunction with those of Nijhawan and Kirschfeld (2003). Finally on this matter, it is 
conceptually unclear why limb position should be foveally attracted more than a visual 
stimulus, given that accurately localising objects relative to one’s hand is required to 
effectively interact with the environment. An uncorrected bias to perceive a body part 
closer to fixation than a visual object would likely lead to judgment errors. It is thus 
improbable that the anisotropy reported herein can be explained by differential foveal 
attraction, and that motion away from fixation really does generate a flash-lead; that is, 
a tendency to perceive the flash ahead of the hand, rather than simply further from 
fixation. It should be noted, though, that while it has been argued that a differential 
foveal attraction account is not without its difficulties, it explains the data rather well, 
and has certainly not been ruled out in the present experiments. The section that follows 
will present an alternative position, which may explain both the motor flash-lag/lead, as 
well as the flash-drag findings. 
 
Before moving on, however, another possibility is worth considering. As outlined 
above, it has been observed that the perceived position of one’s moving hand relative to 
a flash is different depending on the direction of motion of the hand relative to fixation. 
It could be though that this anisotropic effect depends on a ‘reference point’ other than 
fixation. For example, it might be that the direction of hand motion relative to the 
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direction in which one’s head or body is facing determines whether the hand is 
perceived more or less far along its trajectory. In the current experiments the subjects’ 
eyes, head, and body all faced in the same direction, so this has not been tested. This 
point will require further research, and is returned to later on (see Section 2.7.2). 
 
 
2.7 General Discussion 
 
In the introduction, literature was outlined that emphasised the close association 
between perception and action systems. It will be argued herein that the motor flash-
lag/lead findings of Experiments 1a and 1b, and the motor flash-drag findings of 
Experiment 2a and 2b, derive from such a relationship. 
 
Nijhawan and Kirschfeld (2003) interpreted the motor flash-lag effect in terms of the 
operation of forward models, a prevalent concept in the motor control literature (e.g., 
Miall & Wolpert, 1996). The idea extends from the broader concept of internal models, 
which posits that the nervous system internally simulates the workings of the 
musculoskeletal system to solve various computational problems (Kawato, Furukawa, 
& Suzuki, 1987). More specifically, forward models are thought to take as input the 
motor system’s current state and a given motor command in order to predict a future 
state (Jordan & Rumelhart, 1992). It has been suggested that a function of such a 
prediction could be to reduce the system’s reliance on delayed proprioceptive feedback, 
which would otherwise result in control instability (Miall & Wolpert, 1996). This idea 
is notably comparable to the suggestion that the future states of visual stimuli are 
predicted in order to compensate for the transmission delays between retinal activity 
and perception (e.g., Nijhawan, 1994, 1997, 2002, 2008). 
 
Several avenues of research provide behavioural evidence for prediction in arm motor 
control. In a virtual pole-balancing task, for instance, Mehta and Schaal (2002) showed 
that when the visual display was momentarily blanked-out, performance was consistent 
with subjects having access to an internal estimate of the pole’s current state, based on a 
prediction. Load-sliding tasks show that grip force is regulated in anticipation of 
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changes in load force (Flanagan & Wing, 1997), and that the inertial anisotropy of the 
arm is appropriately predicted when planning the movement of an object (Flanagan & 
Lolley, 2001). Another strand of research reveals that adjustments of the legs are made 
prior to, rather than in response to, postural disturbances arising from arm movements 
(Leonard, Gritsenko, Ouckama, & Stapley, 2011). However, Nijhawan and Kirschfeld's 
(2003) claim that the motor flash-lag effect is a manifestation of forward models finds 
most direct support from comparable studies examining estimates of unseen hand 
position. It has been demonstrated, for example, that when tasked with foveating the felt 
position of their hand after an invisible arm movement, subjects consistently 
overestimate the distance it has travelled (Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995). 
Similarly, saccades towards the hand’s instantaneously felt position during movements 
in the dark are towards the location it will occupy in 150ms, rather than to where it is 
currently (Ariff, Donchin, Nanayakkara, & Shadmehr, 2002). Like Nijhawan and 
Kirschfeld's (2003) study, these last two papers suggest that perceptual judgments of 
arm position are forwardly shifted. 
 
A flash-lead effect accompanying foveofugal arm movement is not readily explained by 
a motor prediction account, since the moving object is perceived to lag behind the flash. 
Further research is required to investigate the nature of the foveofugal flash-lead effect. 
It may, however, reflect the operation of very different neural systems to the foveopetal 
flash-lag effect. Consider the differences in motor control inherent to these opposing 
directions of arm motion. In everyday human behaviour, foveopetal arm motion tends to 
comprise forearm movement towards the midsaggital plane, with the palm of the hand 
facing inwards more often than outwards. This class of movement, as compared to 
foveofugal motion, is more likely to be used to bring the hand and fingers towards – and 
perhaps to interact with – an object of interest. With this in mind, it is probable that 
foveopetal arm movements are underpinned by more developed neural architecture, 
permitting, for instance, highly dextrous actions. Backhand foveofugal arm movement, 
on the other hand, is less commonly deployed in finely tuned, skilled interaction with 
objects of attention. This leads us onto the possibility that more behaviourally 
significant types of movement might be more likely to result in a flash-lag percept. This 
argument was put forth by Shi and Nijhawan (2008) to explain the difference between 
the larger foveopetal and smaller foveofugal flash-lag effects in vision. These authors 
highlighted that “a scenario where an object’s image is ‘approaching the fovea’ is much 
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more reflective of the animal’s interest in the object than the scenario where the object’s 
image is ‘moving away from the fovea’” (p. 10). That is, the need to accurately localise 
an object moving towards the fovea is likely to be more pressing than the need to 
localise an object moving away. This is similar to the conjecture outlined above that 
foveopetal arm movement tends to bring the hand towards a point of interest, and is thus 
likely to be supported by more developed neural systems. Specifically, Shi and 
Nijhawan (2008) invoked claims from other authors (Kanai et al., 2004; Kirschfeld & 
Kammer, 1999; Kirschfeld, 2006) that the visual flash-lag effect occurs due to a wave 
of attentional facilitation at the leading edge of a moving stimulus, and an opposing 
wave of inhibition at the trailing edge. However, the authors took a different tack by 
suggesting that the combination of attentional facilitation and inhibition works to 
advance the perceived position of moving stimuli to compensate for neural delays prior 
to perception (Shi & Nijhawan, 2008). It was proposed in particular that during 
foveopetal movement, there is a relative enhancement of facilitation at the leading edge 
of the moving stimulus, coupled with a relatively diminished wave of inhibition at the 
trailing edge, ultimately leading to a larger forward displacement of the perceived 
position. Accordingly, the authors also suggest that during foveofugal visual motion, the 
peak of the faclitatory wave and the trough of the inhibitory wave are less pronounced, 
resulting in a smaller flash-lag effect. Along these lines one might explain the motor 
flash-lead effect during foveofugal arm motion as the result of ‘inverted’ attentional 
waves. Perhaps when one is moving their arm in a backhand motion away from fixation 
there is attentional inhibition at its leading edge and facilitation at its trailing edge, 
producing a flash-lead effect due to a backwards displacement of the perceived limb 
position. A foveopetal biasing of attention not present for purely visual stimuli might 
explain such an effect. For example, the tendency to orient spatial attention towards 
fixation (Shulman, Remington, & McLean, 1979) may be stronger when there is a lack 
of bottom-up visual input. Additionally, or alternatively, there could be a bias to direct 
spatial attention towards more sensitive or utilitarian body parts, such as the 
foveopetally-facing palm of the hand (e.g., Reed, Betz, Garza, & Roberts, Jr., 2010). In 
theory, anything that serves to orient attention towards the more foveopetal side of the 
hand or arm could reverse the direction of the difference between the attentional waves 
at its leading and trailing edges, and thereby cause a backwards perceptual 
displacement. Given this line of reasoning, it is still possible that similar predictive 
mechanisms give rise to the visual and motor flash-lag/lead effects. Put differently, the 
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sign of the motion direction based anisotropy, which is the same between vision and 
action, could be more significant than the difference in surface appearance of the 
foveofugal effects. 
 
The flash-drag effects observed in Experiments 2a and 2b are more intuitively 
accounted for under the umbrella of perception-action unity. Put simply, both visual 
motion and unseen arm motion are able to drag the perceived position of a stationary 
flash. It is argued here that this is due to a shared representational space between visual 
and motor systems, giving rise to analogous percepts. The original explanation of the 
flash-drag effect was that motion signals across the visual field are integrated when 
assigning positions to static stimuli (Whitney & Cavanagh, 2000a). It is suggested here 
that this claim need not be revised to account for motor flash-drag, except that the 
motion can also be action-based, rather than simply visual. Whitney and Cavanagh 
(2000), however, also conjectured that visual flash-drag occurred as a result of feedback 
from extrastriate motion areas (i.e., MT or MST) to V1. These regions are traditionally 
thought to take their input only from retinal stimulation, however, and there is no 
evidence that motor areas involved in controlling limb movement feed back to V1. It 
seems, then, that this circuit cannot also account for motor flash-drag. Instead, it is 
suggested here, that other areas with visuomotor matching properties are instrumental in 
producing the visual and motor versions of both the motor flash-lag/lead and flash-drag 
effects. 
 
If the visual and motor versions of the motor flash-lag/lead and flash-drag effects share 
a representational space with their visual counterparts, then neurons responding to both 
vision and action at some level of the nervous system must be involved. Recall that in 
the introduction several prominent classes of neuron were outlined appearing to display 
both visual and motor functionality (i.e., mirror, canonical, and visuotactile neurons). 
Another potentially relevant type of neuron is found in the primary motor cortex of the 
rhesus monkey, and is also likely to be present in the human homologue (Port, Kruse, 
Lee, & Georgopoulos, 2001). These fire both during manual interception of a moving 
object, and when simply tracking the object visually without any accompanying muscle 
activity. It should be noted that these particular cells are especially relevant to the 
current findings because they show that processes of symbolic (i.e., non-biological) 
visual motion and arm motion converge onto the same neurons. Furthermore, it is not 
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implausible that their visual functions affect their motor functions, or vice versa. It 
could be, then, that these or other types of multimodal neuron are behind both the visual 
and motor versions of the effects, since they represent motion and position in both 
visual and motor terms.  
 
 
2.7.1 Origins of perception-action unity 
 
It will be useful here to consider how the multimodal functions of these types of neuron 
arise. Put simply, the question addressed will be whether sensorimotor connections are 
laid down as a result of genetics, or whether they develop within each organism’s 
lifetime on the basis of experience. This issue has recently garnered attention with 
regards to the emergence of mirror neurons in the brain (Catmur, 2013; Cook et al., 
2014; R. P. Cooper, Cook, Dickinson, & Heyes, 2013; Ferrari, Tramacere, Simpson, & 
Iriki, 2013; Heyes, 2010, 2013; Keysers & Perrett, 2004). In the introduction it was 
mentioned that these cells fire when performing an action, as well as when a similar 
behaviour is simply observed (e.g., di Pellegrino et al., 1992). The well-established 
‘genetic’ view of mirror neurons is that the organisms possessing them were endowed 
with an evolutionary advantage since they had a more intimate understanding of the 
actions of conspecifics (e.g., Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). This implies that action 
understanding is an adaptive trait, and as a result gave rise to the neurons that subserve 
it. Objections to the genetic account have however been raised along the lines that 
mirror properties could have developed on the basis of associative learning processes 
quite divorced from the function they now serve (Catmur, 2013; Cook et al., 2014; R. P. 
Cooper et al., 2013; Heyes, 2010, 2013). In essence, it is argued that if an action is 
performed while that same action is observed, formerly weak connections will become 
stronger between visual neurons responding to the observed action and motor neurons 
commanding the performed action. Observation of a concurrently performed action 
could, for instance, occur when imitating someone else’s movement, or when receiving 
visual feedback of one’s own movement either directly or reflected in a mirror (Cook et 
al., 2014). The proposal is, then, that mirror neurons are the result of correlated activity 
between sensory and motor areas due to the co-occurrence of action observation and 
performance, and that their facilitation of action understanding is merely a serendipitous 
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side effect. Several lines of evidence support the associative hypothesis. For example, it 
has been highlighted that the efficiency of associative learning processes means that 
functioning mirror systems may even be present in young infants, and that sensorimotor 
training can modulate mirror functions (for a review, see Cook et al., 2014). The 
competing genetic and associative accounts tend to characterise the debate as an all-or-
none affair (Ferrari et al., 2013; Gallese, Rochat, Cossu, & Sinigaglia, 2009), but for 
now it is sufficient only to establish that associative learning might help shape the 
properties of mirror (and similarly multimodal) neurons, without getting into the impact 
of genetics.  
 
In their discussion of the possible role of ontogenetic factors (in addition to fundamental 
phylogeny) in the development of an action understanding system, Gallese et al. (2009) 
advocated that motor processes had primacy over the developing visual system (see also 
Gallese & Sinigaglia, 2014). The authors argue that since the motor system becomes 
more developed in utero than vision (e.g., Zoia et al., 2007), connectivity may already 
be established at birth between motor areas and “to-become-visual” areas. Their 
suggestion was that this would potentially allow immediate rudimentary action 
understanding in neonates, which could be honed through visual and motor experience. 
It is interesting to note that while Gallese et al. (2009) are firmly in the genetic camp of 
mirror neuron origins, this aspect of their thinking somewhat presages the associative 
learning account outlined above. The primacy of the motor processes over the visual 
system finds support in the findings mentioned earlier demonstrating that manipulation 
of motor systems has knock on effects on visual perception (e.g., Beets et al., 2010; 
Brown et al., 2007; Hecht et al., 2001; Volcic et al., 2013). 
 
In light of the associative account, coupled with the motor primacy argument of 
(Gallese et al., 2009), an interesting possibility emerges for explaining the present 
findings. Herein it has been suggested that the visual flash-lag and flash-drag effects 
have motor analogues, though it may be more accurate to view the visual effects as 
derivatives of more primitive motor programs. More specifically, it could be that 
systematic mislocalisations inherent to the motor system in gestation translate after birth 
(and the onset of rich visual feedback) into analogous mislocalisations in vision through 
processes of associative learning. For instance, when a neonate’s eyes open and it can 
see its own arms moving, the forward displacement of an arm’s position induced 
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through motor forward models could also be used to inform the naïve visual system of 
the position of objects in space. In neuronal terms, multimodal cells firing on the basis 
of the output of the motor system might serve to calibrate the visual system to apply 
similar biases to visual motion in general. While Gallese et al. (2009) suggested that 
motor processes inform the developing visual system only in the perception of 
biological motion, others have claimed that biological motion actually forms the 
groundwork for motion perception in general (Viviani, 2002). Recall that the two-thirds 
power law describing the way that velocity varies during limb movements also 
constrains visual motion perception (e.g., Viviani & Schneider, 1991; Viviani & 
Stucchi, 1992). It was further highlighted earlier that people are sensitive to deviations 
from visual motion obeying the two-thirds power law even when they are unable to 
recognise the stimuli as biological in nature (Bidet-Ildei et al., 2006). This implies that 
fundamentals of the motor system are not only used in the perception of other people’s 
behaviour, but also for motion in general. It is possible, then, that the visual flash-lag 
and flash-drag effects might occur (in all types of motion) in part due to analogous 
mislocalisations applied to the motor representation of one’s moving body. This claim 
will of course require more evidence to support it. 
 
 
2.7.2 Future directions 
 
A number of interpretations outlined in the present paper could be tested in more detail. 
Of particular interest in this case is the immediately preceding argument that 
visuospatial illusions occur on the basis of more fundamental motor illusions. Here one 
could investigate whether individual differences in the magnitude of the visual flash-lag 
and flash-drag effects correlate with equivalent differences in the motor domain. Also 
along these lines, the size of the visual flash-lag and drag effects could be compared 
between groups of observers who have never had use of their arms, who have lost their 
arms later in life, and who have normal use of their arms. If the first differed from the 
second two groups it would support the suggestion that early visual experience of one’s 
limbs in motion calibrates the visual system.  
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In Experiments 1a and 1b it was noted that differential foveal attraction might explain 
the apparent motion direction based anisotropy of the felt position of the hand; that is, 
the hand may have been foveally attracted more than the flash, regardless of its 
direction of motion. This possibility could be tested with a motor flash-lag-type 
experiment, in which static hand position (unseen in the visual periphery) is judged 
relative to a flash. This would reveal whether the hand is biased towards fixation more 
than the flash in the absence of motion. 
 
If this crucial test revealed that differential foveal attraction could not account for the 
difference in felt hand position relative to a flash between motion directions, a further 
question remains: does the motion direction based anisotropy really occur in relation to 
fixation? This issue could be elucidated with experiments that disentangle foveopetal 
and foveofugal motion from from forehand and backhand movement, and from motion 
that is either towards or away from the direction that the head or torso is facing.  
 
 
2.8 Conclusions 
 
The first two experiments revealed that foveopetal movement of one’s arm in the dark 
produces a flash-lag effect, while equivalent foveofugal movement produces a flash-
lead effect. The second two experiments showed that this could not be accounted for by 
a bias of flash position. It was argued that the visual flash-lag anisotropy and motor 
flash-lag anisotropy are of the same sign, and thus reflect the common underlying 
processes in perception and action. While the motor flash-drag effect observed in the 
second pair of experiments was modestly sized, it was highly robust, and was argued to 
represent a motor equivalent of the visual flash-drag effect. Motor illusions with visual 
analogues, it has been suggested, might be a result of visual systems developing on the 
basis of motor programs established in utero, though this claim requires further support. 
  
	   94 
Paper II: Threat enhances the flash-lag 
effect 
 
 
3.1 Abstract 
 
The paternalistic vision approach claims that visuospatial perception is sensitive to our 
behavioural requirements. One direction of research proposes that threatening objects 
are perceived closer, larger, and moving faster than equivalent non-threatening objects, 
in order to safeguard us from harm. Several researchers have contended, however, that 
the studies upon which these claims are based confuse perception with cognitive factors, 
such as memory and task demands. The effects of threat upon the magnitude of the 
flash-lag effect (a perceptual illusion in which moving stimuli appear ahead of flashed 
stimuli) are investigated in two experiments. In the first experiment, with looming and 
receding stimuli, no effect of threat is observed, though the second experiment, with 
linear translating stimuli, demonstrates larger flash-lag effects for threatening moving 
objects, in general support of paternalistic vision. This effect was however independent 
of motion direction relative to the observer, contrary to the claim that threatening 
objects are perceived closer. It is thus argued that threat can indeed affect basic 
visuospatial perception. 
 
 
3.2 Introduction 
 
3.2.1 Paternalistic vision 
 
A growing body of research implies that our visual systems warp the perception of 
space to better suit our present needs. Vision, it is claimed, does not attempt to provide 
an accurate representation of the environment, but instead monitors our current abilities, 
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resources, goals, and anxieties, as well as our bodily and socio-emotional states before 
applying spatial biases that encourage desirable actions (for reviews, see Firestone, 
2013a; Proffitt, 2006; Witt, 2011). This position is in notable contrast with the more 
established view that cognition is distinct from early vision and that perception – at its 
most basic levels – is cognitively impenetrable (e.g., Fodor, 1983; Pylyshyn, 1999, 
2003). Following on from Firestone (2013a), the idea that visual perception aims to 
safeguard us from performing unfavourable behaviours will be termed herein the 
paternalistic vision hypothesis. This paper reports two experiments performed to test the 
predictions of paternalistic vision as applied to threat. The most fundamental issue 
addressed is whether visuospatial perception is sensitive to the threat value of a 
stimulus, though more specific predictions about whether threatening stimuli are 
perceived as closer, larger, or faster are also tested. In the following section, a spectrum 
of the findings used to support paternalistic vision will be outlined, before consideration 
is given to some of the main objections to the account. Following this, the related claim 
that threatening stimuli affect spatial vision will be discussed in terms of the criticisms 
levelled so far only at other parts of the paternalistic vision literature. 
 
An influential experiment by Bhalla and Proffitt (1999) had subjects stand at the base of 
a hill and judge its incline using several measures. Some subjects wore a heavy 
backpack while others did not, and it was found that the encumbered subjects judged the 
hill to be steeper than did the subjects without a backpack. The conclusion – 
characteristic of much of the literature that followed – was that the backpackers would 
need to exert more effort to scale the hill, so their visual systems provided them with 
exaggerations of its gradient in order to caution against an energy-sapping ascent. 
Consistent with this position, subsequent experiments showed that people who were 
tired, unfit, elderly, or in declining health also relatively overestimated the hill’s 
gradient (Bhalla & Proffitt, 1999). Besides incline, it has also been demonstrated that 
proximity estimations are biased by similar factors. For instance, in a study analogous 
to that just mentioned, people wearing a heavy backpack and standing in a grass field 
overestimated the distance to a traffic cone compared to an unencumbered group 
(Proffitt, Stefanucci, Banton, & Epstein, 2003). Like the Bhalla and Proffitt (1999) 
study, the claim was that the effort required to walk with a heavy load led to the 
distance appearing greater. A later study also found that subjects who had recently 
consumed a high glucose drink tended to underestimate the gradients of hills compared 
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to subjects who had drunk an artificially-sweetened drink (Schnall et al., 2010). It was 
proposed that the former group, loaded up on calories as they were, would have been 
more capable in that moment of climbing the hill, and so required less of an 
exaggeration of its incline. Taken together, this collection of findings implies that it is 
the potential physical effort required for actions, associated with caloric expenditure, 
that biases people’s perceptual judgments. However, as we shall see, this is not the sole 
concern of whatever system it is that implements these apparent spatial misperceptions. 
 
Along the same lines as the gradient estimation studies mentioned above, it has been 
revealed that passersby accompanied by a friend typically underestimate the slope of a 
hill compared to lone passersby (Schnall et al., 2008). The authors posit that having a 
friend nearby increases one’s available psychosocial resources, making the climb seem 
less challenging, and so making the hill appear less steep. It has also been recently 
shown that magnified judgment of both distance when wearing a heavy backpack (Shea 
& Masicampo, 2014), and height when one’s sense of self is depleted (Huynh, 
Stefanucci, & Aspinwall, 2014), is eliminated after performing a self-affirmation 
exercise. Similarly, another study showed that groups of subjects who either listened to 
happy music or imagined a positive life event underestimated a hill’s incline in 
comparison to groups who either listened to sad music or imagined a negative life event, 
respectively (Riener, Stefanucci, Proffitt, & Clore, 2011). Previously we saw that spatial 
parameters are influenced by the availability of physiological resources, though these 
studies represent something of a departure, in that they additionally demonstrate a role 
for psychological resources. 
 
Related to the effect of mood and psychosocial resources on visuospatial judgments, 
another stream of research has examined the impact of threat. For example, one study 
had subjects who were either high or low in acrophobia (fear of heights) stand on a 
long, two-story balcony and look down over the edge at a target at ground level 
(Teachman, Stefanucci, Clerkin, Cody, & Proffitt, 2008). Subjects then asked an 
experimenter to move towards or away from them along the balcony until they felt that 
the horizontal distance to the experimenter matched the vertical distance to the target. It 
was found that the high acrophobia group estimated themselves to be considerably 
higher above the ground than did the low acrophobia subjects. A follow-up study found 
that getting people to vividly imagine that they were falling from the balcony increased 
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the overestimation of the balcony’s height in the high-acrophobia (but not low-
acrophobia) group (Clerkin, Cody, Stefanucci, Proffitt, & Teachman, 2009). From this 
it seems that the more fear one feels from being on a high balcony, the further away 
they perceive the ground to be. This bias is consistent with the paternalistic vision 
hypothesis, in that it is likely to encourage threatened observers to stay away from the 
edge, thus avoiding potential harm.  
 
 
3.2.2 Objections to paternalistic vision 
 
From the findings reviewed thus far it is certainly tempting to conclude that vision is 
indeed paternalistic, and that visual space is tractable to our needs and potential actions 
at a given time. Others, however, have argued that, while robust and mostly replicable 
effects in themselves (though for failed replications, see de Grave, Brenner, & Smeets, 
2011; Woods, Philbeck, & Danoff, 2009), these are not necessarily reflections of 
perception, but may in fact result from of influences upon cognition itself – for 
example, in terms of task demand characteristics, or perhaps biases in memory or 
judgment. This section will cover several arguments that cast doubt on the perceptual 
nature of this class of effects, before looking at evidence in favour of alternative 
interpretations. 
 
A number of theoretical contentions about why the paternalistic vision hypothesis may 
be unsatisfactory have been put forth, full consideration of which is beyond the scope of 
the current literature review (though for an in depth discussion, see Firestone, 2013a). 
However, as a brief example, a prominent difficulty for the paternalistic vision account 
is its inability to explain the lack of associated phenomenology – for instance, why we 
do not see hills suddenly getting steeper as we pick up heavy bags (Firestone, 2013a). 
Leaving this for now though, we will turn to the range of experimental evidence that 
renders problematic the claim that visual space itself is affected by our current needs, 
abilities, moods and resources. 
 
A recent set of experiments has illustrated that one finding used to support the 
paternalistic view may not be the result of an effect on perception (Firestone & Scholl, 
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2014). The original experiment, by Stefanucci and Geuss (2009), had subjects face a 
doorway-like aperture made up of two vertical poles. One group held the ends of a 
114cm-long, horizontally-oriented rod, while another group held their hands by their 
sides. After looking at the doorway, subjects turned 90° to face the experimenter, who 
adjusted the length of a tape measure to match the width of the aperture according to the 
subject‘s instructions. It was found that the rod-holding group produced narrower 
estimations of the aperture than the group without their hands held out. In line with 
paternalistic vision, the authors’ conclusion was that holding one’s arms out made the 
effective width of their body wider, which in turn made the doorway appear less wide 
because it was less passable. Firestone and Scholl's (2014) investigation focused on the 
visual matching task by which the estimations were made in this initial study. The 
reasoning behind their experiments extended from something known as the “El Greco 
fallacy” (Rock, 1966), and requires a brief synopsis. For some time a prevalent theory 
for why the famous artist, El Greco, painted elongated human forms was that he was in 
fact astigmatic, and therefore perceived his subjects as vertically stretched. However, it 
has since been asserted this could not explain the distortions in El Greco’s paintings, 
because, if the artist faithfully committed what he saw to canvas, any perceptual 
elongation would be cancelled out when depicted (Anstis, 2002; Firestone & Scholl, 
2014; Firestone, 2013b; Rock, 1966). Put differently, if a visual distortion occurs in the 
perception of an object, and if its depiction is similarly distorted, then the artist should 
see the original and depicted stimuli as matching; that is, the distortion should not be 
evident in one more than the other. This interpretation was experimentally validated by 
Anstis (2002). Applying the same logic as that which exposed the El Greco fallacy, 
Firestone and Scholl (2014) reasoned that if subjects holding a rod actually perceive a 
door to be narrower (as per Stefanucci & Geuss, 2009), then this effect should disappear 
if an adjustable doorway, rather than a tape measure, is also used for the visual 
matching task. To highlight the analogy, if the stimulus doorway is like El Greco’s 
subject, then the matching doorway is like his canvas, and should receive an equal 
distortion if the originally reported effect is genuinely perceptual. It was found instead, 
though, that the rod-holding subjects judged the doorway to be less wide when matched 
both with a tape measure and with an adjustable doorway (Firestone & Scholl, 2014). 
Since the effect persisted when using a matching stimulus that should have in theory 
also been perceptually distorted, the authors concluded that apertures are not literally 
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seen as narrower when holding a rod that prevents easy passage. If not perception, then, 
what might cause these effects to manifest? 
 
An especially fruitful direction of critique of the paternalistic vision hypothesis has been 
to examine the effects of task demands. The essential question here is whether subjects 
guess at experimental hypotheses when presented with, for instance, notably 
unexplained rods or backpacks. Influentially, Durgin et al. (2009) reexamined the initial 
finding of Bhalla and Proffitt (1999) showing that backpack-wearing subjects 
overestimate the slant of a hill more than backpack-free subjects. The original 
conclusion was that this was an effect on perception, such that carrying the extra weight 
actually made the hill look steeper. Durgin et al. (2009) were interested in whether the 
backpack group in this study may have guessed the experimenters’ hypothesis and 
provided responses in accordance with their interpretation. That is, the authors 
wondered if – when given a heavy backpack and asked how steep a hill is – people are 
more inclined to give elevated estimates because they think that is what is meant to 
happen. A new version of the experiment was performed with a third group of subjects 
(in addition to the no-backpack and backpack groups) who wore a backpack but who 
were also given an elaborate explanation for its presence (Durgin et al., 2009). Subjects 
in this group were told that the backpack (emitting wires and electrodes that attached to 
their ankles, as well as making a whirring fan noise, for extra credibility) contained 
electromyographic equipment that would record muscle activity during the task. 
Subjects in both backpack groups were also questioned extensively to probe their 
beliefs about the backpacks and the effects they might have on their judgments. 
Interestingly, it was found that 12 out of 13 of the no-cover-story backpackers had 
indeed guessed that the backpack was meant to affect their gradient perception, 
compared to only 4 of 20 in the electrode group. Most importantly though, the no-
cover-story backpack group provided more inflated slant ratings than either the no-
backpack or cover-story groups, whose ratings did not differ from each other. In line 
with their suspicions, Durgin et al. (2009) here showed that when subjects were given 
an explanation for the burden, the relative overestimation was abolished. It is thus likely 
that the backpack-wearing subjects in the original Bhalla and Proffitt (1999) study 
interpreted a reason for the bag they were wearing and came to the conclusion that it 
must have been meant to affect their slope estimates. The bias they reported might 
therefore have been the result of implicit task demands, rather than having been an 
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effect on visuospatial perception. This approach was followed up and extended to 
demonstrate that simply asking subjects to avoid succumbing to task demand and 
compliance effects also eliminated the effect (Durgin et al., 2012). An analogous 
experiment by Firestone and Scholl (2014) further examined the finding that holding a 
rod horizontally leads to narrower judgments of nearby doors. Again, it was shown that 
when a plausible cover story was given (the rod was a balance aid), the apparently 
perceptual effect disappears. That manipulating task demands determines whether the 
biases attributed to a paternalistic visual system manifest or not indicates that 
expectation and compliance effects might have a greater impact on judgments than 
perception itself. 
 
We have just seen that task demands can explain some important paternalistic biases, 
and now we come to another thread of critique that suggests some of these effects may 
actually stem from memory, rather than vision. It will be additionally argued that the 
intertwined nature of mental imagery and memory may well underpin the apparent 
spatial distortions. A piece of research that helped inspire the “New Look” movement in 
perceptual psychology in the mid-20th century will help to illustrate. Bruner and 
Goodman (1947) performed an experiment in which it was found that poorer children 
tended to overestimate the size of coins more than wealthier children. In some ways 
presaging the paternalistic vision account, this was taken to mean that the value of a 
visual stimulus was incorporated into its representation by the perceptual system. A 
later study, however, revealed that this effect was principally due to a difference 
between rich and poor children only when the judgment of coin size was made from 
memory, rather than when the coin itself was still visible (Carter & Schooler, 1949). It 
might be then that when people are left to conjure an image from memory, non-visual 
factors are able to exert effects that are seemingly attributable to primary visual 
perception. A similar approach has been taken with regards to more recent research 
used to bolster the paternalistic account. An initial study showed that softball batters 
with a high recent batting average provided larger estimates of softball size, implying to 
the authors that their greater batting ability made the softballs look bigger (Witt & 
Proffitt, 2005). This has been supported by similar findings that show well-performing 
golfers (Witt, Linkenauger, Bakdash, & Proffitt, 2008) and American football kickers 
(Witt & Dorsch, 2009) estimate golf holes and field goal posts to be larger, respectively. 
However, these judgments were either made without the to-be-estimated object in view, 
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or else after numerous shots had been made, and so it remains possible that the biases 
are applied in memory rather than in vision (A. D. Cooper et al., 2012). This possibility 
was examined in more detail in a series of experiments by Cooper et al. (2012), in 
which subjects judged the size of a hole after attempting to throw a marble through it, 
either when the hole was still visible (perceptual judgment) or after the hole had been 
covered up (memory judgment). By taking estimates on a trial-by-trial basis the authors 
showed that success at throwing increased the remembered size of the hole, but not its 
perceived size. Evidently, this last finding is of particular concern to the studies 
requiring spatial judgments once the target object is no longer visible. 
 
In fact, memory is likely to have been confounded with perception in numerous studies 
that use psychophysical matching tasks to demonstrate paternalistic biases (see Cooper 
et al., 2012). For instance, if one reconsiders the finding that acrophobics, compared to 
non-acrophobics, overestimate the height of a balcony on which they are standing 
(Clerkin et al., 2009; Teachman et al., 2008), it could actually be that when they look 
away from the drop to perform their visual matching task, a bias affects their short term 
visual memory. The additional capacity for mental imagery to magnify this effect 
(Clerkin et al., 2009) could even support the role of memory, especially in light of 
recent arguments that visual working memory and mental imagery are intertwined 
cognitive processes (e.g., Albers, Kok, Toni, Dijkerman, & de Lange, 2013; Tong, 
2013).  
 
In addition to task demand effects, the equivocality of visual memory and mental 
imagery (Carter & Schooler, 1949) may permit additional, non-visual cognitive biases 
to influence subjects’ judgments, which otherwise appear to all intents and purposes to 
reflect visual perception itself. Consider that, while there is a debate about whether 
visual perception is cognitively impenetrable (e.g., Fodor, 1983; Pylyshyn, 1999, 2003), 
mental imagery is at its core, cognitively generated, and therefore deeply susceptible to 
influence from higher-level processing. When bottom-up visual information is absent, 
such as when recalling the size of stimulus, it is likely that top-down factors, such as 
threat, need, and ability are able to impact fellow high-level processes of memory and 
mental imagery more so than visual perception supported by bottom-up, stimulus-
driven input. 
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3.2.3 Threat and visuospatial judgments 
 
An overview has now been given of some of the research commonly used to support the 
paternalistic vision hypothesis, as well as a number of experimentally validated 
objections to it. Earlier, the effect that threat could have on visuospatial judgments was 
briefly touched upon, with consideration of how acrophobics overestimate their height 
above the ground (Clerkin et al., 2009; Teachman et al., 2008). Now let us return to a 
related avenue of research that has received less attention in light of the objections 
raised above. This literature often focuses on the fear felt from spiders (indeed, this will 
be the focus of the current experiments), and we shall see that the authors tend to align 
their conclusions with the paternalistic vision account by claiming that visual perception 
itself is modulated by threat. The studies mentioned below imply that the motion 
(Riskind et al., 1992, 1995; Vagnoni et al., 2012; Witt & Sugovic, 2013), position (Cole 
et al., 2013) and size (van Ulzen et al., 2008; Vasey et al., 2012) of threatening stimuli 
cause perceptual biases consistent with the paternalistic vision hypothesis – that is, we 
see threatening objects as faster, closer and larger, presumably to facilitate responses 
that keep us out of danger. 
 
In a number of studies, Riskind and colleagues claim to have demonstrated that people 
who fear spiders actually perceive spiders to be looming towards them more than 
control subjects, even when they are looking at static photographs (Riskind et al., 1992, 
1995). For instance, in one experiment subjects were shown a picture of a tarantula and 
asked to imagine themselves in a room with it, then to draw on a plan view of the room 
any imagined motion trajectory of the spider (Riskind et al., 1995). With this measure it 
was found that high-fear subjects were more likely to envisage the spider moving 
towards them at speed. Another experiment showed that either while looking at 
photographs of spiders, or after watching videos of spiders, high-fear subjects gave 
greater ‘looming’ ratings than low-fear subjects (Riskind et al., 1992). These ratings 
were based on the answers to questionnaire items such as “how actively and 
energetically is the spider moving to you?”, and “how slow or fast is it moving towards 
you?”. On these grounds the authors of the above studies propose that high-fear subjects 
actually perceive spiders as moving rapidly toward them more than low-fear subjects do 
(Riskind et al., 1992, 1995). It should be clear, though, that these methods are far from 
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ideal probes of visual perception. Firstly, since perception is supposedly measured by 
asking direct questions about, for instance, the speed of looming motion, it would not 
take a great deal of reflection by the subject to infer the experimental hypothesis. This 
possibility is made all the greater by subjects being recruited largely on the basis of their 
self-reported level of spider-phobia. We saw earlier that other, even with less 
transparent measures, experiments into paternalistic biases were susceptible to task 
demands. Further problems with the conclusions of Riskind et al. (1992, 1995) arise 
when we consider how memory and mental imagery may have underpinned their 
results. In Riskind et al. (1992; experiment 3) subjects are shown videotapes of spiders 
crawling towards or away from the camera, before they give their ratings of 
‘loomingness’. Again, the problems associated with inferring perception from 
judgments based on memory were covered earlier. Furthermore, issues of both memory 
and mental imagery arise in Riskind et al. (1995), in which subjects, after looking at a 
photograph of a spider, had to imagine themselves in a room with it before giving their 
looming ratings. In conjunction with the potential task demands mentioned above it is 
very clear that this is not an adequate measure of perception, but rather one of 
imagination and memory. 
 
A study by Vagnoni, Lourenco and Longo (2012) also examined the perception of 
looming of threatening visual stimuli. Here the researchers presented a range of 
photographs of threatening (spiders and snakes) and non-threatening (butterflies and 
rabbits) animals that expanded on screen for one second before disappearing. Subjects 
were tasked with imagining that the animal was still looming towards them and to press 
a button when they thought it would collide with them. Time-to-collision estimates 
were smaller for threatening than for non-threatening stimuli, and importantly, the 
degree of underestimation correlated with one’s fear ratings. Echoing Riskind and 
colleagues, Vagnoni et al. (2012) surmised that “threatening stimuli are perceived as 
approaching more rapidly than non-threatening stimuli” (p.R827, emphasis added). 
While certainly a possibility, it is contended here that this is not a necessary conclusion 
from these data. The effect observed by Vagnoni et al. (2012) could only be considered 
a perceptual bias, per se, if it was shown that the threatening stimuli were seen to have 
expanded further than the non-threatening stimuli before their point of disappearance. 
If, on the other hand, the bias is introduced after the disappearance of the looming 
stimulus, the subject is likely to be relying on their memory of its final appearance, 
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coupled with the extrapolated mental imagery of its continuing trajectory. This would 
not be the first time that mental imagery has affected spatiotemporal judgments of 
threatening stimuli in high-phobia subjects (Clerkin et al., 2009). Besides the further 
possibility that high-phobia subjects prefer to end trials sooner due to the discomfort 
felt, it could be that higher physiological arousal as a result of threat accelerates the 
build up of a neural accumulator, the output of which triggers the button press 
(Schurger, Sitt, & Dehaene, 2012). It remains to be seen, then, whether the time-to-
collision underestimates reported by Vagnoni et al. (2012) are a result of perception, 
mental imagery, or response bias. 
 
While still on the topic of threatening stimuli in motion, it was claimed by Witt and 
Sugovic (2013) that spiders are estimated to move at a higher velocity than non-
threatening objects, such as a circles, ladybirds, and ‘X’-shapes. The experimenters, 
however, only examined motion towards the observer, and not motion away, so even if 
the effect they uncovered is perceptual, it would be an overextension of their findings to 
propose that perceived velocity is affected by threat, independent of motion direction. It 
should also be noted that, while the researchers performed experiments with control 
stimuli to validate that the effect was not due to either the animacy or the overall shape 
of the moving stimulus, they did not measure threat. Besides an assumption that the 
spider was more threatening than the control stimuli, there is no guarantee that threat 
produced the observed effects. However, perhaps most problematic, in light of the 
critiques outlined earlier, is Witt and Sugovic's (2013) measure of velocity. A method of 
constant stimuli in which subjects judged whether the speed at which the stimulus 
moved towards them more closely resembled one of two reference speeds shown to 
them at the start of the experiment. This procedure, again, suffers from the potential 
effects of memory upon subjects’ judgments. Comparison stimuli (i.e., the reference 
velocities) were not presented simultaneous with the targets for genuine perceptual 
judgments, but instead had to be committed to memory after being presented earlier in 
the session. It could therefore be that the relatively higher velocity estimates for spiders 
stem from them being judged to move faster than a somewhat vague recollection of the 
reference velocities. That is to say, subjects may selectively misremember the reference 
speeds according to the threatening quality of the target stimulus. Indeed, as we argued 
earlier, memory and mental imagery are more cognitively pliable than perception itself. 
It is furthermore uncertain whether the observed effect was due to spiders seemingly 
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moving faster, or simply being advanced in position. While velocity is little more than a 
variation of position over time, it has been posited that these two physical 
characteristics are processed independently (e.g., Smeets & Brenner, 1995). To 
illustrate, it could be that the apparent velocity bias is actually a tendency for 
threatening objects to be estimated as closer than they truly are, independent of speed. If 
this were the case, the final position of the spiders would have been advanced beyond 
that of the non-threatening stimuli, and so when questioned the observer’s inference 
might have been that it must have moved faster in order to produce a closer percept. If it 
were shown that spider velocity estimates were greater than (or the same as) other 
stimuli it would imply that threatening stimuli really are estimated to move faster 
towards oneself (or in general). On the other hand, if motion away from the subject 
produced lower velocity estimates for threatening stimuli, it would suggest that it is an 
effect of estimated position, rather than speed.  
 
Cole, Balcetis and Dunning (2013) found that people estimate threatening stimuli to be 
closer to them than disgusting or neutral stimuli. In their first experiment, subjects stood 
at some distance from a live tarantula and estimated the number of inches between them 
and the animal. Currently felt threat and disgust were each measured on a Likert scale, 
and it was demonstrated that threat, but not disgust, was negatively correlated with 
distance ratings. Their second experiment had separate groups of subjects watch a video 
of a confederate talking about their own behaviour, which was either threatening, 
disgusting, or neutral. The subject and confederate were then brought into the same 
room and seated a constant distance from one another. Those subjects who had viewed 
the ‘threatening’ video rated the confederate as being more threatening, and 
importantly, closer to them than those who had seen either the ‘disgusting’ or ‘neutral’ 
videos. As before, the disgust condition did not differ from the neutral condition. It is 
worth noting that a comparable experiment by Harber, Yeung, and Iacovelli (2011), 
found that depleting one’s sense of self-worth made people more likely to underestimate 
the number of inches to a threatening object (a live tarantula). In numerous studies 
mentioned thus far, memory has been cited as a possible candidate for the observed 
paternalistic-like effects. This criticism is however less easily applied to any of these 
experiments, since position estimates are taken while the stimulus is still in full view of 
the subject. The problem here, it is suggested, is with the measure of proximity, which 
is potentially more cognitive than perceptual. Consider the size of the true distances to 
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the objects, which were held constant within each of the Cole et al. (2013) studies (156” 
from the tarantula in Experiment 1;  132” from the confederate in Experiment 2), and 
were jittered between several locations in the Harber et al. (2011) experiment (6”-56”). 
In the Harber et al. (2011) study subjects simply had to give a verbal estimate of the 
number of inches between them and the object, while in both Cole et al. (2013) 
experiments they were shown a one-inch sample line and asked to judge how many 
inches were between them and the stimulus. In all experiments, then, subjects had to 
formulate a number to ascribe to the distance between them and the stimulus. Shown a 
distance of, say, four inches, one may reasonably apply a perceptual judgment in 
reporting that either one’s internalised notion of an inch (in the case of Harber et al., 
2011), or a sample inch (in the case of Cole et al., 2013), appears that it should fit 
approximately four times within the gap. However, since the true number of inches is 
considerably larger in the Cole et al., (2013) studies, and in most trials of the Harber et 
al. (2011) experiment, it is unlikely that this measure reflects in any meaningful way the 
contents of visuospatial perception. In this way the method is not unlike judging how 
many jellybeans fit in a jar. The point of the popular fairground game is that the number 
of jellybeans is not directly perceivable, and instead one has to make an informed guess, 
perhaps by drawing upon prior knowledge. It is argued therefore that reduced distance 
estimates for threatening stimuli using this method are less likely to reflect the effects of 
threat upon vision than they are the effects of threat upon cognitive mechanisms of 
generating numbers. Though perhaps challenging to implement, a psychophysical 
measure of perceptual comparison would have provided a more objective and direct 
assessment of perceived proximity. 
 
It has been additionally claimed that size estimations are modulated by threat. For 
instance, after viewing a live tarantula the subjects in an experiment by Vasey et al. 
(2012) estimated the spider’s leg span by drawing a single straight line on a piece of 
card. It was demonstrated that spider-phobics judged the tarantula to be larger the 
higher their current levels of state anxiety. As articulated earlier, the method of 
removing the stimulus from view prior to making a spatial judgment permits only the 
remembered size of the stimulus to factor into people’s estimates, which may be more 
readily biased by threat. This is something that the authors themselves concede, though 
they still claim to have found evidence of a perceptual distortion. However, another 
paper suggesting an impact of affective content on size perception did not suffer from 
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potential confounding effects of memory (van Ulzen et al., 2008). Here it was shown 
that circles containing negative affective stimuli (e.g., spider or skulls) appeared larger 
than circles containing neutral (e.g., mug or mushroom) or positive (e.g., kittens or 
flower) affective stimuli. Size estimations were made by adjusting a concurrently 
visible comparison circle to match the size of a target circle containing the affective 
stimulus. Memory, then, is unlikely to be at the heart of the effect. It should be noted 
that the authors were careful not to claim that the perceived size of the affective 
stimulus itself is influenced, since the subjects only judged the size of the circle 
surrounding it. This study suggests therefore that emotional content can in certain 
circumstances impact upon visuospatial perception (perhaps mediated by attention, as 
van Ulzen et al., 2008 suggest), though perhaps not upon the perception of the 
threatening stimulus itself. The focus of this paper was also not specifically on threat, 
but on positive versus negative affective valence. The experiments used stimuli that 
were predefined as positive, neutral or negative in affective content, and no measures of 
threat or fear were taken. It remains to be seen therefore, whether threat itself can bias 
visuospatial perception. 
 
Taken together, the aforementioned literature variously claims that threatening stimuli 
appear to move faster, to be closer to us, and to be larger in size, than non-threatening 
stimuli. In essence, it is said that fear-inducing objects are perceived in ways that makes 
them appear even scarier. The direction of all of these reported biases is therefore 
consistent with the literature used to support the paternalistic vision hypothesis, which 
proposes that vision provides us with percepts tailored to our behavioural requirements. 
Do we, then, literally see threatening objects as bigger, closer, and faster because this 
promotes their more prompt avoidance? The arguments of others (e.g., Durgin et al., 
2009; Firestone, 2013a) have been cited and added to, claiming that much of the 
literature used to prop up paternalistic vision is flawed in that it allows for cognitive 
factors to impact judgments that are taken to reflect perception. It is additionally 
proposed that the largely separate literature on the effects of threat upon visuospatial 
perception is problematic in the same manner. Are any of the claims that threat value 
warps our spatial perception valid? The sheer number of robust, consistent effects 
reported across these two fields implies that paternalistic–like biases are not mere 
artefacts, but they may reflect, for example, task demands and memory more than they 
do vision.  
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In the present experiments we draw upon the flash-lag effect, a visual-perceptual 
illusion in which the position of a moving object appears forwardly displaced beyond 
that of a collocated flash (MacKay, 1958; Nijhawan, 1994). This is a very robust, and 
enormously replicated phenomenon (for an extensive review of empirical findings, see 
Hubbard, 2014), that scales up with the velocity of the moving object (Krekelberg & 
Lappe, 1999; Lee et al., 2008; Nijhawan, 1994; Wojtach et al., 2008). While a heated 
debate persists regarding the cause of the illusion, it is uncontroversial to assert that it is 
perceptual in nature, rather than being the result of, for instance, response bias, task 
demands, or memory (for reviews, see Krekelberg & Lappe, 2001; Nijhawan, 2002; 
Schlag & Schlag-Rey, 2002; Whitney, 2002). Judgments are made over multiple trials 
regarding the instantaneous relative positions of two concurrently visible stimuli, and 
evidence has indicated that the measure is robust against response bias (Kanai et al., 
2004). Though most commonly investigated with moving visual stimuli that either 
rotate (e.g., Nijhawan, 1994) or linearly translate (e.g., Kanai, Sheth, & Shimojo, 2004) 
in the frontoparallel plane, flash-lag also occurs with stimuli that appear to change in 
depth (Harris, Duke, & Kopinska, 2006; Ishii, Seekkuarachchi, Tamura, & Tang, 2004; 
Lee et al., 2008), colour (Sheth et al., 2000), sound (Alais & Burr, 2003), and 
motor/kinaesthetic space (Nijhawan & Kirschfeld, 2003). The illusion is also not 
cognitively impenetrable, since higher-level stimulus attributes are able to affect it (for a 
review, see Hubbard, 2014). For example, when the moving and flashed stimuli 
together make up the components of a Japanese Kanji character, the flash-lag effect is 
reduced for Japanese speakers, but not for English speakers with no linguistic 
experience of the symbol (Noguchi & Kakigi, 2008). Similarly, it has been reported that 
when the bottom half of a frontal face image is in motion, and the top half is flashed, the 
flash-lag effect is reduced when both halves are from the same, rather than different 
faces (Khurana et al., 2006). Also demonstrating a role for prior knowledge, Nagai et al. 
(2010) showed that when the moving image was of a car, the flash-lag was greater 
during backwards rather than forwards motion, suggesting that knowledge of an 
object’s typical motion characteristics is integrated into the percept. Given that these 
‘higher’ cognitive factors are able to modulate the flash-lag effect, one might suppose 
that, if threat is able to impact visuospatial perception, it should also affect the size of 
the forward displacement in the flash-lag effect. The following experiments therefore do 
not necessarily bear on explanations for the flash-lag phenomenon, but instead use it to 
probe the question of whether threat influences visuospatial perception. If the flash-lag 
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effect is modulated by the fear content of the stimuli it would strengthen the overall 
footing of the paternalistic vision stance by suggesting that visual space can indeed be 
manipulated by threat, without concurrent effects from memory, for instance. More 
specifically, if the ‘known-quantity’ of flash-lag is enhanced or reduced depending on 
whether motion is towards or away from the subject, this would bear upon the 
paternalistic claims that threatening stimuli are perceived as closer, larger, and faster.  
 
 
3.3 Experiment 1: Looming and receding motion 
 
Outlined earlier were claims that people perceive threatening stimuli to be (1) closer, (2) 
larger, and (3) moving faster towards them than non-threatening stimuli. These will 
henceforth be referred to simply as claims (1), (2), and (3). This experiment explicitly 
addresses claims (1) and (2) in conjunction, and to a lesser extent, claim (3). The size of 
the flash-lag effect was investigated in subjects with a range of spider-phobia levels for 
a spider image and a butterfly image that either loomed or receded, while a flashed 
version of the same image was presented nearby for size comparison. Looming or 
receding motion could be seen as either motion in depth, or a change of size in the distal 
object. If the former is the case (as is the intention), claim (1) predicts an enhanced 
flash-lag (above equivalent motion for the butterfly image) in high-phobia subjects, 
since the effect should make the threatening stimulus appear closer. Claim (1) 
simultaneously predicts a reduced flash-lag for the receding spider image compared to 
the butterfly image in high-phobia subjects. Claim (2), on the other hand, suggests that 
threatening objects are seen as larger than non-threatening objects. Note that since the 
current stimuli do not clearly distinguish between motion in depth and size-change, the 
predictions of claim (2) are actually the same as claim (1).  
 
Since flash-lag scales up with velocity (e.g., Nijhawan, 1994), the prediction that the 
motion of threatening objects towards the subject produces greater velocity estimates 
should also result in a magnified effect. Put simply, if something is perceived to move 
faster, it should produce a larger flash-lag. According to claims (1) and (2), motion of 
the spider away from high-phobia subjects should produce a relatively small flash-lag, 
because the effect of threat should make the spider seem less distant or less small. 
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However, the literature on the perceptual effects of threat has so far yielded no explicit 
claim about how the velocity of threatening objects moving away from the observer 
should be perceived. A null-result in this condition will therefore not be considered at 
odds with claim (3). The only prediction derived from claim (3), then, is that looming 
motion (to the extent that is perceived as approaching motion in depth) should produce 
a larger effect with spiders than with butterflies in high-phobia subjects. See Table 3.1 
for a summary of the various predictions derived from paternalistic vision. 
 
 
Table 3.1. 
Experiment 1: Predicted differences in flash-lag magnitude for high compared to low 
phobia subjects derived from Claims 1, 2, and 3 of paternalistic vision. Key predictions 
are displayed in bold. 
 
 
 	    
Spider Butterfly Spider Butterfly
Claim 1: Threatening 
objects appear closer Larger FLE
Same/
similar FLE Smaller FLE
Same/
similar FLE
Claim 2: Threatening 
objects appear larger Larger FLE
Same/
similar FLE Smaller FLE
Same/
similar FLE
Claim 3: Threatening 
objects appear to move 
faster towards you
Larger FLE Same/similar FLE
Same/ 
similar FLE
Same/
similar FLE
Looming motion Receding motion
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3.3.1 Methods 
 
3.3.1.1 Subjects 
 
Thirty-two naïve subjects (25 female) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
participated in exchange for payment or course credits.  
 
3.3.1.2 Apparatus 
 
Subjects sat at a desk with their head immobilised by a chin support while viewing a 
21” Sony Trinitron Multiscan E500 CRT monitor (85Hz refresh rate, 1400 x 1050 
resolution) from a distance of approximately 40cm. Responses were given with 
subjects’ preferred hands by pressing the left and right keys on an Apple USB 
keyboard. Stimuli were presented using custom Matlab scripts, running with the 
Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997).  
 
3.3.1.3 Stimuli and Procedure 
 
Flash-lag task. On each trial a square clip art image of either a black spider or a black 
butterfly (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2) either loomed (expanded) out from or receded 
(contracted) towards a point 11.3° to the left or right of a central fixation cross. Only the 
black portions of the images were displayed, and the white regions shown in Figure 3.1 
were shown in the neutral grey of the display background. After 2200ms the animal 
image disappeared. Measured between their most distant horizontal and vertical points 
the animal images were 1.5° × 1.5° at their smallest, and 18° × 18° at their largest. 
Rather than using an abstract shape as the control stimulus a butterfly was chosen 
because it has similar overall image complexity and, like spiders, butterflies are small, 
animate creatures.  
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Figure 3.1. Spider and butterfly images used in Experiment 1. 
 
 
While both axes of the image had the same amount added to or subtracted from them in 
each video frame, this quantity was varied over the course of the animation. If the image 
were to expand or contract by the same angular subtense in each frame it would produce 
the percept of an object either slowing down as it approached (during expansion) or 
speeding up as it receded (during contraction). The method of Regan and colleagues 
(e.g., Regan & Hamstra, 1993; Regan & Vincent, 1995) was used in order to produce a 
two-dimensional expansion or contraction animation consistent with motion in depth at 
a constant velocity. The variation in the angular subtense of the expanding image was 
thus described by the equation 
 tan𝜃! = tan𝜃!1− 𝑡/𝑇! 
 
where the image’s angular subtense at time t was 2𝜃! and 2𝜃! at t = 0, and the time-to-
collision at t = 0 was given by 𝑇!. The resulting animation appeared consistent with an 
object moving towards the observer at a constant velocity. To produce the receding 
animation the looming animation was simply reversed. It has been shown that when 
faced with dynamic two-dimensional stimuli, perception prefers to interpret the simplest 
three-dimensional motion path that maintains an object’s shape and identity (e.g., 
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Attneave & Block, 1973; Bundesen, Larsen, & Farrell, 1983; Corbin, 1942; Shepard & 
Judd, 1976; Shepard & Zare, 1983). It is thus expected that subjects will perceive the 
stimuli as moving in depth, rather than as simply changing in size. 
 
Halfway through the animation, a flashed version of the same image was presented for a 
single video frame (12ms) centred 11.3° to the opposite side of fixation. The size of the 
flash was equivalent to one of eight possible former or future sizes of the animated 
image, evenly distributed between 423ms in the past and 1056ms in the future (-423ms, 
-211ms, 0ms, 211ms, 423ms, 634ms, 845ms, and 1056ms). After the animation had 
finished, subjects pressed one of two keys depending on whether they perceived the left 
or the right image as larger at the time of the flash (binary choice). Since the stimuli 
were not stereoscopic, a judgment of relative size was considered to be more 
straightforward for subjects than a judgment of relative position in depth. 
 
The side of the display on which the animated image was presented was alternated 
between trials to avoid a build up of motion aftereffects in one hemifield. After 16 
practice trials, a total of 640 experimental trials were presented in random order (2 
animals × 2 motion directions × 8 flash sizes × 20 flash size repetitions), with a short 
break at the halfway point. 
	   114 
 
Figure 3.2. Experiment 1: Example of stimuli used in a spider trial. Only objects in 
black were shown. 
 
 
Phobia level assessment. After completing the flash-lag task, subjects’ phobia levels 
were assessed for both spiders and butterflies using the 18 standard items of the Fear of 
Spiders Questionnaire (Szymanski & O’Donohue, 1995) for spiders, and modified 
versions of the same 18 items for butterflies. Following Vagnoni et al. (2012), the 
butterfly items were identical to the spider items, except that the word “spider” was 
replaced by the word “butterfly.” Some example items were therefore: “If I came across 
a spider now, I would get help from someone else to remove it,” and “I would feel very 
nervous if I saw a butterfly now.” Using a custom Matlab script, the 36 spider and 
butterfly items were shuffled together and presented on screen one at a time in random 
order above a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” 
Strong agreement with an item gave a score of +3 (indicating high-phobia), while strong 
disagreement gave a score of -3 (indicating low-phobia). After completing both sets of 
items the mean phobia score for each animal was calculated. 
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A paired samples t-test reveals that, across all subjects, spiders (M = -1.09, SD = 1.72) 
were considered to be more threatening than butterflies (M = -2.31, SD = 0.87), t(31) = 
4.49, p < .001, d = 0.9. A significant paired samples correlation (r = .46, p = .008) also 
revealed that those who gave a high spider-phobia score, also tended to give a relatively 
high butterfly-phobia score. This suggests that the spider and butterfly phobia scores 
were not entirely independent – perhaps due to each subject being more or less likely 
than others to show agreement with statements given in questionnaires. The difference 
between the phobia scores for spiders and butterflies (i.e., spider score - butterfly score) 
was therefore taken to be the best measure of true spider-phobia level. Positive 
difference scores thus meant that spiders were considered more threatening than 
butterflies.  
 
For some of the analysis to come subjects were separated into high- and low-phobia 
groups depending on whether their phobia difference score was above or below the 
median value, respectively. The high-phobia group had a significantly greater phobia 
difference score (M = 2.41, SD = 1.33) than the low-phobia group (M = 0.03, SD = 
0.29), t(16.4) = 6.98, p < .001, d = 2.93. To ensure that the difference between spider 
and butterfly phobia scores was greater in the high-phobia group a 2 × 2 mixed-
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed, with animal phobia score 
(spiders or butterflies) as a within-subjects factor, and phobia level (high or low) as a 
between-subjects factor. There were significant main effects of animal phobia score, 
F(1, 30) = 51.25, p < .001, ηp2 = .631, and phobia level, F(1, 30) = 12.3, p = .001, ηp2 = 
.291, and a significant interaction between them, F(1, 30) = 48.65, p < .001, ηp2 = .619. 
An examination of the mean phobia scores for each animal from each group allows an 
interpretation of the interaction. While the low-phobia group produced very similar 
spider (M = -2.28, SD = 0.91) and butterfly (M = -2.31, SD = 0.94) scores, and the high-
phobia group produced similarly low scores for butterflies (M = -2.3, SD = 0.82), the 
latter gave much higher scores for spiders (M = 0.1, SD = 1.51). This suggests that the 
aforementioned finding that spiders were considered more threatening than butterflies 
overall is almost entirely due to the difference in phobia scores from group labelled as 
‘high-phobia’. 
 
Data analysis. Responses regarding which image appeared larger were converted so 
that they equated to either ‘flash-ahead’ or ‘flash-behind’. So, for example, if a subject 
	   116 
reported that either a looming stimulus looked smaller than the flash, or that a receding 
stimulus appeared larger than the flash, it would be coded as a ‘flash-ahead’ response. 
 
Psychometric curves were fit to the data from each condition (looming spider, receding 
spider, looming butterfly, receding butterfly) for each subject with a cumulative normal 
function (using the Palamedes toolbox for Matlab; Prins & Kingdom, 2009). Points of 
subjective equality (PSEs) and confidence intervals were estimated using a bootstrap 
procedure with 2000 iterations. PSEs corresponded to the size of the flash (in 
milliseconds of animation progress) that would receive 50% ahead and 50% behind 
responses. A PSE of 100ms therefore indicates that the two stimuli were perceived as 
equal when the flashed image was equal in size to that which the animated image would 
be expected to reach 100ms in the future. 
 
For each subject PSE difference scores were calculated. These included the motion 
direction anisotropies associated with the spider image (looming spider PSE - receding 
spider PSE) and the butterfly image (looming butterfly PSE - receding butterfly PSE), 
and the difference between these anisotropies (spider anisotropy - butterfly anisotropy). 
A positive anisotropy difference therefore indicates that the spider produced a larger 
anisotropy than the butterfly. Also derived were the differences between the PSEs for 
the looming spider and looming butterfly (looming spider PSE - looming butterfly 
PSE), and the receding spider and receding butterfly (receding spider PSE - receding 
butterfly PSE). Positive values in both of these measures mean that the spider produced 
a larger flash-lag than the butterfly. Figure 3.3 shows psychometric curves from a 
representative subject. 
 
 
3.3.2 Results 
 
Correlations across all subjects. Phobia difference score did not correlate with 
anisotropy difference, r = -.047, p = .799, therefore implying no relationship between 
phobia level and the difference between one’s flash-lag anisotropies for the spider and 
butterfly images. 
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There was also no correlation between either the difference between one’s looming 
spider and looming butterfly flash-lags, r = .123, p = .502. Additionally, there was no 
correlation between the difference between one’s receding spider and receding butterfly 
flash-lags, r = .141, p = .44. Taken together, these two null results suggest that phobia 
level was not related to the difference between one’s spider and butterfly flash-lags, in 
either direction of motion. 
 
ANOVA with high- and low-phobia groups. A 2 × 2 × 2 mixed design ANOVA was 
performed, with motion direction (looming or receding) and animal (spider or butterfly) 
as within-subjects factors, and phobia level (high or low) as a between-subjects factor.  
 
There was a main effect of motion direction, F(1, 30) = 6.58, p = .016, ηp2 = .18, a main 
effect of animal, F(1, 30) = 19.17, p < .001, ηp2 = .39, and a significant 2-way 
interaction between them, F(1, 30) = 16.55, p < .001, ηp2 = .356. An examination of 
Figure 3.4 indicates that the spider and the butterfly produced similar flash-lags for 
looming motion, and that while receding motion led to smaller effects with both images, 
it was more pronounced for the spider than the butterfly. There was no main effect of 
phobia level, F(1, 30) = .26, p = .616, ηp2 =  .008, nor did it interact with motion 
direction, F(1, 30) = .35, p = .559, ηp2 = .012, or animal, F(1, 30) = 2.28, p = .142, ηp2 = 
.071. There was furthermore no three-way interaction between motion direction, animal, 
and phobia level, F(1, 30) = .01, p = .755, ηp2 = .003. In combination, these null results 
show that phobia level had no impact on flash-lag magnitude. 
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Figure 3.3. Experiment 1: Psychometric curves from a representative subject. Negative 
offsets represent flashes that lag behind the instantaneous size of the dynamic stimulus. 
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Figure 3.4. Experiment 1: Mean flash-lag effects for looming and receding spider and 
butterfly images for high- and low-phobia subjects. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard 
error. 
 
 
3.3.3 Discussion 
 
These findings are inconsistent with the paternalistic vision hypothesis, in that they 
imply that visual perception is not affected by threat. An unequivocally perceptual 
measure was used to probe instantaneously perceived spatiotemporal position and no 
effect of manipulating threat was found. Furthermore, contrary to the aforementioned 
studies, no evidence was found that threatening objects are perceived as closer, larger, 
or faster, than non-threatening objects. Phobia difference score did not correlate with 
the flash-lag anisotropy difference between the spider and the butterfly (as would be 
predicted by claims (1) and (2)), nor did it correlate with either the difference between 
the looming spider and the looming butterfly flash-lags (as would be predicted by claim 
	   120 
(3)), or the difference between the receding spider and the receding butterfly flash-lags. 
When subjects were split into high- and low-phobia groups, an ANOVA showed no 
effect of this between-groups manipulation, and no interaction between it and the other 
variables.  
 
To the extent that the moving stimuli were perceived as moving in depth (as should be 
expected given the size-change profiles of the looming and receding animations) the 
current results bear most strikingly upon claim (1), that threatening stimuli are 
perceived to be closer to us than non-threatening stimuli. Our results suggest that this is 
not the case, i.e., that people do not underestimate the distance to threatening objects 
due to a perceptual bias. If, however, the looming and receding stimuli were actually 
perceived as changing in size rather than in depth, the present results would be evidence 
against claim (2), that threatening objects appear larger. Since this experiment does not 
distinguish motion in depth and size-change, the findings could potentially be taken as 
evidence against either claim (1) or (2), or both of them together. It is however more 
likely that the animations were perceived as motion towards or away from the observer, 
because the size-change profile was consistent with the simple, linear motion of an 
object moving in depth at a constant velocity.  
 
The present results can also be taken as evidence against claim (3) – that incoming 
threatening stimuli appear to be moving faster – since high-phobia subjects should have 
seen looming spider stimuli as moving more quickly than low-phobia subjects, and thus 
displayed relatively augmented flash-lag effects. This is however a less direct 
implication of the present data since it has only been inferred that something perceived 
to move faster should produce a greater flash-lag effect. In defence of claim (3), Anstis 
(2010) has shown that when physical and perceptual motion directions are dissociated, 
flash-lag depends on the former, so it may similarly be that only physical velocity, and 
not perceptual velocity, is able to modulate the effect. 
 
Despite our results being (on face value) contradictory to the paternalistic vision 
hypothesis, one may still argue that the interaction between motion direction and animal 
type could be explained from a paternalistic standpoint. Across all subjects, looming 
stimuli produced similarly large flash-lags that were greater than those for receding 
stimuli. However, the interaction shows that, across all subjects, the receding spider 
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gave a smaller flash-lag than the receding butterfly. It could be, then, that the spider was 
more threatening than the butterfly to everyone, regardless of their apparent phobia 
level, and that this made the spider appear less far along its trajectory and/or less small. 
If this was the case though, why was a difference between high- and low-phobia 
subjects not evident? As we saw earlier, the low-phobia group produced very similar 
phobia scores for both spiders and butterflies, while the high-phobia group gave 
considerably higher scores for spiders, but similarly low scores for butterflies. So, to the 
extent that the questionnaire was a valid measure of threat, the low-phobia group was 
equally intimidated by spiders and butterflies, while the high-phobia group was much 
more afraid of spiders. To maintain the paternalistic stance one could argue that the 
phobia measurements used herein did not reflect threat as it operated in the flash-lag 
task. The Fear of Spiders Questionnaire is, however, based on solid empirical footing 
(Szymanski & O’Donohue, 1995), and a similarly modified version was used by 
Vagnoni et al. (2012) to demonstrate the “affective modulation of the perception of 
looming stimuli” (p. R826). Given our almost identical use of the questionnaire to 
Vagnoni et al. (2012), one would have expected a comparably observable modulation of 
spatiotemporal judgments, though this was not the case. It may be retorted, however, 
that their measure of time-to-collision and our measure of flash-lag are simply not the 
same, and thus cannot be compared. Consider, though, that this would be inconsistent 
with the conspicuous analogies between our perceptual measures. Recall that in their 
experiment subjects viewed a stimulus looming for 1s before disappearing, then pressed 
a button to indicate when they thought it would have collided with them if it had 
continued to loom. The time between the stimulus offset and the button press was the 
time-to-collision measure. It should be highlighted that their measure of time-to-
collision and the present measure of flash-lag are both judgments regarding the 
instantaneous spatiotemporal positions of two-dimensional objects appearing to move in 
depth at close proximity. It is posited therefore, that the starkest contrast between these 
two measures is that theirs involves a component of memory and mental imagery, while 
ours is a perceptual comparison. The present null-result, therefore, is most likely to 
reflect that spatiotemporal visual perception itself is not affected by threat. A plausible 
explanation for the interaction between motion direction and animal type might be that 
the low-level characteristics of the spider’s shape (e.g., its outward-pointing legs) made 
it appear relatively larger during receding motion. 
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If one continues to entertain the possibility that spiders were scarier than butterflies for 
everyone, and that this explains the interaction effect outlined above, it may also be 
conjectured that a flash-lag difference between looming spiders and looming butterflies 
was not evident due to a ceiling effect. That is, perhaps an upper flash-lag limit for 
looming stimuli was hit. Consistent with this possibility, the present effects are 
considerably greater (up to ~800ms in some cases) than the sub-100ms effects 
commonly observed with either rotating or linear translating stimuli (e.g., Nijhawan, 
1994). Larger-than-typical flash-lags have been observed previously in stimuli moving 
in depth (Harris et al., 2006). Encountering a flash-lag ceiling could have equalised the 
looming spider and looming butterfly effects, when the former would otherwise have 
had an advantage. The possibility of a ceiling effect cannot be discounted without 
further experiments. 
 
An additional limit to this experiment becomes apparent when we consider the lesson of 
the El Greco fallacy outlined earlier (Firestone & Scholl, 2014; Firestone, 2013b). If the 
target and matching stimulus in a psychophysical task are analogous, then any 
perceptual effect should cancel out when the comparison is made. In the current 
experiment animated spiders were compared with flashed spiders, and animated 
butterflies were compared with flashed butterflies. The reasoning behind this decision 
was that for a valid size comparison to be made, the moving and flashed stimuli had to 
be the same shape. There is the potential, though, for a perceptual bias to be applied 
equally to both stimuli, thereby nullifying its appearance in the data. 
 
Sample size might also be cited as a limiting factor in the present experiment. Given 
that considerable individual differences are commonly observed in the magnitude of the 
flash-lag effect (e.g., Kreegipuu & Allik, 2004; Nijhawan, 2001), it could be that thirty-
two subjects provided insufficient power to reveal an effect.  
 
A final point worth noting is that all subjects saw both the spider and the butterfly, and 
trials with each image were presented in random order. The spider or the butterfly could 
therefore appear on any given trial. It may be that at the beginning of each trial subjects 
were initially uncertain about whether they were seeing the spider or butterfly image in 
motion, since it was presented in the periphery. If confusion about the nature of the 
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image being shown persisted to the moment of the flash, this could have had negated 
perceptual differences between the images. 
 
 
3.4 Experiment 2: Linear translation 
 
In the foregoing discussion it was argued that the spatiotemporal perception of 
threatening stimuli appears to be no different from that of non-threatening stimuli. 
However, the specific findings and the stimuli used also presented further issues that 
kept alive a potential role for paternalistic biases in visuospatial perception. Several 
possibilities were identified: everyone considered the spider more scary than the 
butterfly; ceiling effects equalised the looming flash-lags; the resemblance of the 
moving and flashed stimuli cancelled out perceptual biases; the sample was too small to 
reveal an effect; and seeing both threatening and non-threatening stimuli reduced 
effects. The current experiment attempts to circumvent these issues by presenting spider 
images that linearly translate up or down across displays that are either horizontally 
(i.e., flat) or vertically (i.e., standard) oriented. Flash-lag effects tend to be smaller when 
motion is in the frontoparallel plane (e.g., Nijhawan, 1994; Whitney & Murakami, 
1998) than when motion is in depth (e.g., Harris et al., 2006), so by using the former it 
is hoped that ceiling effects will be avoided. For each subject the flash-lag effect is 
measured by briefly presenting two horizontal lines, one above and one below the 
translating spider image, and having the subject select which line had been closer to the 
spider at the time that they flashed. By having abstract (i.e., non-spider) shapes as the 
flashed stimuli, we avoid the potentially nullifying effect of identically shaped moving 
and flashed objects. Importantly, position in depth is also disentangled from 
instantaneous size. With the horizontal display, downwards motion is towards the 
subject, and upwards motion is away from the subject. Neither direction of motion is 
either towards or away from the subject’s body when the display is vertically oriented. 
This experiment is therefore focused on testing claim (1), and not claim (2). Instead of 
having a within-subjects manipulation of threat as before (i.e., spider versus butterfly), a 
further between-group manipulation is added, so that some subjects view a less scary 
spider image, while others view a more scary spider image. The intention here is that 
there will be no moment of ambiguity about what image subjects are seeing in motion 
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since each individual always sees the same image. Finally, a larger sample is used to 
increase statistical power. 
 
The specific predictions from the paternalistic vision stance are similar to those outlined 
for the previous experiment, except that the focus is now on testing claims (1) and (3), 
and not on testing claim (2). According to claim (1), high-phobia subjects should 
produce larger effects than low-phobia subjects for motion towards them (i.e., 
horizontal display, downwards motion), and smaller effects than low-phobia subjects 
for motion away from them (i.e., horizontal display, upwards motion). This anisotropy 
difference between phobia groups should therefore also be greater for subjects seeing 
the more scary spider than those seeing the less scary spider. This would suggest that, 
regardless of motion direction relative to their body, more threatening objects are 
perceived closer to high- than low-phobia subjects. The difference between downwards 
and upwards motion on the vertical display should differ less or not at all between 
subjects of different phobia levels and between subjects viewing the less and more scary 
spider images. Again, the specific prediction derived from claim (3) is that motion 
towards the subject should produce a larger flash-lag (because it should be perceived to 
move faster in that direction) to the extent that it is more threatening. See Table 3.2 for a 
summary of the various predictions derived from paternalistic vision. 
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Table 3.2. 
Experiment 2: Predicted differences in flash-lag magnitude for high compared to low 
phobia subjects derived from Claims 1 and 3 of paternalistic vision. Key predictions are 
displayed in bold. 
 
Note. Claim 2 was not tested in this experiment 
 
 
3.4.1 Methods 
 
3.4.1.1 Subjects 
 
Eighty naïve subjects (56 female) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
participated in exchange for payment or course credits.  
 
3.4.1.2 Apparatus 
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Two 21” Sony Trinitron Multiscan E500 CRT monitors with identical display settings 
(85Hz refresh rate, 1400 x 1050 resolution) were positioned side-by-side. One was 
arranged in a standard, vertical configuration, while the other was tilted forwards and 
viewed as a reflection in a half-silvered mirror, such that its image was projected in the 
horizontal plane of the desk (see Figure 3.5). For this latter display orientation, upwards 
motion was away from the subject’s body, and downwards motion was towards the 
subject’s body. For the vertical screen neither motion direction was explicitly towards 
or away from the subject. Stimuli presented on the horizontal display were inverted so 
that when reflected they projected the same retinal image as those on the vertical 
monitor. Subjects viewed the vertical display projected through a half-silvered mirror 
while their head was immobilised by a chin rest. When viewing the horizontal display, 
subjects sat at the same desk, also using a chinrest, but tilted their forehead forwards to 
rest on a support. They looked straight down towards the desk, where the screen was 
reflected. In both cases the subject’s nasion was 35cm from the plane of the display. 
Responses were given with subjects’ preferred hands by pressing the left and right keys 
on an Apple USB keyboard. Stimuli were presented using custom Matlab scripts, 
running with the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997).  
 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Experiment 2. Schematic diagram (not to scale) of display orientations used. 
Dotted lines indicate positions of half-silvered mirrors. Arrows indicate visible 
trajectory of spider in each condition. 
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3.4.1.3 Stimuli and Procedure 
 
Subjects saw one of two bird’s-eye-view spider images (see Figure 3.6). One was the 
same clip art image used in the previous experiment (less scary), while the other was a 
photograph of a tarantula (more scary), modified slightly to appear more symmetrical 
about its vertical midline. Both spider images were square (5.7° × 5.7°) and had 
transparent backgrounds, so that they appeared atop the neutral grey screen. Subjects 
began the session using one of the displays before switching to the other halfway 
through the main flash-lag task. 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Experiment 2. Less scary (left) and more scary (right) spider images. 
 
 
Alignment task. Using the first display orientation, subjects first performed a task in 
which they manually aligned the spider image they were to see in the flash-lag task 
between two horizontal lines. A fixation cross was presented with its centre 9.97° left of 
the display’s vertical meridian, and vertically aligned with the display’s horizontal 
meridian. Two lines (5.7° × 0.5°) were aligned horizontally with the vertical meridian 
of the display, but separated vertically by 19.36°, and their overall vertical positioning 
was jittered so that the halfway point between them was somewhere between 2.24° 
below and 2.24° above the horizontal midline of the display. The two lines flashed for 
one frame (12ms) repeatedly, every 1 second. The spider image initially appeared with 
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its centre somewhere between 10.14° and 13.19°, either above or below physical 
alignment between the flashing lines. While fixating slightly to the left of the spider’s 
vertical path, subjects took as much time as they needed to move the spider image so 
that it appeared equidistant between the two repeatedly flashing lines, using the 
keyboard’s up and down keys. When subjective alignment was achieved subjects 
pressed the space key to complete the trial. Three upward-facing and 3 downward-
facing trials were performed in alternation, with the first trial type (up or down) 
counterbalanced across subjects. The mean upwards-facing and mean downwards-
facing value was calculated for each subject and these offsets from equidistance were 
used in the following flash-lag task in place of actual physical alignment. This task 
allowed subject-by-subject calibration of the stimulus positioning so that the flash-lag 
effect could be distinguished from subjective alignment without motion. 
 
Flash-lag task. Flash-lag effects were measured using stimuli similar to those in the 
alignment task. At the beginning of each trial the same forwards-facing spider image 
moved onto the display from the edge and translated either upwards or downwards at 
21.67°/s, for approximately 2000ms, before disappearing off the opposite edge of the 
display (see Figure 3.7). While the spider was moving, the same two lines used in the 
alignment task were flashed for one frame (12ms). The midpoint between the lines was 
jittered between three vertical positions, so that it could be either aligned with, or either 
1.79° above or below the display’s horizontal meridian. This was to make the position 
of the flashes unpredictable so that subjects could not simply judge the spider’s location 
relative to fixation. The lines were presented when the spider reached one of 7 positions 
between them. The equidistance value was taken from the result of each subject’s 
alignment task. In terms of milliseconds-from-equidistance, the offsets of the spider 
between the lines were -100ms, -50ms, 0ms, 50ms, 100ms, 150ms, and 200ms. Once 
the spider had disappeared off screen the subject was able to press the up or down key 
(binary choice) depending on whether they thought the line nearer to the top or bottom 
of the screen had been closer to the spider, respectively, at the time that they had 
flashed. After completing the first half of the flash-lag task on the first display 
orientation, subjects were moved to the second display for the rest of the session. Spider 
offset and motion direction were randomised across all trials performed on each display. 
Display orientation order (i.e., vertical then horizontal or horizontal then vertical) was 
counterbalanced across spider image and phobia level groups. Each subject performed a 
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total of 588 trials (2 display orientations × 2 motion directions × 7 spider offsets × 3 
jittered flash positions × 7 repetitions of each spider offset at each flash position). 
 
As in the previous experiment, cumulative normal functions were fit to the data from 
each condition for each subject using the Palamedes Toolbox for Matlab (Prins & 
Kingdom, 2009) and PSEs and confidence intervals were estimated using a bootstrap 
procedure with 2000 iterations. In this experiment, PSEs corresponded to the position of 
the spider image between the flashes that would receive 50% ‘ahead-of-equidistance’ 
and 50% ‘behind-equidistance’ responses. In this case, then, a PSE of 50ms would 
indicate that the spider image would have to be 50ms of animation progress behind the 
point of equidistance between the flashes in order to be perceived as equidistant. See 
Figure 3.8 for psychometric curves from a single representative subject. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7. Experiment 2: Example of stimuli used. Only objects in black were shown. 
In this example the spider image is behind the point of equidistance between the flashes. 
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Fear of Spiders Questionnaire task. Continuing on the second display orientation, 
subjects performed the same Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (Szymanski & O’Donohue, 
1995) task used in the previous experiment, but with only the 18 spider-related items. 
As before, subjects with a phobia score above the median were defined as “high-
phobia”, and those with a score below the median were defined as “low-phobia”. An 
independent samples t-test confirmed that high-phobia subjects produced significantly 
higher spider-phobia scores (M = 0.62, SD = 0.82) than low-phobia subjects (M = -2.1, 
SD = 0.58), t(78) = 17.23, p < .001, d = 3.91.  
 
Spider image relative scariness task. Subjects who performed the main experiment 
with the more scary spider were given a final additional task, in which they had to give 
a scariness rating for each of the spider images. The two 5.7° × 5.7° spider images were 
presented side-by-side (less scary on the left, more scary on the right; 17.23° between 
their nearest edges) above a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from -3  (“Not scary at all”) to 
+3 (“Very scary”). A circle was initially presented surrounding the less scary spider on 
the left, with the question “How scary is this spider?” displayed above it. Once the 
subject had given a scariness rating for that spider, the more scary spider on the right 
was similarly highlighted, and a separate response was given. A 2 × 2 mixed-design 
ANOVA was performed on the scariness ratings for the two spider images, with phobia 
level (high or low) as a between-subjects factor, and spider image (more- or less scary) 
as a within-subjects factor. As expected, there was a main effect of phobia level, F(1, 
38) = 14.93, p < .001, ηp2 = .282, with high-phobia subjects finding both images scarier 
than low-phobia subjects. There was also a main effect of spider image, F(1, 38) = 
68.79, p < .001, ηp2 = .644, with the more scary spider appearing scarier to everyone. 
The two factors did not interact. 
 
 
3.4.2 Results 
 
Alignment task results. To investigate whether the display orientation or spider image 
used for the alignment task affected the alignments subjects made, a 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 
mixed-design ANOVA was performed. Alignment task display orientation (horizontal 
or vertical), phobia level (high or low), and spider image (more or less scary) were 
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between-subjects factors, and alignment task direction (upwards or downwards) was a 
within-subjects factor. The means and standard deviations for each condition are shown 
in Table 4 below. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of alignment task 
display orientation, F(1, 72) = 11.48, p = .001, ηp2 = .138, with subjects performing the 
horizontal alignment task producing estimates that were biased more towards the top of 
the display than those who performed the vertical alignment task. There was no effect of 
phobia level, spider image, or alignment task direction, and no interactions between any 
factors or combinations thereof. The main effect of alignment task display orientation 
implies that there was a general bias for subjects to perceive the spider closer to them by 
an average of 0.33° (2mm) when performing the horizontal rather than the vertical 
alignment task. Since these alignments were used to set the zero-offset position in the 
subsequent flash-lag task, this could have had a knock-on effect among subjects who 
performed the horizontal alignment task of enhancing flash-lag for upwards motion and 
reducing it for downwards motion. It should be noted, though, that this is a relatively 
small effect, translating to the distance travelled by the spider in approximately one 
12ms frame in the flash-lag task. This finding will be readdressed in the flash-lag results 
section. Overall, excepting the main effect of alignment display orientation, this 
collection of results suggests that the subjective alignments made were not a function of 
either the direction the spider faced, or more notably, the subject’s phobia level. This 
last point was corroborated by the lack of a correlation between spider-phobia score and 
the alignment made in either direction, either among all subjects, or when the data from 
those who performed each of the alignment tasks were analysed separately.  
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Table 3.3. 
Experiment 2: Offset from alignment with horizontal meridian of display (mm) in each 
condition of the alignment task. 
Alignment 
task display 
orientation 
Phobia 
level 
Spider 
image 
Alignment 
task direction 
Mean SD 
Horizontal 
High 
More scary 
Upwards 4.9 11.95 
Downwards 9.1 14.3 
Less scary 
Upwards 7.2 9.37 
Downwards 6.3 10.34 
Low 
More scary 
Upwards 6.7 11.85 
Downwards 9.8 14.62 
Less scary 
Upwards 5.7 14.45 
Downwards 10.3 11.06 
Vertical 
High 
More scary 
Upwards -3.1 8.7 
Downwards 1.9 12.27 
Less scary 
Upwards 4.3 8.55 
Downwards 3.1 20.93 
Low 
More scary 
Upwards -3.5 6.04 
Downwards 4.5 17.53 
Less scary 
Upwards -2.1 7.36 
Downwards -3.5 13.53 
Note. A positive offset from alignment represents a bias towards the top of the display 
 
 
Flash-lag results: Correlations across all subjects. Phobia score did not correlate with 
the difference between the horizontal display flash-lag anisotropy and the vertical 
display flash-lag anisotropy, either overall, r = .143, p = .206, or when the data from the 
more scary, r = .126, p = .438, and less scary, r = .161, p = .322, spider images were 
examined separately. This is contrary to claim (1), which predicted a larger anisotropy 
on the horizontal display compared to the vertical display among subjects of higher 
phobia level. 
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Furthermore, there was no correlation between phobia score and the difference between 
downwards motion on the two displays, r = .068, p = .546, or upwards motion on the 
two displays, r = -.151, p = .181. These results were the same when the data from the 
more scary, (downwards difference, r = .006, p = .972; upwards difference, r = -.168, p 
= .3), and less scary (downwards difference, r = .123, p = .448; upwards difference, r = 
-.146, p = .368) spider images were analysed individually. According to claim (3), 
downwards motion should have produced a larger effect on the horizontal display than 
on the vertical display in subjects high in spider-phobia. 
 
Flash-lag results: ANOVA with high- and low-phobia groups. A 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 mixed 
measures ANOVA was performed, with display orientation (horizontal or vertical) and 
retinal direction (up or down) as within-subjects factors, and phobia level (high or low) 
and spider image (more or less scary) as between-subjects factors. There was a main 
effect of retinal motion direction, F(1, 76) = 13.6, p < .001,  ηp2 = .152, with downwards 
motion producing larger flash-lag effects. This implies that the aforementioned bias in 
the alignment task among those who performed it on the horizontal display is unlikely 
to have had a major effect, since the highly significant difference in flash-lag effects is 
in the opposite direction to that expected. There was a significant main effect of spider 
image, F(1, 76) = 5.61, p = .02, ηp2 = .069, with the more scary spider producing larger 
flash-lags than the less scary spider. There was also a significant interaction between 
phobia level and spider image, F(1, 76) = 7.42, p = .008, ηp2 = .089, indicating that the 
main effect of spider image was entirely the result of differences exhibited by the high-
phobia group. More specifically, the more scary spider image produced much larger 
flash-lags than the less scary spider, but only for the high-phobia group. To follow up 
this interaction the data were collapsed across display orientation and motion direction, 
so that there were four flash-lag observations from each subject. Separate independent 
samples t-tests were used to compare the complete sets of observations from the high- 
and low-phobia subjects for each spider image. These revealed that, compared to the 
low-phobia subjects, the high-phobia subjects produced significantly smaller flash-lags 
(M high-phobia = 17.55ms, SD = 57.78; M low-phobia = 42.3ms, SD = 57.12) with the less 
scary spider, t(158) = 2.73, p = .007, d = 0.431, and significantly larger flash-lags (M 
high-phobia = 66.16ms, SD = 48.02; M low-phobia = 38.92ms, SD = 59.26) with the more scary 
spider, t(158) = 3.19., p = .002., d = 0.508. Both findings remained significant with a 
Bonferroni-corrected α-level of 0.025. 
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Figure 3.8. Experiment 2: Psychometric curves from a representative subject. Negative 
offsets represent flash positions in which the spider image was ahead of the point of 
equidistance. 
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Figure 3.9. Experiment 2: Mean flash-lag effects from high- and low-phobia subjects 
for less- and more scary spider images, collapsed across display orientation and motion 
direction. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard error. 
 
 
3.4.3 Discussion 
 
The present results show that the flash-lag effect can be modulated by threat. Whether a 
moving spider image was more or less scary had little effect upon the flash-lags of low-
phobia subjects, but among high-phobia subjects the scarier spider led to far greater 
flash-lags than the less scary spider (see Figure 3.9). These findings were only apparent 
in the ANOVA and not in the correlations because the latter looked at flash-lag 
differences between particular conditions, for example, whether horizontal downwards 
PSE - vertical downwards PSE correlated with phobia score. This method was intended 
to test the specific predictions from paternalistic vision that threatening objects are 
perceived be closer or to move faster towards oneself. However, the present ANOVA 
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results reveal a different picture; that flash-lag is simply enhanced as a function of 
threat, irrespective of motion direction relative to one’s body.  
 
Claim (1), that threatening objects are perceived closer to us, is not supported by these 
data. If this were the case, threatened subjects should have perceived the moving 
stimulus further down the horizontal display, closer to them, regardless of motion 
direction. This would have shown up in the horizontal display conditions of high-phobia 
subjects as a relatively augmented downwards motion flash-lag, and a relatively 
diminished upwards motion flash-lag, and especially so for the more scary spider 
image. Instead, it was found that downwards motion produced a larger flash-lag effect 
regardless of the display orientation, the subject’s phobia level, or the scariness of the 
spider image. This effect is likely to be the result of retinal motion direction, something 
that has previously been shown to mediate flash-lag magnitude (e.g., Brenner, van 
Beers, Rotman, & Smeets, 2006; Kanai et al., 2004; Mateeff & Hohnsbein, 1988; 
Mateeff et al., 1991; Shi & Nijhawan, 2008). However, while previous studies have 
focused on how flash-lag is larger for motion towards, rather than away from fixation, 
the present findings additionally suggest that downwards retinal motion produces a 
larger effect than upwards retinal motion. The phenomenon of representational 
momentum, which exhibits numerous parallels with flash-lag (Hubbard, 2013; Munger 
& Owens, 2004), is also greater for downwards than upwards motion, and it has been 
suggested that this is because the visual system has an internalised model of the way 
that gravity acts upon real-world objects (De Sá Teixeira & Hecht, 2014; Hubbard & 
Bharucha, 1988; Hubbard, 1990, 2001). Under this interpretation then, it would be 
claimed that flash-lag is greater for downwards retinal motion because an object moving 
downwards on the retina is more likely to continue in that direction because downwards 
momentum works in conjunction with gravity, rather than against it.  
  
There may still be scope however for the idea that we perceive threatening objects to be 
closer to us. Consider that the present findings support the basic premise that threat can 
influence low-level visual perception, and imply therefore that higher cognitive 
confounds may not explain all of the findings in the paternalistic vision literature. Given 
that this is the case, one may argue that the present results are not entirely contrary to 
claim (1), since static objects and objects in motion might be subject to different 
perceptual biases. For instance, when threatening objects are stationary there might be a 
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bias to perceive them closer to us, but when they are in motion another bias may 
dominate, so that threatening stimuli are seen further along their trajectory.  
 
Claim (3), that we perceived threatening stimuli to move faster towards us, finds some 
support from these findings. It was reasoned that if claim (3) were true, threatening 
objects should produce a larger flash-lag under the appropriate motion conditions, since 
the flash-lag effect increases with the velocity of the moving target. Given that in this 
experiment threat augmented the flash-lag effect in general, it is possible that moving 
objects were perceived to move faster by those who felt threatened by them, regardless 
of direction. This is consistent with the conclusions of Witt and Sugovic (2013), though 
they only took velocity estimates for motion towards the subject, whereas our findings 
might imply that a threatening object moving away is also perceived to have a higher 
velocity.  
 
Why then, did this experiment reveal an effect of threat, when the previous one did not? 
As highlighted earlier, there were several potential issues with the previous stimuli that 
were not present in the current investigation. Firstly, ceiling effects may have been 
avoided by using linear translation, thereby allowing higher-end differences to manifest. 
Also, the present experiment used flashed lines, rather than flashed versions of the 
moving stimuli, thereby removing the possibility that effects were cancelled out because 
both stimuli were perceived with the same bias. Presenting images of different threat 
levels as a between-subjects manipulation may also have meant that even when the 
moving stimulus was relatively peripheral, subjects could identify it.  
 
An additional possibility is that the greater power provided by the larger sample size in 
Experiment 2 meant that it was able to reveal an effect that Experiment 1 was not.  It 
should also be acknowledged, though, that the larger sample size may also have led to a 
Type 1 error; that is, the significant results might not reflect actual, real-world 
differences. This may be considered unlikely though, given the ample effect sizes 
(Cohen, 1988) accompanying the statistical significance. 
 
It is not clear why the effects of phobia level differed between the two spider images. 
Why, for instance, did high-phobia subjects produce smaller flash-lags than low-phobia 
subjects with the less scary spider, but greater flash-lags than the low-phobia group with 
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the more scary spider? It could be that the high-phobia subjects realised that the less 
scary stimulus (a monotone clip art spider) was so evidently not real that they were able 
to overcompensate in their responding for what would otherwise be an enhanced flash-
lag. The more realistic, more scary spider, on the other hand, may have been too 
threatening to permit such a compensation. This is of course entirely speculative, and 
post-hoc, and it is an open question why the flash-lags for the less scary spider should 
be smaller for the high- than the low-phobia group.  
 
 
 
3.5 General Discussion 
 
Two experiments have been reported. The first showed no evidence that threat 
modulated the flash-lag effect, while the second ironed out several issues present in the 
first, and revealed that threat augmented the flash-lag effect, irrespective of the direction 
of motion relative to the observer. This evidence suggests, therefore, that visuospatial 
perception can indeed be affected by threat – a core requirement of the paternalistic 
vision hypothesis. As mentioned in the introduction, several researchers have claimed 
that many apparently ‘perceptual’ findings used to support paternalistic vision could 
actually reflect the workings of cognitive factors. It was further argued that this 
criticism could be applied to much of the research used to claim that threatening stimuli 
are perceived as closer, larger, and faster. To the extent that the flash-lag effect reflects 
visual perception, then, these findings provide general support for the idea that 
visuospatial perception itself can be influenced by threat. This said, evidence that 
threatening objects are perceived as closer or larger was not found, though our data are 
consistent with the possibility that they appear to move faster.  
 
 
3.5.1 Theories of the flash-lag effect 
 
The flash-lag effect was not augmented or diminished depending on the direction of 
motion, but was modulated on the basis of how threatening the moving stimulus was to 
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the observer. While these results do not explicitly arbitrate between different 
explanations for the flash-lag effect, it will be useful now to consider some of those 
accounts in order to help elucidate the nature of the effect reported herein.  
 
One theory for the occurrence of the flash-lag effect is that our visual systems 
compensate for neural transmission delays by extrapolating the positions of moving 
objects so that their perceived positions more closely approximate their real positions 
(Nijhawan, 1994, 2008). Without such a prediction, it is reasoned that the perceived 
positions of rapidly moving objects would trail behind their real positions to an extent 
that would render interaction with them problematic. According to this account, the 
prior trajectory of the moving object allows an extrapolation of its future position, 
which means that its retinotopic cortical representation does not lag behind its retinal 
location. We see a spatial separation, then, because the unpredictable flash reaches 
perception later, after a delay of approximately 100ms. While this explanation initially 
appealed to early visual mechanisms (e.g., Berry, Brivanlou, Jordan, & Meister, 1999), 
later reasoning has argued that compensation for the delays of moving objects may 
occur at multiple levels of the nervous system (Nijhawan et al., 2004; Nijhawan, 2008). 
Shi and Nijhawan (2008) furthermore argued that flash-lag motion direction 
anisotropies relative to the fovea are a sign of the visual system’s sensitivity to the 
behavioural significance of stimuli. From this perspective, the mechanisms of visual 
prediction might further extrapolate the positions of threatening objects to err on the 
side of caution, because they are more behaviourally significant. It is perhaps safer to 
for the observer to perceive a scary-looking moving spider as having travelled slightly 
further than it actually has. If this occurred prior to the integration of body position 
signals, it would explain the lack of a difference between motion towards and away 
from the body. This interpretation would be consistent with the claims of the 
paternalistic vision literature pertaining to threat. These suggest that we perceive 
threatening or potentially dangerous things in ways that promote behavioural responses 
that safeguard us from harm (e.g., Cole et al., 2013; Teachman et al., 2008; Vagnoni et 
al., 2012; Witt & Sugovic, 2013).  
 
Movement of attention has also been invoked to explain the flash-lag effect. Baldo and 
Klein (1995) firstly suggested that the flashed stimulus draws attention away from the 
moving stimulus, which moves some distance in the time it takes to shift attention and 
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make a perceptual comparison – thereby resulting in a misalignment. It was further 
highlighted that focusing attention on the moving object would reduce its perceptual 
latency, thus making it appear advanced beyond the relatively delayed flash. While later 
evidence has indicated that attentional processes do not cause the flash-lag effect (e.g., 
Khurana & Nijhawan, 1995; Khurana, Watanabe, & Nijhawan, 2000), it is still 
acknowledged as a modulatory factor (Baldo et al., 2002; Baldo & Klein, 2010; Namba 
& Baldo, 2004). In light of this position it is interesting to note that it takes longer to 
disengage attention from a threatening stimulus (Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; 
Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002; Georgiou et al., 2005). Given that the attentional shift 
account of flash-lag suggests that the effect is proportional to the time taken to shift 
attention from the moving to the flashed stimulus, a tendency for attention to linger on 
the threatening stimulus would increase the effect. Furthermore, it could be that a more 
acute focus of attention upon the threatening stimulus reduces its perceptual latency 
beyond that of the less threatening stimulus, allowing it to reach perception even earlier 
before the flash. This interpretation overlaps with that which follows from another 
explanation of the flash-lag effect: that of differential latencies for moving and flashed 
stimuli. The idea here is simply that moving stimuli are perceived with a lower latency 
than flashed stimuli, without invoking a role for attention (Purushothaman et al., 1998; 
Whitney, Murakami, et al., 2000; Whitney & Murakami, 1998). It could also be, then, 
that perceptual latencies for threatening stimuli are lower than those for non-threatening 
stimuli, without a mediating effect of attention.  
 
Several other theories of flash-lag have at their heart the notion that the visual system 
must integrate position signals over time in order to generate a motion percept. While 
disagreeing on when the integration window begins and ends, these theories propose 
that flash-lag occurs because the average position of the moving object during this time 
period is beyond the position of the stationary flash (Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000a, 
2007; Krekelberg & Lappe, 1999, 2000a, 2000b; Lappe & Krekelberg, 1998). These 
theories would ascribe a larger flash-lag to a longer temporal integration window, such 
that the average position of the moving object was perceived even further beyond the 
flash. However, it is unclear why such a low-level attribute should be affected by threat 
in the way demonstrated in the current study.  
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3.5.2 Neuroanatomical pathways 
 
A further consideration of interest in explaining how threat could enhance the flash-lag 
effect lies in the neuroanatomical pathways that could underpin such an interaction 
between emotion and vision. It has been shown, for instance, that projections from the 
amygdala to the visual cortex facilitate the recognition of emotional facial expressions 
(e.g., Morris et al., 1998; Vuilleumier, Richardson, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2004). 
While these findings mostly demonstrate functional connections between the amygdala 
and the ventral visual stream, there is also anatomical evidence of projections from the 
amygdala to dorsal areas (Amaral, Behniea, & Kelly, 2003) responsible for processing 
information relevant to spatial relationships and action (Goodale & Milner, 1992). It is 
also worth noting that the flash-lag effect is modulated by activity in area V5/hMT+ 
(Maus, Ward, Nijhawan, & Whitney, 2013), which has separately been shown to 
interact with the amygdala in processing simultaneous motion and emotion (Hindi 
Attar, Müller, Andersen, Büchel, & Rose, 2010). An influence of amygdala activity 
upon the dorsal visual stream or V5/hMT+ could potentially underlie the threat-
enhanced flash-lag effects observed herein. 
 
 
3.5.3 Limitations and future directions 
 
Attention was drawn earlier to some of the advantages of Experiment 2 over 
Experiment 1 in an effort to explain why it exhibited an effect of threat that was not 
initially apparent. Consideration will now be given to the limitations common to both 
experiments, and some directions for future research will be suggested in light of these.  
 
Two of the main arguments put forward to explain where paternalistic visual effects 
might come from, if not perception, are that either task demands (e.g., Durgin et al., 
2009; Firestone & Scholl, 2014) or memory (e.g., Cooper et al., 2012) are behind the 
biases. The flash-lag effect involves a relative position judgment of two stimuli 
presented simultaneously, so it is unlikely that memory, or associated mental imagery, 
are able to explain the current findings. What about task demands, though? Critics of 
the paternalistic vision literature contend, with experimental support, that subjects might 
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often guess the experimenters’ hypotheses, and then produce responses in accordance 
with that expectation (Durgin et al., 2009; Firestone & Scholl, 2014; Firestone, 2013a; 
Russell & Durgin, 2008). It is possible that the experiments reported herein may too 
have suffered from this problem. Subjects in both experiments were recruited with the 
knowledge that the experimenter sought people with a range of levels of spider-phobia, 
which may, in conjunction with the methods, have indicated to them something about 
the purpose of the experiment. That said, judgments were not explicitly in reference to 
one’s body, as was the case in previous experiments (e.g., Cole et al., 2013; Vagnoni et 
al., 2012). Had the subjects been required to judge, for example, the positions of spiders 
relative to themselves, it would have perhaps been more suggestive of the underlying 
hypotheses, e.g., that high-fear people underestimate the distance to scary objects. 
Future experiments may go some way to avoiding this possibility by not mentioning 
anything about, for example, spiders, prior to the experimental session.  
 
As discussed, a possible issue with these experiments that keeps in play the potential for 
threatening objects to be perceived closer to us is that threatening objects in motion may 
be subject to different biases than static threatening objects. This could perhaps be 
investigated with a static version of the second experiment, in which the position of a 
stationary, continuously visible spider is judged relative to lines flashed above and 
below it on the display. If threatening stimuli are perceived closer to us, high-phobia 
subjects should estimate that the spider is closer to the lower line when the display is 
horizontal, compared to when it is vertical, and more so than low-phobia subjects. 
 
To measure the flash-lag effect one must perform a number of trials with the same 
moving and flashed stimuli. It is possible that repeated exposure to the threatening 
stimulus might have meant that subjects became desensitised to the threat, or gained an 
implicit understanding that the stimulus was not to be feared. In fact, these very 
outcomes are some of the principal aims of exposure therapy for treating emotional and 
anxiety disorders (Richard & Lauterbach, 2007). Such an effect may have abolished the 
influence of threat on the flash-lag effect in the first experiment, and reduced it in the 
second. Such effects could perhaps be alleviated by using an adaptive measure of flash-
lag (e.g., Nijhawan, 1994) to reduce the required number of trials. In addition, only 
subjects with either very high, or very low phobia levels could be tested in an effort to 
enhance between-group differences. The potential for over-exposure is however a 
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notable limit of the flash-lag method for investigating the effects of threat. Vagnoni et 
al. (2012), on the other hand, who measured time-to-collision, were able to present each 
of their threatening and non-threatening images only once, thus avoiding the potential 
for exposure effects to reduce the influence of threat.  
 
Finally, and very briefly, it should be highlighted that while spiders are frequently a 
source of threat, evidence that other commonly feared objects (e.g., needles, or snakes) 
can have a similar effect on flash-lag magnitude would greatly strengthen the findings 
reported.  
 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
 
It was argued in the introduction that many experiments in the paternalistic vision 
literature likely suffer from possible confounding effects of cognition, such as task 
demands, memory, and mental imagery. The first experiment – with looming and 
receding spider and butterfly images – appeared supportive of this contention, since the 
flash-lag effect, an unequivocally perceptual illusion, was not modulated by threat. The 
second experiment used an alternative method, however, in which separate groups of 
high- and low-phobia subjects saw either a more or a less scary spider image that either 
moved up or down, or towards or away from them. This, it was argued, controlled for 
some of the potential issues with the first experiment. It was found that flash-lag effect 
was in general boosted when the moving stimulus was threatening to the observer. This 
strongly supports a basic premise of paternalistic vision – that visuospatial perception is 
sensitive to our behavioural needs. However, no evidence was found for the specific 
claims that threatening stimuli are perceived as closer, or larger, though the findings are 
consistent with the possibility that threatening objects are seen to move faster, 
regardless of the direction relative to the observer. These findings imply, therefore, that 
the paternalistic vision hypothesis need not be considered groundless, and that many of 
the findings that appear susceptible to cognitive influence, may not actually reflect it. 
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Paper III: Additive and subtractive effects of 
gamma movement on the forward 
displacement of size-changing stimuli 
 
 
 
4.1 Abstract 
 
Previous findings show that expanding or contracting stimuli that abruptly disappear are 
perceptually displaced in the direction of size-change, so that their final size appears 
larger or smaller, respectively. Experiments reported here make use of the flash-lag 
effect and related illusions to demonstrate that this forward displacement is greater for 
contracting stimuli than expanding stimuli, but only when the size-changing stimulus 
disappears at the moment of perceptual comparison. The aforementioned directional 
anisotropy is shown to be present when size-changing stimuli are compared to 
references that disappear at (Experiments 1 & 2) or continue after (Experiment 3) their 
offset. It is then shown that when the size-changing stimulus continues after the 
disappearance of the reference, the difference in effects between directions is abolished 
(Experiment 5). The findings are explained in terms of the apparent contraction (gamma 
movement) of abruptly disappearing stimuli. More specifically, it is suggested that at 
the moment of disappearance, the formerly expanding or contracting objects undergo a 
rapid perceptual contraction, which augments the forward displacement of contracting 
stimuli and diminishes it for expanding stimuli. Finally, a novel account of gamma 
motion is given that suggests we perceive abrupt disappearance as contraction because 
objects in the environment do not frequently instantaneously vanish. Rather, their retinal 
images tend to contract before going out of sight. 
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4.2 Introduction 
 
A crucial task of the visual system is to accurately localise the positions of moving 
objects in space. Numerous illusions reveal that when something is in motion its percept 
is biased forwards along its trajectory, relative to its real position or to other stimuli (for 
reviews, see Nishida, 2011; Whitney, 2002). Of particular interest here is that the final 
size of an expanding or contracting object that suddenly disappears is misperceived in 
the direction of size change (Whitaker et al., 1999).  It is shown further on in a series of 
experiments that this forward displacement is greater for contracting than for expanding 
stimuli when the dynamic stimulus disappears at the moment of perceptual comparison. 
However, before reporting the current findings in detail it will be helpful to briefly 
recap some of the prominent literature on forward displacements.  
 
Ramachandran and Anstis (1990) showed subjects displays with square arrays of 4 
square windows. Behind each window was a field of horizontally translating random 
dots. When the dots in the upper windows moved towards the middle of the display and 
the dots in the lower windows moved away from the middle of the display, the upper 
windows were perceived closer together than the lower windows. Similarly, De Valois 
and De Valois (1991) found that when gratings moved in opposite directions within two 
adjacent, aligned windows, the windows themselves were perceived as misaligned, each 
biased in the direction of the motion they contained. If a moving pattern is seen through 
a window, then, the shape of the window itself is perceived as shifted in the same 
direction. Explanations for this motion-induced position shift are debated, with accounts 
appealing to, for example, forward shifts of visual cortical receptive fields (Fu, Shen, 
Gao, & Dan, 2004), and contrast enhancement at the leading edges of moving stimuli 
(Arnold, Thompson, & Johnston, 2007). 
 
Comparably, the final position of a sequence of progressively displaced shapes is biased 
in the direction of apparent motion (representational momentum; Freyd & Finke, 1984; 
Hubbard & Bharucha, 1988; Kelly & Freyd, 1987). In a particularly influential 
experiment, Freyd and Finke (1984) showed subjects a sequence of three snapshots of a 
progressively rotated rectangle separated by brief intervals. A fourth rectangle was then 
shown – its orientation consistent with either a continuation or a reversal of rotation. 
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Subjects were more likely to judge the fourth rectangle as being the same as the third 
when it was oriented further in the direction of implied rotation. This effect was also 
found to occur with smooth linear translation (rather than discreet rotations), and 
furthermore, that it was greater for downwards than for upwards motion (Hubbard & 
Bharucha, 1988). A wealth of findings has since lead to the claim that high-level 
internalisations of simple physical properties, such as momentum and gravity, are 
responsible for the bias (for reviews, see Hubbard, 1995, 2005).  
 
In addition to motion endpoints, it has been shown that smoothly moving stimuli are 
biased forwards in perception both at the start of motion (Fröhlich, 1923; Kirschfeld & 
Kammer, 1999), and relative to other stimuli presented during motion (Nijhawan, 
1994). The latter example here has been termed the flash-lag effect, and is exemplified 
by the perceived spatial advance of a moving stimulus beyond a briefly aligned flash. 
While it was initially thought that flash-lag did not occur when the flash occurred in 
synchrony with the disappearance of the moving stimulus (flash-terminated condition, 
or FTC; Eagleman & Sejnowski, 2000; Whitney, Murakami, & Cavanagh, 2000), it has 
subsequently been shown that a flash-lag can be elicited in the FTC, for example, when 
the stimuli are at a considerable eccentricity (Kanai et al., 2004). Forward displacements 
of moving stimuli endpoints have also been observed without flashed comparisons 
when the moving stimuli are blurred (Fu, Shen & Dan, 2001), or when their offset is 
made less perceptually abrupt, for example, by fading out instead of instantaneously 
disappearing (Maus & Nijhawan, 2006; 2008; 2009; Shi & Nijhawan, 2012). 
 
We shift focus now to an assortment of findings that show that expanding and 
contracting stimuli are misperceived as shifted in the direction of their size change. For 
instance, it was recently shown that the flash-lag effect occurs in expanding and 
contracting lines (Kafaligönül et al., 2010). Subjects fixated centrally while a vertical 
line (with one of its ends fixed at the horizontal meridian) expanded or contracted on 
one side of the screen. Another line on the opposing side flashed briefly during the first 
line’s ongoing motion. When the lines were the same size at the time of the flash, the 
size of the flash was perceived to lag behind that of the dynamic line. This effect was 
larger for expanding than contracting objects, which the authors suggested was 
consistent with the finding that flash-lag is larger for approaching than receding stimuli 
(e.g., Harris, Duke, & Kopinska, 2006). 
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Kelly and Freyd (1987) also found evidence of representational momentum with 
expanding and contracting stimuli. Squares either grew or shrunk in size over the course 
of three sequential inducer presentations, before a fourth probe-square was presented. 
Subjects judged whether the size of the fourth square was the same as or different to 
that of the remembered third square. They found that subjects tended to overestimate 
the size of the third square in ‘grow’ trials and underestimate it (though not 
significantly) in ‘shrink’ trials. The larger forward displacement in expanding motion is 
consistent with the aforementioned finding in expanding and contracting flash-lag 
(Kafaligönül et al., 2010). 
 
Whitaker et al. (1999) similarly demonstrated that smoothly expanding and contracting 
stimuli are biased in their direction of size change at the moment of their disappearance. 
This was the case when the whole stimulus expanded or contracted, when it was just the 
internal texture (but not its window – akin to the motion-induced position shift), and 
when the movement was in the form of a motion aftereffect. However, of most interest 
here is their first experiment, in which subjects fixated between two radial Gabor 
patterns (6° centre-to-centre), one of which was static (reference) while the other was 
changing in size (dynamic). The reference stimulus was approximately 3.5° in diameter, 
while the dynamic stimulus either expanded from 0.5×, or contracted from 2× its size. 
At some point, both stimuli disappeared and subjects had to decide whether the dynamic 
stimulus had been larger or smaller than the reference stimulus at the moment of their 
mutual disappearance. It was found that the size of the expanding stimulus was 
overestimated by 7.2%, while the size of the contracting stimulus was underestimated 
by 9.7%. So, inasmuch as there is a forward displacement of the size of the dynamic 
stimulus, this result is in accordance with the aforementioned findings from Kafaligönül 
et al. (2010) and Kelly and Freyd (1987). However, whereas the tendency in those 
studies was for a greater expanding than contracting effect, the bias here, to anticipate 
the present findings (see further on) appears to be in the opposite direction. It should be 
noted, though, that Whitaker et al. (1999) did not report a difference between the effect 
magnitudes in each direction. 
 
Here experiments are reported showing that the forward displacement of contracting 
stimuli is greater than that of expanding stimuli, specifically when the size-changing 
stimulus disappears at the instant the observer has to make a perceptual judgment 
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(hereafter termed the moment of comparison). To begin, informal observations suggest 
that a flash-lag effect occurs for both expanding and contracting stimuli in the FTC, and 
that it is larger in the latter than it is in the former. The initial experiment is intended to 
formally test this possibility, and represents the first formal investigation of flash-lag in 
the FTC with expanding and contracting stimuli. 
 
 
4.3 General Methods 
 
4.3.1 Subjects  
 
Subjects with normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated in exchange for money 
or course credits. All were naïve to the purpose of the experiments. Different groups of 
subjects were used in each experiment.  
 
4.3.2 Apparatus 
 
In all experiments subjects rested their chin on a support while viewing a 21” Sony 
Trinitron Multiscan E500 CRT monitor (85Hz refresh rate, 1400 x 1050 resolution) 
from a distance of 350mm. Stimuli were presented using custom Matlab scripts, running 
with the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Responses were made 
using the left and right keys on an Apple USB keyboard. 
 
4.3.3 Stimuli and Procedure 
 
Stimuli were black on a neutral grey background. On each trial a dynamic stimulus was 
presented at 8° eccentricity, either to the left or right of fixation. A reference stimulus 
appeared at the same eccentricity in the opposite hemifield. In a binary choice 
paradigm, subjects were required to judge whether the left or right stimulus was longer 
(Experiments 1, 2, 3, & 5), more distantly spaced (Experiment 4a), or closer to the edge 
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of the display (Experiment 4b) at a moment of comparison. This moment was specified 
differently between experiments. Subjects responded by using the left or right hand to 
press the left or right keyboard key, respectively.  
 
Excepting Experiment 4b (see Section 4.8.1), immediately following the first 
appearance of the dynamic stimulus, each of its ends either moved vertically away from, 
or towards the horizontal meridian at a constant rate of 3.65º/s. This meant that the 
separation between the ends of the stimulus changed at 7.3°/s. The animation proceeded 
for one of 5 randomly jittered durations (1386ms, 1468ms, 1550ms, 1632ms, or 
1714ms) before the moment of comparison was signalled (see individual methods 
sections). This meant that the midpoint of the dynamic stimulus was always on the 
horizontal meridian of the display. 
 
The length of the reference stimulus at the moment of comparison was varied between 
trials so that it was equal to one of 7 size offsets (based on pilot observations) from the 
instantaneous length of the dynamic stimulus. Excepting Experiments 4a, 4b, and 5 (see 
Sections 4.7.1, 4.8.1, and 4.9.1, respectively), the reference could range from 1.3° 
shorter (longer) than, to 2.6° longer (shorter) than the dynamic stimulus in expanding 
(contracting) motion, in 7 equal steps. The 7 size offsets used in each condition were 
equivalent to time offsets of -188ms, -94ms, 0ms, 94ms, 188ms, 282ms, and 376ms. So 
for instance, an offset of 376ms would mean that the reference line would have to 
continue for another 376ms into the future to achieve the same length as the reference 
stimulus. In this example therefore, the reference would be 376ms ‘longer’ than the 
instantaneous size of the dynamic stimulus in the expanding condition, and 376ms 
‘shorter’ than it in the contracting condition. As the time offsets used were the same in 
both directions of size change these (rather than size offsets) will be referred to 
henceforth.  
 
On each trial the side on which the dynamic line was presented was alternated in order 
to prevent a build-up of motion aftereffects. After 12 training trials, subjects performed 
a total of 560 experimental trials (2 directions of size change × 2 hemifields × 7 
reference stimulus offsets × 4 repetitions at each offset × 5 moments of comparison) 
with a short break at the halfway point. 
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4.3.4 Data analysis 
 
Raw data based on whether the left or right stimulus appeared larger or more widely 
spaced were converted into responses consistent with the reference stimulus appearing 
either ahead of or behind the dynamic stimulus. If the reference stimulus appeared 
smaller than the dynamic stimulus in a contracting trial, for instance, this would be 
converted to a ‘reference-ahead’ response. Psychometric curves were fit to individuals’ 
data using a cumulative normal function implemented in the Palamedes set of Matlab 
routines (Prins & Kingdom, 2009). Points of subjective equality (PSEs) and confidence 
intervals were estimated using a bootstrap procedure with 2000 iterations. All PSEs are 
expressed in milliseconds (ms) of lag of the reference behind the dynamic stimulus. See 
Figures 4.2, 4.6, and 4.9 for examples of psychometric curves from representative 
subjects in Experiments 1, 4a, and 5, respectively. 
 
 
4.4 Experiment 1: Flash-terminated condition 
 
4.4.1 Methods 
 
Nine subjects (2 female) participated. The dynamic stimulus was a vertical line of 
constant width (0.41°) that changed in length from either 0º (expansion) or 22.64º 
(contraction) to reach either 10.52°, 11.15°, 11.78°, 12.41°, or 13.03°  (depending on 
the jittered time measure; see General Methods) before the moment of comparison was 
signalled by a flashed reference line (single frame flash duration = 12ms). See Figure 
4.1 for a diagram of the stimuli. Immediately following the flash, both stimuli 
disappeared simultaneously. The length of the reference line was randomly varied 
between 7 length offsets from the dynamic line at the moment of comparison (see 
Section 4.3.3). The subjects judged whether the line on the left or right of the screen 
was longer at the time of the flash. 
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Figure 4.1. Example of line stimuli used in Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 5. Only objects 
displayed in black were visible during the experiments. Reference stimulus was either 
flashed or continuously visible (see individual methods sections).  
 
 
4.4.2 Results 
 
One-sample t-tests show that the mean PSEs for expanding [M = 83.35ms, SD = 49.95, 
t(8) = 5.01, p = .001, d = 3.54] and contracting [M = 171.45ms, SD = 42.49, t(8) = 12.1, 
p < .001, d = 8.559] motion were significantly different from zero, indicating a strong 
flash-lag effect in both directions. A paired samples t-test further reveals that the 
reference was perceived to lag behind the dynamic stimulus more so for contracting 
lines than it did for expanding lines, t(8) = 3.87, p = .005, d = 1.293. Figure 4.3 shows 
plots of the mean flash-lag effects in each direction. 
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Figure 4.2. Experiment 1: Psychometric curves from a representative subject. Negative 
offsets represent flashed stimuli that physically lagged the instantaneous size of the 
dynamic stimuli. 
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Figure 4.3. Experiment 1: Mean forward displacements observed in Experiment 1, in 
which the reference flashed synchronous with dynamic stimulus offset. Error bars 
indicate ± 1 standard error. 
 
 
4.4.3 Discussion 
 
These results, like Kanai et al. (2004), demonstrate that there can be a flash-lag effect in 
the FTC. The size of the flashed reference line was perceived to lag behind the 
instantaneous size of both expanding and contracting lines, even though the moving and 
flashed stimuli disappeared simultaneously. The effects reported previously (25ms; 
Kanai et al., 2004) were considerably smaller than those observed here (grand mean = 
127.4ms, SD = 63.87) – requiring some explanation. Importantly, it has been shown that 
the flash-lag effect increases with the separation between the moving and flashed 
stimuli (Baldo et al., 2002; Baldo & Klein, 1995; Kanai et al., 2004) and that both a 
large stimulus separation and eccentricity contribute to eliciting a flash-lag effect in the 
FTC (Kanai et al., 2004). In the current experiment both the eccentricity of each 
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stimulus (8°), and the interstimulus separation (16°) were even greater than those used 
in Kanai et al. (2004), so it is likely that these factors amplified the flash-lag in 
comparison to their findings. It may still be that expanding and contracting stimuli, per 
se, produce flash-terminated flash-lag effects even when the stimuli are close together in 
central vision, but the current experiment has not tested this possibility. It is an open 
question for future research. 
 
Of greater interest, however, is that the forward displacement for contracting motion 
was more than double that observed during expanding motion. This is inconsistent with 
the findings of Kafaligönül et al. (2010), who used similar stimuli but found the 
opposite results. However, two conspicuous distinctions between this experiment and 
theirs should be noted. Firstly, they used a full-cycle flash-lag display, in which the 
moving stimulus continued for some time and distance after the flash occurred, while 
here the flash and dynamic stimulus disappeared simultaneously. Secondly, although 
the authors used vertical lines that grew longer or shorter, only one end of the line 
moved (the other was fixed). In this experiment, on the other hand, the centre of the line 
was fixed at the meridian, while both ends moved simultaneously towards or away from 
it. Either of these discrepancies may have been sufficient to produce the conflicting 
results. It is argued later (see Section 4.9.3), however, that the first of these points is 
more likely to be at the root of the difference. 
 
It has been shown that the flash-lag effect is larger for foveopetal than foveofugal linear 
translation in both full-cycle (Mateeff & Hohnsbein, 1988; Shi & Nijhawan, 2008) and 
flash-terminated conditions (Kanai et al., 2004). In the present experiment the only 
motion present in any given trial was of the ends of the dynamic line, either moving 
towards (contracting) or away from (expanding) each other. When one also considers 
that the ends of the lines simultaneously moved either towards or away from the 
display’s horizontal meridian, the possibility emerges that the present anisotropy was a 
manifestation of the previously reported capacity for foveopetal motion to produce a 
larger effect than foveofugal. That is, it could be that motion-towards-the-meridian is a 
close enough approximation of foveopetal motion that it leads to an enhanced flash-lag 
effect. This would, though, be in conflict with the results of Kafaligönül et al. (2010), 
mentioned above. In their experiment, contracting motion still involved the motion of 
one end of a line towards the meridian and yet expanding motion produced the larger 
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effect. The size-changing stimulus was also at a considerably smaller eccentricity than 
that used here, and so the motion of the end of the line was even more directly 
foveopetal or foveofugal. The possibility that the motion of the ends of the line relative 
to fixation is responsible for the anisotropic flash-lag found here is further discounted in 
a series of control experiments reported later on (Experiments 4a and 5).  
 
So, if not motion direction relative to fixation, then what causes the difference between 
expanding and contracting stimuli? It has been demonstrated that objects approaching a 
visual landmark undergo greater representational momentum than objects receding from 
a landmark (Hubbard & Ruppel, 1999). Similarly, and as mentioned previously, the 
flash-lag effect is relatively enhanced in motion towards, rather than away from, the 
fixation (Kanai et al., 2004; Mateeff & Hohnsbein, 1988; Shi & Nijhawan, 2008). 
Comparable to motion-towards-a-landmark, and motion-towards-fixation, contracting 
motion has a point of reference – an implied endpoint. That is, if an object continues to 
contract, it will eventually reach a vanishing point. While it is rejected further on 
(Experiments 4a and 5) that motion-towards-an-endpoint, in general, is responsible for 
the anisotropy, a slightly different notion remains tenable. Retinal images undergoing 
contraction are implicitly approaching a moment of disappearance. Indeed, it is likely 
that contraction even predicts disappearance. In support of the compatibility between 
disappearance and contraction, it has been claimed for a long time that abruptly 
disappearing stimuli are actually perceived to rapidly contract – a phenomenon referred 
to as gamma movement (Baldwin & Tinsley, 1965; Bartley & Wilkinson, 1953; Bartley, 
1936, 1941; Hartmann, 1938; Kanizsa, 1979; Kenkel, 1913; Lindemann, 1938; Winters, 
Jr. & Gerjuoy, 1965; Winters, Jr., 1964). The implication here is that the visual system 
assigns a contraction percept to something that instantaneously, uniformly disappears. 
So, in the present experiment, if the dynamic stimuli were subject to gamma contraction 
at the moment of comparison, it would make them appear to quickly (but not instantly) 
contract to down to ‘zero’ size. In the contracting condition, this was the implied 
endpoint of the dynamic stimulus anyway, but the endpoint of the expanding stimulus 
was less clear, and would, if anything, have been in the opposite direction. Gamma 
contraction upon offset would therefore have facilitated the transit of the contracting 
stimulus to its implied endpoint, but inhibited that of the expanding stimulus. Such an 
interaction between forward displacements and gamma motion could explain why the 
present effect was larger for contracting than expanding stimuli. 
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Here, though, it should be noted that in Experiment 1, flashed references were used for 
perceptual comparison with dynamic stimuli, while the experiments of Whitaker et al. 
(1999) made use of continuously visible reference stimuli. Since no statistically-
significant difference in the forward displacements of expanding and contracting motion 
was reported by Whitaker et al. (1999), it follows that the anisotropy found presently 
may be a result of using flashed reference stimuli. Experiment 2 tests this with a method 
analogous to Whitaker et al. (1999), in which subjects compare a dynamic stimulus to a 
continuously visible reference that disappears in conjunction with it. 
 
 
4.5 Experiment 2: Continuous reference/ 
synchronous offset 
 
4.5.1 Methods 
 
Nineteen subjects (12 female) participated. This experiment was identical to Experiment 
1, except that instead of flashing the reference line, it was visible throughout each trial, 
from the onset to the offset of the dynamic stimulus. The moment of comparison was 
the time at which both stimuli disappeared simultaneously.  
 
 
4.5.2 Results 
 
The results of Experiment 2 are plotted in Figure 4.4, further on. As before, one-sample 
t-tests reveal that the size of the reference stimulus was perceived to lag behind that of 
the dynamic stimulus for both expanding [M = 136.61ms, SD = 89.68, t(18) = 6.64, p < 
.001, d = 3.13] and contracting [M = 209.49ms, SD = 86.18, t(18) = 10.6, p < .001, d = 
5] motion. A paired-samples t-test shows that the forward displacement was larger for 
contracting than expanding motion, t(18) =2.37, p = .029, d = 0.544. For the purpose of 
comparison with the data of Whitaker et al. (1999), the mean percentage of 
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misjudgment of the size of the dynamic stimulus was calculated for expanding and 
contracting motion. This calculation made use of the mean dynamic line length at the 
moment of comparison (11.78°) and the constant rate of size-change (7.3°/s). The size 
of the contracting stimulus was underestimated by approximately 12.98%, while the 
size of the expanding stimulus was overestimated by around 8.47%. In Whitaker et al. 
(1999) these misjudgments were 9.7% and 7.2%, respectively. 
 
 
4.5.3 Discussion 
 
This experiment resulted in the same pattern of findings as Experiment 1, suggesting 
that they were not a product of using flashed reference stimuli. Replicating Whitaker et 
al. (1999), stimuli in both conditions were forwardly displaced in their direction of size-
change. However, extending those findings, it was additionally found that the forward 
displacement during contracting motion was larger than it was during expanding 
motion, echoing the data from the Experiment 1.  
 
As before, these findings are in line with the suggestion that the consistent direction of 
contracting motion and gamma contraction (upon physical disappearance) leads to a 
larger forward displacement than expanding motion prior to sudden offset. However, if 
gamma movement is indeed occurring in the dynamic stimulus, it should also be 
affecting the size percept of the reference stimulus. Take Experiment 2, for example, in 
which both stimuli were visible for the same amount of time, and abruptly disappeared 
in synchrony. If both dynamic and reference stimuli were subject to gamma contraction 
at their offset, their percepts would have raced each other to ‘zero’ size; that is, they 
would have looked more similar to each other than they might have done otherwise. 
This would serve to relatively diminish the apparent forward displacement for 
contracting motion, while augmenting it for expanding motion, thereby resulting in a 
smaller anisotropy. In the next experiment the dynamic stimulus expands or contracts as 
before, and must be compared to the reference at the moment it disappears, but the 
reference is visible continuously, throughout, and for some time after the offset of the 
dynamic line. The prediction is that, if gamma movement is no longer also applied to 
the reference stimulus at the moment of comparison, an even larger forward 
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displacement should be observed for contracting motion, and an even smaller one 
should be seen for expanding motion. 
  
 
4.6 Experiment 3: Continuous reference/ no 
offset 
 
4.6.1 Methods 
 
Fourteen subjects (11 female) participated. This experiment was identical to Experiment 
2 except that the reference line persisted on screen for some time after the 
disappearance of the dynamic line, which was itself jittered randomly between 5 
durations as before. In each trial the reference line was visible for 3100ms, instead of up 
to the moment of comparison, which here was the time at which the dynamic stimulus 
disappeared from screen. Subjects had to wait until both stimuli had disappeared before 
making their response. 
 
 
4.6.2 Results 
 
One-sample t-tests show that the length of both expanding [M = 92.92ms, SD = 80.65, 
t(13) = 4.31, p = .001, d = 2.39] and contracting [M = 273ms, SD = 111.58, t(13) = 
9.16, p < .001, d = 5.08] lines was perceived advanced beyond that of a static reference 
that endured on screen after the moment of comparison. A paired-samples t-test again 
showed that this forward shift was greater for contracting than it was for expanding 
motion, t(13) = 4.66, p < .001, d = 1.259.  
 
To compare the results from Experiment 2 with those from Experiment 3 the data were 
submitted to a 2 × 2 mixed-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), with direction of 
size-change (expanding or contracting) as a within-subjects factor, and experiment (2 or 
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3) as a between-subjects factor (see Figure 4.4). As expected, there was a significant 
main effect of the direction of size change, F(1, 31) = 26.9, p < .001, ηp2 = .465, with 
contracting motion leading to larger forward displacements than expanding motion, but 
no main effect of experiment, F(1, 31) = .22, p = .645, ηp2 = .007. More importantly, 
however, there was a significant interaction between the direction of size change and 
the experiment, F(1, 31) = 4.83, p = .036, ηp2 = .135, showing that the difference 
between the expanding and contracting forward displacements was larger in Experiment 
3 than it had been in Experiment 2. While follow-up t-tests however revealed that the 
differences between the expanding effects from each experiment, t(31) = 1.44, p = .159, 
d = 0.512, and the contracting effects from each experiment, t(31) = 1.85, p = .074, d = 
0.637, were not significant, the effects were nevertheless medium in size (Cohen, 1988). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Mean forward displacements observed in Experiments 2 and 3, in which a 
continuous reference disappeared in synchrony with, or some time after dynamic 
stimulus offset, respectively. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard error. 
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4.6.3 Discussion 
 
It is of particular interest that the anisotropy was larger in Experiment 3, in which the 
reference line persisted on screen after the moment of comparison, than it was in 
Experiment 2, in which the reference line disappeared in conjunction with the dynamic 
line. It is argued here that this is because the reference line was not subject to gamma 
motion at the moment of comparison, on account of it persisting after the dynamic line 
disappeared. Since the reference line appeared longer at the moment of comparison, the 
forward displacement of expanding and contracting lines were relatively diminished and 
enhanced, respectively, leading to a larger anisotropy. This therefore supports the claim 
that gamma contraction is responsible for the forward displacement advantage of 
contracting objects over expanding ones observed consistently in Experiments 1, 2, and 
3. 
 
Earlier it was highlighted that the stimuli in the current experiments involve 
simultaneous motion of the ends of the dynamic lines either towards or away from the 
horizontal meridian of the display. Even though the ends of the lines did not move 
directly towards or away from fixation, the possibility was raised that the greater 
forward shifts seen in contracting stimuli may be due to the ends of the lines moving 
obliquely, ‘more’ towards the fovea than they do in expanding stimuli. This would be 
contrary to the explanation given herein, that contracting objects are biased more 
forwards than expanding objects because gamma contraction upon their disappearance 
works in combination with a more basic forward displacement. Implicit in this 
interpretation is that perceptual systems assume the distal stimulus is a coherent object. 
From this assertion it follows, then, that the anisotropy observed thus far should be 
reduced or eliminated if the dynamic stimulus is not perceived as a single object with an 
expanding or contracting retinal image. The next experiment tests this prediction by 
using the same stimuli as Experiment 1, but presenting only the top and bottom portions 
of each line. Instead of dynamic stimuli being coherent objects that expand or contract, 
they are simply pairs of small squares that translate away from, or towards each other, 
respectively. Gamma motion is the distinct contraction of individual objects, and so 
should not bias such stimuli towards each other upon offset. On the other hand, an 
explanation of the anisotropy invoking an advantage for foveopetal movement would 
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predict that the anisotropy should remain, because retinal motion direction is the same 
relative to fixation. 
 
 
4.7 Experiment 4a: Two translating squares/ 
FTC 
  
4.7.1 Methods 
 
Nine subjects (6 female) participated. This experiment was identical to Experiment 1, 
except that rather than showing the full line stimuli as before, only the uppermost and 
lowermost square sections of the dynamic and reference lines were displayed (see 
Figure 4.5). These squares therefore subtended 0.41° × 0.41° of visual angle, and 
moved vertically in opposite directions - away from each other in the expanding 
condition and towards each other in the contracting condition. As before, the moment of 
comparison was when the dynamic stimuli disappeared in synchrony with the flashed 
reference stimuli. In this case, however, subjects judged whether the left or right pair of 
dots looked more distantly spaced. 
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Figure 4.5. Experiment 4a: Example of square stimuli used. Only objects displayed in 
black were visible during the experiment. Reference stimulus was flashed in synchrony 
with dynamic stimulus offset. 
 
 
4.7.2 Results 
 
The overall results of Experiment 4a are displayed in Figure 4.8, further on. 
Psychometric curves from a representative subject are shown below in Figure 4.6. 
Consistent with previous experiments, one-sample t-tests show that the vertical 
separation of squares moving both away from [M = 80.93ms, SD = 79.41, t(8) = 3.06, p 
= .016, d = 2.162] and towards [M = 109.66ms, SD = 83.37, t(8) = 3.95, p = .004, d = 
2.79] each other was forwardly displaced in the direction of change. However, a paired-
samples t-test shows that the difference in forward displacement between squares 
moving towards and away from each other (equivalent to previous experiments’ 
expanding and contracting conditions, respectively) was not significant, t(8) = .67, p = 
.52, d = 0.224. 
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Figure 4.6. Experiment 4a: Psychometric curves from a representative subject. Negative 
offsets represent flashed stimuli that physically lagged the separation of the dynamic 
stimuli. 
 
 
4.7.3 Discussion 
 
As before, Experiment 4a demonstrates a forward displacement for both directions of 
motion, but unlike in previous experiments, no difference in the magnitude of the 
effects was observed. This implies that when the motion is limited to the end portions of 
the lines, the anisotropy between contracting and expanding (in this case, towards and 
away from each other) disappears. While the motion relative to fixation was the same as 
in Experiment 1, presenting the stimuli as squares translating towards or away from 
each other, rather than as coherent lines, meant that the anisotropy was abolished. This 
is in support of the claim presented earlier that gamma movement is ultimately 
responsible for the greater forward displacement of contracting than expanding stimuli. 
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One should additionally note that the flash-lag effects found here are comparable in size 
to those in Experiment 1. This suggests that expanding or contracting motion was not 
the critical factor in eliciting a flash-lag effect in the FTC in the first experiment. As 
argued earlier, it is more likely to be the result of – simultaneously – a large eccentricity 
and a large separation between moving and flashed stimuli (see Kanai et al., 2004). 
 
Another inference that can be taken from this result is that motion-towards-an-endpoint 
is not sufficient to explain the greater forward displacement in contracting than 
expanding conditions observed in the preceding experiments. Here, when two squares 
moved towards each other such that they appeared as if they would imminently collide, 
no greater flash-lag effect was evident, even though their collision was an implied, 
shared endpoint of their linear motion trajectories. 
 
This experiment has suggested that the larger forward displacement in contracting 
stimuli cannot be explained by way of it being partially confounded with foveopetal 
motion, though another experiment will be useful to further examine this issue. The 
next experiment presents only one of the two squares in motion towards or away from 
the horizontal meridian. The prediction is that, if previously reported forward 
displacement differences between foveopetal and foveofugal motion play no part in the 
current experiments, a single square translating towards the meridian (i.e., ‘more’ 
towards fixation) should not produce a larger flash-lag than a square moving away. 
 
 
4.8 Experiment 4b: Single translating square/ 
FTC 
 
4.8.1 Methods 
 
Ten subjects (8 female) participated. This experiment was identical to Experiment 4a, 
except that only one of the two square end portions of the dynamic line from the 
preceding experiments was presented in any given trial (see Figure 4.7). A single square 
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(0.41° × 0.41°) could thus translate either towards or away from the horizontal 
meridian, in either the upper or lower hemifield (counterbalanced), before a square on 
the opposite side of the screen flashed at its time of offset. Subjects had to report 
whether the left or right square appeared closer to the top (if stimuli were in the upper 
hemifield) or the bottom (if stimuli were in the lower hemifield) of the display.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.7. Experiment 4b: Example of square stimuli used. Only objects displayed in 
black were visible during the experiment. Reference stimulus was flashed in synchrony 
with dynamic stimulus offset. 
 
 
4.8.2 Results 
 
One sample t-tests reveal that squares moving towards the horizontal meridian produced 
a significant flash-lag effect [M = 185.12ms, SD = 142.63, t(9) = 4.1, p = .003, d = 
2.736], but that squares moving away did not [M = 37.22ms, SD = 75.26, t(9) = 1.56, p 
= .152, d = 1.043]. A paired-samples t-test furthermore shows that the difference 
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between these displacements was significant, t(9) = 3.21, p = .011, d = 1.09. The results 
of Experiment 4b are plotted in Figure 4.8. 
 
In order to compare the results of Experiment 4a with Experiment 4b, a 2 × 2 mixed 
measures ANOVA was performed, with direction of motion (away from or towards the 
meridian) as a within-subjects factor and experiment (4a or 4b) as a between-subjects 
factor. There was a main effect of direction of motion, F(1, 17), p = .012, ηp2 = .315, 
with motion towards the horizontal meridian producing a larger effect than motion 
away. There was no main effect of experiment, F(1, 17) = 7.81, p = .64, ηp2 = .013, and 
no interaction between direction of motion and experiment F(1, 17) = 3.56, p = .077, ηp2 
= .173. Independent samples t-tests show that neither the expanding effects from each 
experiment, t(17) = 1.23, p = .235, d = 0.565, nor the contracting effects from each 
experiment, t(17) = 1.39, p = .184, d = 0.646, differed significantly from one another. 
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Figure 4.8. Mean forward displacements observed in Experiments 4a  (two translating 
squares) and 4b (single translating square) when the reference flashed in synchrony with 
dynamic stimulus offset. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard error. 
 
 
4.8.3 Discussion 
 
These results do not fit with the predictions outlined above. While Experiment 4a 
showed that two squares translating vertically towards or away from each other do not 
produce the same flash-lag anisotropy observed with a single line, Experiment 4b has 
shown that when just one of these squares is visible, the anisotropy appears to return. 
The most parsimonious explanation, and that submitted to here, appeals to the 
perceptual similarity of motion towards and away from the meridian with foveopetal 
and foveofugal motion, respectively. That is, to the extent that motion towards the 
meridian is ‘more’ foveopetal than motion away, it should produce a larger flash-lag 
effect. This experiment therefore replicates previous findings in the FTC (Kanai et al., 
2004). The possibility is therefore left open that in Experiments 1-3, motion direction of 
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the ends of the lines relative to the fovea contributed to the magnitude of the observed 
effects. 
 
Why, though, do we see 1), a greater forward displacement in contracting than 
expanding lines (Experiments 1-3); 2), no such anisotropy when only the ends of the 
lines are visible (Experiment 4a); and 3), the reemergence of the anisotropy when only 
one of the ends is presented (Experiment 4b)? It is proposed here that the anisotropy 
evident in Experiments 1-3 is of a different nature to that seen in Experiment 4b. An 
explanation for the former anisotropy was outlined earlier (i.e., gamma motion 
interacting with forward displacements), and a different, simple explanation for the 
anisotropy in Experiment 4b presents itself in the form of direction relative to fixation. 
However, there is reason to believe that these effects are caused by different 
mechanisms, since Experiment 4a does not show a corresponding anisotropy, even 
though it emulates both the line stimuli from Experiments 1-3, and the individual square 
stimuli from Experiment 4b. Prior to Experiment 4a, it was predicted that motion of two 
squares towards each other should not produce a larger forward shift at offset than two 
squares moving away, because the moving stimuli were not a single coherent object. 
This argument stands, though an explanation is required for why the findings should be 
incongruent with those in Experiment 4b. Consider that in Experiment 4b, two dynamic 
stimuli were seen on each trial, each moving in opposite directions. It has been shown 
that motion in one part of the visual field can influence the perception of motion 
(Murakami & Shimojo, 1993; Ramachandran & Cavanagh, 1987; Whitney & 
Cavanagh, 2002) and position (Durant & Johnston, 2004; Whitney & Cavanagh, 2000a; 
Whitney, 2002) in other regions. It has further been demonstrated that the magnitude of 
the flash-lag effect depends on motion in distant parts of the visual field (Maiche, 
Budelli, & Gómez-Sena, 2007; Shioiri et al., 2010). It is not implausible, therefore, that 
motion in one region can also affect the forward shift magnitude of a stimulus in 
another part. In Experiment 4a, in particular, the upwards motion of one square may 
have interfered with the forward displacement of the other, downwards moving square, 
and vice versa. If this interference effect was greater when the squares moved towards 
each other than when they moved away it would explain why the flash-lag effects did 
not differ, but were of comparable size overall to those in Experiment 1 (i.e., the full 
line equivalent of Experiment 4a). So, it is argued that a foveopetal advantage may not 
have manifested in Experiment 4a as it did in Experiment 4b because of the presence of 
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two stimuli translating in opposite directions. However, making this case precludes the 
earlier suggestion that the null result in Experiment 4a disproves that a bias relative to 
fixation is at the heart of the anisotropies seen in Experiments 1-3. Further research on 
this would therefore be required. 
 
As mentioned earlier, it has been reported that foveopetal motion results in a larger 
flash-lag effect than foveofugal movement, both when the moving stimulus disappears 
with the flash (FTC; Kanai et al., 2004), and when it carries on after the flash (full-
cycle; Mateeff & Hohnsbein, 1988; Shi & Nijhawan, 2008). In light of the latter of 
these two findings, if the direction of motion relative to the fovea is responsible for a 
larger forward displacement in contracting than expanding lines, this should be the case 
in both the FTC, and full-cycle flash-lag displays. Conversely, it has been suggested 
here that the forward displacement of contracting (expanding) objects is augmented 
(reduced) when they suddenly disappear due to gamma contraction. If this is the case, 
size-changing stimuli that do not disappear at the moment of comparison should not 
display the same anisotropy as those that do. The next experiment therefore uses a full-
cycle flash-lag display, in which the expanding or contracting line continues after the 
moment of comparison (i.e., a flashed line). This experiment is comparable to that of 
Kafaligönül et al. (2010), who found a greater effect for expanding than contracting 
lines, which they attributed to its perceptual similarity to looming motion, which leads 
to a greater flash-lag than receding motion (Harris et al., 2006). It may be expected, 
then, that this experiment will also produce a greater forward displacement for 
expanding than contracting stimuli, which would oppose the suggestion that the 
findings of Experiments 1-3 are the result of motion direction relative to fixation. At the 
same time, such a finding would conflict with the possibility mentioned earlier that 
motion-towards-an-endpoint, per se, results in larger forward displacements. Since a 
contracting line still has an implied point of disappearance regardless of whether it 
abruptly disappears before reaching it, this perspective would predict that it should yield 
a greater flash-lag. 
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4.9 Experiment 5: Full-cycle flash-lag 
 
4.9.1 Methods 
 
Ten subjects (6 female) participated. This experiment was very similar to Experiment 1, 
in that a line expanded or contracted on one side of the screen before another line 
flashed on the other side. Here, however, the dynamic line continued in its direction of 
size-change after the flash, so that it was on screen for a full 3100ms. As in previous 
experiments, the timing of the flash was jittered randomly between 5 times to prevent it 
becoming predictable. Pilot observations suggested that, on the whole, this experiment 
would produce larger forward displacements than the previous experiments. 
Accordingly, the spread of offsets of the reference from the dynamic stimulus was 
increased to better measure the flash-lag effect. The length of the flashed line could 
therefore differ from the dynamic stimulus by -258ms, -129ms, 0ms, +129ms, +258ms, 
+388ms, or +517ms of size-change. The moment of comparison was the time of the 
flash, and subjects gave their responses after both stimuli had disappeared from screen. 
 
 
4.9.2 Results 
 
One-sample t-tests show that both expanding [M = 346.52ms, SD = 125.72, t(9) = 8.72, 
p < .001, d = 5.811] and contracting [M = 279.05ms, SD = 110.54, t(9) = 7.98, p < .001, 
d = 5.322] lines produced significant flash-lag effects. Although there was a tendency, a 
paired-samples t-test shows that the difference between the flash-lag effects in the two 
directions was not significant, t(9) = 1.03, p = .331, d = 0.325. Psychometric curves 
from a representative subject are plotted in Figure 4.9, and the mean flash-lag effects 
across all subjects are plotted in Figure 4.10. 
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Figure 4.9. Experiment 5. Psychometric curves from a representative subject. Negative 
offsets represent flashed stimuli that physically lagged the size of the dynamic stimuli. 
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Figure 4.10. Mean forward displacements observed in Experiment 5, in which the 
reference flashed partway through the dynamic stimulus animation. Error bars indicate 
± 1 standard error. 
 
 
4.9.3 Discussion  
 
That the flash-lag effects were considerably larger in this full-cycle experiment than 
they were in the FTC (Experiment 1) is consistent with the finding that, when a flash-
lag effect is elicited in the FTC, it is smaller than it could have been if motion continued 
after the flash (Kanai et al., 2004). 
 
More interestingly, these findings show unequivocally that, when a size-changing 
stimulus does not disappear at the moment of comparison, a contracting line produces 
no greater effect than an expanding line. In fact, in this full-cycle flash-lag experiment 
the effect was slightly in the opposite direction, though not significantly so. While the 
ends of the lines moved – as before – towards or away from the horizontal meridian, 
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there was no forward displacement advantage of one direction over the other. Since it 
has been shown that foveopetal motion leads to a greater flash-lag than foveofugal 
motion (Mateeff & Hohnsbein, 1988; Shi & Nijhawan, 2008), the implication is that 
this factor is not responsible for the greater forward displacement of contracting lines 
observed in Experiments 1-3. That is, in the present experiment, the ends of the 
dynamic line still moved towards or away from the meridian (‘more’ or ‘less’ towards 
fixation, respectively), but these two directions produced similarly sized effects. In 
discussing Experiment 4b, it was argued that Experiment 4a was, in hindsight, not a 
good control for the possibility that contraction and expansion had been confounded 
with foveopetal and foveofugal motion in Experiments 1-3. The findings of Experiment 
5, however, suggest more strongly that this was not the case, and more broadly, that 
contraction and expansion produce a different class of motion percept to linear 
translation. 
 
In accord with the null result of Experiment 4a, however, the current finding suggests 
that motion-towards-an-endpoint is not, in itself, what leads to a relatively enhanced 
forward shift in contracting lines in Experiments 1-3, since contracting motion in this 
experiment also had an implied endpoint.  
 
How does continuation of the animations after the flash lead to similar contracting and 
expanding motion effect? As mentioned earlier, it has been demonstrated elsewhere that 
abruptly disappearing stimuli are perceived to quickly shrink in size (e.g., Kenkel, 
1913). The sudden disappearance of the stimulus that was previously contracting 
enhances its forward displacement. When considered alongside the strong advantage for 
contracting motion seen in Experiment 1, the present null-result is in support of this 
position. Here, the moving stimulus did not disappear at the moment subjects had to 
make a perceptual comparison. This prevented the occurrence of high-speed gamma 
contraction that would have resulted in stimulus disappearance, and thus reduced the 
magnitude of the flash-lag effect. Additionally, that the flash-lag of the expanding line 
was considerably larger than it had been in any of the preceding experiments suggests 
that its forward displacement was not perceptually cut-short by gamma contraction at 
disappearance, as was the case previously.  
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The current finding is also consistent with that mentioned earlier, that full-cycle motion 
with expanding and contracting lines leads to a larger expanding than contracting flash-
lag effect (Kafaligönül et al., 2010). While the difference between the directions did not 
reach significance here, the discrepancy between the present findings and those of 
Kafaligönül et al. (2010) is really one of degree, rather than kind, and could have been 
due to inconsistencies between the two sets of stimuli, such as the larger eccentricity 
used in the current studies.  
 
 
4.10 General Discussion 
 
The preceding experiments have shown that a contracting object that abruptly 
disappears at the moment of perceptual comparison is perceived further along its 
trajectory than a similar object that had previously been expanding. Conversely, when a 
size-changing stimulus continues after the moment of comparison, whether it had been 
contracting or expanding makes little difference. It is argued here that gamma 
movement (Kenkel, 1913), a form of apparent motion, adds to the underlying forward 
displacement of contracting stimuli upon disappearance, and subtracts from it in 
expanding stimuli. This explains the forward shift advantage for contracting stimuli 
when they disappear at the moment of comparison, and the lack of such when they do 
not. This account was outlined in part earlier on, though a more detailed overview will 
be given now of both gamma movement, and why it should differentially affect the 
forward displacements of formerly contracting and expanding images. Further 
discussion will then be given of the nature of gamma movement, and a novel 
interpretation will be proposed that aligns it with other apparent motion phenomena. 
 
When something instantaneously vanishes, its percept undergoes a rapid contraction 
(Baldwin & Tinsley, 1965; Bartley & Wilkinson, 1953; Bartley, 1936, 1941; Hartmann, 
1938; Kanizsa, 1979; Kenkel, 1913; Lindemann, 1938; Winters, Jr. & Gerjuoy, 1965; 
Winters, Jr., 1964). This phenomenon was first studied formally by Kenkel (1913), who 
gave it the term gamma movement, in light of its parallels with other forms of apparent 
motion, such as alpha and beta phenomena. Studies showed that when a stimulus was 
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illuminated for a brief period of time, its onset and offset were accompanied, 
respectively, by apparent expansion and contraction (e.g., Bartley, 1941; Hartmann, 
1938; Lindemann, 1938). Though initial experiments used very subjective, introspective 
measures of perceived motion, such as asking subjects to report whether they were 
seeing the movement or not, later studies used more robust psychophysical methods. 
Winters, Jr. (1964), for instance, presented a circle, followed after 800ms by another 
circle. After a further 200ms, both circles disappeared simultaneously. Subjects tended 
to estimate that the later-appearing circle had been larger than the initial circle, even 
when it had actually been identical, or even slightly smaller. This was in spite of the 
subsequent finding that stimuli of longer duration tend to be perceived as larger (e.g., 
Thomas & Cantor, 1975). The conclusion was that since the later stimulus had more 
recently appeared, it was still in the process of gamma expansion at the time the two 
objects had to be compared, and was thus perceived as larger.  
 
It follows from the reasoning of Winters, Jr. (1964), mentioned above, that if the final 
size of a recently disappeared object must be judged, the ongoing process of gamma 
contraction will make it appear smaller than its actual size at offset. Additionally, as has 
been shown previously (Whitaker et al., 1999), and replicated in the present 
experiments, the final sizes of expanding and contracting stimuli are biased in their 
direction of size-change. So, for example, contracting stimuli are perceived smaller at 
offset than they actually are. The argument to be made here to explain the current 
findings was also given, in part, in the discussion of Experiment 1 (Section 4.4.3). It 
was suggested there that the greater forward shift for contracting stimuli stems from the 
consistent direction of perceived size-change between ‘real’ contraction and ‘illusory’ 
gamma contraction (see Figure 4.11). That is, when something is contracting and 
suddenly disappears, it is seen to continue contracting (through gamma motion), if at a 
higher rate. The specific explanation given here, then, is that when something is 
contracting towards a vanishing point, and gamma motion expedites its transit to that 
destination, a larger forward displacement is seen. When something expands before 
disappearing, however, its direction of perceived size-change reverses at the time of 
offset. So, while there is still a forward displacement in the direction of pre-offset 
motion, it is comparatively reduced because it is cut-short by gamma contraction 
working in opposition. In such a case the forward displacement is diminished because 
gamma contraction subtracts from its magnitude. It is claimed, then, that motion-
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towards-an-endpoint alone is not sufficient to explain the current set of results, but that 
motion-towards-an-endpoint working in conjunction with a percept that helps it reach 
that endpoint more quickly (gamma motion) provides a robust account. 
 
 
Figure 4.11. Schematic diagram of the proposed relationship between perceived size of 
the dynamic stimulus and time in Experiments 1-3. Note that in the lower pane the 
direction of perceived size change is consistent before and after the sudden offset. 
 
 
A further possibility that does not rely on the occurrence of full gamma motion (i.e., 
contraction down to ‘zero’ size), is that local motion signals arise at the locations of the 
edges of a recently disappeared stimulus and are interpreted as contraction. Indeed, 
Grossberg and Rudd (1992) have put forward a similar account to explain gamma 
motion in general. Whether a recently disappeared stimulus is perceived to contract 
partially (due to real motion signals) or fully (due to apparent motion) is a question for 
future research.  
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4.10.1 The nature of gamma movement 
 
There has been little recent attention given to the processes underlying gamma 
movement. Originally, the Gestaltists explained it as a central psychological 
phenomenon that occurs whenever a figure emerges on, or disappears from, a 
background (e.g., Harrower, 1929; Hartmann, 1938; Kenkel, 1913; Koffka, 1935; 
Lindemann, 1938). This was later challenged by accounts owing the percept to more 
peripheral aspects of the visual system (e.g., Baldwin & Tinsley, 1965; Bartley & 
Wilkinson, 1953; Bartley, 1936, 1941). Since these interpretations were put forward, 
however, the nature of gamma movement has received little attention. Here a novel 
explanation is given that is consistent with a wide range of well-established phenomena 
in the apparent motion literature.  
 
Let us first consider a type of phenomenon closely related to gamma movement, which 
has been variously termed polarised gamma motion (Kanizsa, 1979), line motion 
(Hikosaka, Miyauchi, & Shimojo, 1993), motion induction (Faubert & von Grünau, 
1995; von Grünau & Faubert, 1994), and more generally, either transformational 
apparent motion (Tse, Cavanagh, & Nakayama, 1998; Tse & Logothetis, 2002; Tse, 
2006) or morphing (Baloch & Grossberg, 1997; Holcombe, 2003). Hikosaka and 
colleagues provided a good example when they showed that if a square is flashed, 
promptly followed by the uniform instantaneous appearance of a line, with one end 
abutting the square’s location, the line is seen to expand into existence from the end 
nearest the square (Hikosaka et al., 1993). So, as with gamma motion, an abruptly 
appearing stimulus is seen to expand in a continuous motion. Several authors have 
claimed that this illusion is best described as a manifestation of processes attempting to 
determine the most likely external cause of perceptual events (e.g. Downing & 
Treisman, 1997; Holcombe, 2003; Tse et al., 1998; Tse & Logothetis, 2002; Tse, 2006). 
Consistently, Tse and Logothetis (2002) provided evidence that this type of motion can 
be perceived to extend out of the picture plane, in depth, implying that a full three-
dimensional object representation is involved. More recently this has been supported by 
functional neuroimaging data that suggest an interaction between high-level form 
(posterior fusiform gyrus) and motion (V5/hMT+) processing cortical areas during the 
perception of transformational apparent motion (Tse, 2006).  
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Expanding on this position, it is proposed here that gamma movement stems from the 
visual system’s attempt to disambiguate the state of objects in the environment. As an 
interpretation of apparent motion in general, this is backed by a substantial literature. 
For example, if the displacement between two alternating stimuli is great, the rate of 
alternation that produces optimal apparent motion must be proportionately low (Korte, 
1915) – as would be expected if a single physical object moved across the same 
distance in space. Other findings have accumulated to suggest that the objects and paths 
of apparent motion are governed by the principles that underpin the motion of real-
world objects (Attneave & Block, 1973; Bundesen et al., 1983; Farrell & Shepard, 
1981; Foster, 1975; Shepard & Cooper, 1982; Shepard & Judd, 1976; Shepard & Zare, 
1983; Shepard, 1981). 
 
It has been argued that since we have evolved in an environment populated by 
persistent, rigid, three-dimensional objects, we are also inclined to interpret discrete, 
successive views of things in these terms (Shepard, 1981). On this account, apparent 
motion occurs because the brain easily accepts the disappearance and appearance of 
stimuli as representing the start and end positions of continuously moving objects. 
Shepard (1984) took a Helmholtzian likelihood approach to explain this, suggesting that 
the visual system internalises statistical regularities inherent in the environment in order 
to disambiguate the external state of things. The idea is that if something is unclear, the 
perceptual system will seek an interpretation by referring back to prior experience. 
How, though, does this apply to an interpretation of gamma motion? Consider first that 
our visual systems have not developed in an environment in which stimuli 
instantaneously vanish. When the images disappear from the retina, it tends to be at the 
end of a continuous process of contraction. Additionally, distal objects themselves do 
not tend to pop out of existence instantaneously; they will usually become less visible 
before becoming invisible, as when moving behind an occluder. Contraction of a retinal 
image is therefore predictive of that image’s imminent disappearance, and more 
generally, of the disappearance from view of the distal object it represents. If a stimulus 
is presented electronically, however, it can be made to instantly vanish without any 
gradual retinal diminishment, even though this is something that does not occur 
naturally. It is suggested therefore that, in the absence of a more likely interpretation, an 
object that suddenly appears or disappears is perceived to expand or contract because 
the visual system associates these respective phenomena. Thinking about this in terms 
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of the states of distal objects, the most likely perceptual solution to something that has 
abruptly appeared or disappeared is that it has rapidly approached or receded away from 
the observer. This final point is consistent with the observation that gamma movement 
is easily perceived as motion in depth (e.g., Allen & Kolers, 1981; Bartley, 1941; 
Kanizsa, 1979). 
 
It is worth briefly noting that the present results represent only the second instance (as 
far as is known) of an ‘objective’ measure of gamma motion. As mentioned earlier, 
previous investigations (e.g., Bartley, 1941) made use of subjective, introspective 
methods to probe the effect, which are vulnerable to considerable bias. Like Winters, Jr. 
(1964), the current experiments employed a binary choice method of constant stimuli, 
though improving on that earlier study, psychometric functions were also fit to do the 
data and used to estimate PSEs. It is suggested that the current method of examining 
differences in the forward displacements of size-changing, disappearing stimuli may 
rekindle interest in the study of gamma motion, which has received little attention for 
many years. 
 
In summary then, this study provides three key contributions. First, it is shown that the 
little-studied phenomenon of gamma motion interacts with forward displacement 
effects, which have been of considerable interest to vision scientists in recent times. 
More specifically, gamma motion is found to enhance a forward shift when the two 
percepts work in a consistent direction. Secondly, it is argued that gamma contraction 
occurs in general because the visual system is naïve to instantaneous disappearance, and 
so infers that the recently vanished object actually rapidly receded. Finally, the 
methodology used herein provides an objective measure of gamma motion, which may 
be adopted in further study of its effects elsewhere. 
 
 
4.10.2 Future directions 
 
A number of avenues of research pertaining to the current finding and claims could be 
pursued. For example, one could look in more detail at the possibility that the motion 
direction of the ends of the stimuli impact the magnitude of the anisotropy. Similar 
	   180 
experiments in which size-change occurs in two dimensions could help with this. Such a 
method would mean that opposing edges of the dynamic stimulus move simultaneously 
in foveopetal and foveofugal directions, and would thereby control for motion direction 
relative to fixation. This may not be a full solution though, because evidence suggests 
that forward displacements are greater in the periphery than in central vision (e.g., 
Kanai et al., 2004). Thus it might be expected that the forward shift of the more 
peripheral edge of the stimulus would be greater than that of the more central edge 
moving in the opposite direction. Another approach would be to use stimuli similar to 
those used here but to shift them up or down on the screen, so that both ends of the 
stimuli are not moving simultaneously foveopetally or foveofugally. 
 
To investigate further where gamma contraction is at the heart of the forward 
displacement anisotropy observed in Experiments 1-3, further experiments could look at 
whether the anisotropy is present when neither stimulus disappears at the moment of 
comparison. This could be done with similar expanding and contracting stimuli, and a 
continuous, static reference stimulus off to one side visible for the same epoch as the 
dynamic stimulus. Instead of signalling the moment of comparison by having one of the 
stimuli flash or disappear, it could be signified by, for instance, a change of colour of 
the background, or the flashing of a third stimulus. Here there would be no gamma 
contraction in the stimuli to be compared, and so it would be predicted that there should 
be no difference in forward displacement between expanding and contracting motion. 
 
 
4.11 Conclusions 
 
A series of experiments has been reported that show expanding lines produce a smaller 
forward displacement in their direction of size change at offset than do contracting 
lines. This was not the case when only the end portions of the lines were visible, or 
when the dynamic lines did not disappear at the moment of comparison. It was argued 
that the latter of these findings, in particular, suggests that the larger forward 
displacement in contracting lines in the preceding experiments was not due to the 
direction of motion of the ends of the lines towards fixation. Instead, it was suggested 
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that the rapid apparent contraction (gamma motion) of abruptly disappearing stimuli 
adds to the forward displacement of contracting lines and subtracts from the forward 
displacement of expanding lines. Put differently, while contracting lines have an 
implied endpoint, which is reached all the more quickly via gamma motion at sudden 
offset, expanding lines have no clear endpoint, and gamma motion at offset works in 
opposition to their forward displacement. A novel interpretation of gamma motion was 
also offered on the basis of a wealth of literature that suggests objects and paths of 
apparent motion are disambiguated on the basis of the ways that objects in the world 
tend to endure and move. In terms of gamma motion, it was thus argued that the visual 
system’s unfamiliarity with sudden disappearance leads to an interpretation on the basis 
of statistical regularities in the ways that distal objects tend to project upon the retina as 
they move in 3-D space. Finally, the methodology introduced here can be easily adopted 
for the ‘objective’ study of a long known effect (gamma motion) that has not just 
received scant attention in recent times, but also most of the studies on it have used a 
subjective method of introspection. 
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